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This research thesis presents the simulation of fire growth and flame spread within a 
metro train in an underground trainway using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model. The motivation of the study is to 
predict the heat release rate (HRR) and specifically the peak value for emergency 
tunnel ventilation system design. Even though currently there are several methods that 
can be used to estimate the HRR for a metro train, it appears that the current methods 
cannot realistically predict the HRR because factors such as the burning behaviour of 
materials; and/or the train and tunnel geometries that affect the HRR are not 
considered. This project attempts to incorporate these factors in the FDS model.  
 
The study evaluated the design of metro trains proposed for the new Circle Line under 
construction in Singapore. In this research, two modelling approaches were proposed. 
The first modelling approach prescribed the Cone Calorimeter heat release rate per 
unit area (HRRPUA) while the other prescribed the heat of vaporisation. The 
difference between the two is the prescribed constant which governed the rate of 
pyrolysis. Cone Calorimeter tests were conducted for the surface exposed materials to 
evaluate the train car materials’ reaction to fire and to derive the material properties 
for input into the FDS model. 
 
In this research, three common fire scenarios have been identified for simulation. 
They were fire on top of the seat (arson), fire in the corner (arson and electrical fault) 
and undercarriage fire (electrical fault). The common fire scenarios were expanded to 
account for ventilation factors. A total of 13 credible fire scenarios were investigated.   
 
As it has been found that prescribing the material properties values derived from the 
Cone Calorimeter test data were not able to accurately predict the ignition and fire 
growth for the materials simulated. A combination of derived and calibrated 






In the final simulations, the two modelling approaches predicted the same fire severity 
for different fire scenarios. The simulations indicated that it is important to prevent 
direct airflow through the train compartment as it may support fire spread if there is a 
large ignition source. The simulations also indicated that for a scenario that will 
progress to flashover under the influence of high ventilation airflow velocity, the fire 
spread to adjacent cars will be very rapid if there is no door installed between the 
metro train cars. 
 
Two peak HRR values have been proposed for the design of emergency tunnel 
ventilation system for the metro train under consideration based on the simulations. 
A peak HRR value of 5 MW has been proposed for a metro train fire at the station 
trackway and a peak HRR value of 10 MW has been proposed for a metro train fire in 
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A  Pre-exponential factor  m/s 
AA  Annular area (i.e. tunnel cross-sectional 
area minus train cross-sectional area) 
 m2 
surA   Surface area   m
2 
C  Empirical constant (Equation 3.11)   - 
calibC  Calibration constant (Equation 8.1)  kg
0.5m0.5K0.5 
connatC  Coefficient for natural convection   - 
c   Specific heat   kJ/kgK 
pc   Specific heat of ambient air at constant 
pressure 
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E  Amount of energy released by complete 
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A mass rapid transit or metro system is a public transportation system, using electric-
powered rolling stock running in its own right-of-way on guideway facilities at-grade, 
underground, or elevated, free from interference with other ground traffic, to transport 
large volumes of passengers at high speeds and with short headway, in the city and its 
adjacent areas. In many cases, at least a portion of the rails are placed in tunnels dug 
beneath the surface of a city in which case the system may be called the subway or the 
underground (Anon 2004a).   
 
Metro systems are being recognised as an effective and efficient way to solve 
transport problems in congested cities and new lines are being planned and built 
throughout the world. In designing a metro system, fire safety is one of the high 
priorities in view of the volume of passengers being transported. It is even more vital 
if the system is built underground as fire incident in an underground trainway is 
considerably different from fire in a building in term of fire development, evacuation 
and rescue operations (Wolinska 2002).       
 
For a metro train fire, it is important that the emergency tunnel ventilation system is 
able to control the direction of smoke movement in order to provide a clear and safe 
path for evacuation of passengers and to facilitate fire-fighting operations. In a tunnel, 
the predominant method for achieving this objective is for the emergency tunnel 
ventilation system to develop sufficient longitudinal airflow movement past the fire 
site so that all the smoke and hot gases will be forced in an opposite direction of 
evacuation (Hettinger and Barnett 1991). This is usually achieved by operating the 
emergency tunnel ventilation system in a push-pull ventilation mode whereby 
ventilation fans at one end of the tunnel will be in supply mode and the other end in 
extraction mode (Luk 2004). The design criterion is to maintain an annular airflow 
rate past the fire site higher than the critical velocity to prevent the upper layer of 
heated air from flowing in the direction opposite to the forced ventilation 
(a phenomenon called “back-layering”) which will hinder the safe evacuation of 
passengers. 





For a metro train fire at the station trackway i.e. the section of track next to the station 
platform, one of the ventilation strategies is to operate the tunnel ventilation fans at 
both ends of the station in extraction mode to extract the smoke and hot gases 
generated from the fire (Luk 2004) so that to maintain a tenable environment along 
the means of escape within the station (Chua 2003).   
 
The capacity of the emergency tunnel ventilation system must be adequately designed 
to cope with the most onerous/ worst case train fire scenarios in the tunnel and at the 
station trackway. In the design, the fire heat release rate (HRR) generated from the 
burning train is one of the key parameters that dictates the air velocity i.e. the critical 
velocity required to prevent back-layering (Hettinger and Barnett 1991). It is also one 
of the parameters that determines the performance of the emergency tunnel ventilation 
system (Chua 2003). The HRR value is dependent upon the quantity and nature of the 
combustible materials in the metro train car, the physical configuration of the metro 
train (i.e. length, width, size of windows, and doors, etc), and the type of metro train 
car construction (Hettinger and Barnett 1991) and is the single most important factor 
contributing to the fire severity (Babrauskas and Peacock 1992).  
 
Although many metro systems/lines have already been built worldwide, there is little 
known of the actual HRR of a metro train. Several methods of determining the HRR 
exist. The most common method involves taking the complete fire load and dividing it 
by an assumed time. The assumed time is taken from the historical observations of 
actual metro train fires.  
 
Another method involves summation of HRR per unit area (HRRPUA) of surface 
materials. The HRRPUA for all the surface materials are obtained from small-scale 
tests e.g. Cone Calorimeter tests (ASTM-E-1354 2004; ISO-5660-1:2002; ISO-5660-
2:2002; ISO-5660-3:2003; NFPA-271 2004 edition).  
 
There are also attempts to use a post-flashover zone model to predict the HRR of a 
metro train. The design assumes the fire is ventilation controlled and therefore has a 
constant burning rate.  





The above methods do not consider the burning behaviour of materials; and/or do not 
consider the physical configuration of the metro train, the type of metro train car 
construction and the tunnel geometry.    
 
Some designers determine the HRRs of major items such as car seat and lining materials. 
The HRRs of these major items are either obtained by conducting a series of tests or from 
references; or derived from the fire load of these major items. The HRR of the metro train 
is then estimated by analysis. Among the methods used to determine the HRRs of major 
items, conducting fire tests are considered to be the most appropriate but conducting full-
scale fire tests are expensive. Furthermore the HRRs obtained from the open-air burning 
experiments may not represent the HRRs in the metro train compartment and the tunnel 
environment because of radiant heat feedback from the fire and the influence of airflow 
from the emergency tunnel ventilation system.    
 
1.1 Impetus for the research 
 
It appears that the current methods cannot realistically predict the HRR of a metro train in 
an underground trainway. A new method/approach that incorporates factors that affect the 
HRR of a metro train needs to be developed.   
 
This research project attempts to use computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model to 
simulate fire growth and flame spread within a metro train in an underground trainway. 
The motivation of the study is to predict the HRR and specifically the peak HRR for 
emergency tunnel ventilation system design. Cone Calorimeter tests will be conducted for 
the exposed surface materials in the metro train. Materials’ thermo-physical properties 
will be derived using existing procedures for input into a CFD model.  
 
A CFD model is chosen instead of zone model because of the complexity in the metro 
train geometry. CFD modelling can be time consuming but it is currently the most state-
of-the-art tool used by the fire engineering community. CFD modelling is not new in the 
transportation industries as it is a common tool used to check on the effectiveness of 
emergency tunnel ventilation design (using a pre-defined HRR) (Könnecke and Schneider 
2004; Sinai 2004). 





The CFD model used in this research is Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) Version 4 
developed by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FDS is used 
because it is currently the most advanced and widely used CFD model for fire 
simulation (VTT 2003) and is available in the public domain. The author recognises 
that fire growth modelling is still in its infancy. However, extensive studies have been 
carried out to validate FDS predictions of fire growth and flame spread e.g. Liang 
(2002); Hietaniemi et al. (2004). FDS has also been successfully used to reconstruct 
several fire incidents e.g. Madrzykowski, et al. (2002); Vettori et al. (2002); 
McGrattan and Hamins (2003). The results from those studies are promising. This 
raises the level of confidence in using FDS to carry out this research. Detailed review 
of validation work of FDS can be found in McGrattan (2004).  
 
Besides predicting the HRR, this research project also allows us to gain valuable 
insight and understanding of how fire may grow, spread and develop in a underground 
trainway which may be useful in planning evacuation and fire fighting procedures and 
designing fire safety systems for metro systems by eliminating guess work on the fire 
development.   
 
1.2 Objective of this research 
 
The objectives of this research project are:  
a) Identify and incorporate factors that affect fire development of a metro train in 
an underground trainway into the FDS model.  
b) Identify credible fire scenarios for a metro train for simulation.  
c) Evaluate the metro train car materials’ reaction to fire and derive the 
materials’ thermo-physical properties from Cone Calorimeter test data.  
d) Carry out FDS simulation to examine the fire growth and flame spread within 
a metro train in and underground trainway and to predict the HRR.  
 





1.3  Limitation of this research 
 
In this research, the physical configuration of the metro train, the type of metro train 
car construction and tunnel geometries are based on the new Circle Line (CCL) under 
construction in Singapore. This is because the author is familiar with the project as he 
has been involved in the design stage.  The other reasons are because the drawings for 
the CCL metro train and tunnel are made available and the exposed surface material 
samples for the CCL metro train are provided by the Land Transport Authority 
(LTA), Singapore for the study.   
 
No full-scale fire test has been conducted to verify the modelling results. This is due 
to the cost involved in burning a metro train; and lack of facilities and equipment that 
are required to conduct the full-scale test. However, HRR estimations based on 
existing methods are used to compare the modelling results. 
 
Because the material properties derived from Cone Calorimeter test data are used as 
input into the CFD model, the main assumptions made for the simulations are: 
a) The thermal properties such as the thermal conductivity and the specific heat 
are constant.  
b) The heat release rate properties such as the heat of combustion and the heat of 
vaporisation (gasification) are constant. Time average values are derived from 
the Cone Calorimeter test data and are used.   
c) The burning behaviour of materials in the real fire scenario is the same as the 
small-scale tests.  
 





1.4 Organisation of this report 
 
This report consists of 12 Chapters. Chapter 2 presents the literature reviewed. 
Chapter 3 outlines the main assumptions and equations behind FDS to give a brief 
overview and broad understanding of the concepts behind the fire model. The 
underlying theory of FDS in predicting fire growth and flame spread will also be 
described.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the approach taken in this research. Chapter 5 gives a brief 
description of the CCL metro train and tunnel. Chapter 6 discusses the possible fire 
scenarios for the CCL metro train. The credible fire scenarios are identified for FDS 
simulation.  Chapter 7 describes the trial simulations carried out. The trial simulations 
serve two purposes:  
a) Carry out grid sensitivity study to decide on the grid size to be used for the 
final simulations.  
b) Identify any unforeseen issue or problem that may be encountered during the 
simulations.   
 
Chapter 8 describes the Cone Calorimeter tests. It also describes the procedures to 
derive the Cone Calorimeter heat release rates and the thermo-physical properties of 
the materials. The observations during the tests and the results will also be presented. 
In Chapter 9, FDS predictions of Cone Calorimeter test results will be covered.  
 
Chapter 10 presents the HRR calculations based on the current methods. The 
estimations serve as baseline for comparison with the final simulation results. Then 
Chapter 11 describes the final simulations; presents and discusses the final simulation 












2 Literature review 
 
The literature review focuses on metro trains rather than all pubic transport vehicles. 
However in some Sections, studies from other public transport vehicles are covered 
because they provide useful information and/ or are considered relevant to this 
research project.   
 
There are four parts in this Chapter. Part one reports the HRRs based on full-scale 
tests conducted. It also reports the HRRs during actual train fire incidents as quoted in 
various literature. Part two reviews and comments on the current methods of 
estimating the HRR for a metro train; and gives a summary of the peak HRR values 
adopted by various metro lines for the emergency tunnel ventilation system design. 
Part three reviews the research programs related to fire safety studies of rail cars and 
part four reviews the other studies relevant to this research project.   
 
2.1 HRRs of metro trains – From full-scale tests and historical 
observations 
 
2.1.1 Full-scale tests - EUREKA project (EUREKA 1995; Ingason et al. 
1994) 
 
SP-Fire Technology conducted a series of full-scale tests of vehicles (a passenger 
train car, a bus, a metro train car, a simulated truck load) and two wood crib tests in a 
tunnel (Ingason et al. 1994).  The study was a joint project between nine western 
European countries with a project name EUREKA EU 499 “Fires in Tunnels” 
(EUREKA 1995). The tunnel used for the fire tests was a 2.3 km long abandoned 
copper-mine in north Norway. The main layout of the tunnel is shown in Figure 2.1. 





Figure 2.1: Layout and typical cross-section of the tunnel (reproduced from Ingason et 
al. (1994)) 
 
The HRRs for the fire tests were calculated using oxygen consumption technique. 
Among the six fire tests, only one test (one of the wood crib tests) was carried out 
with forced ventilation. The difference in peak HRR for the wood cribs tests, with and 
without forced ventilation, was found to be substantial. The full-scale tests for the 
passenger train car (Intercity train), the metro train car and the wood cribs tests are 
discussed below. 
 
Passenger train car (Intercity train) 
The passenger train car was 20.6 m long by 2.7 m wide and 3 m high. The number of 
seats was 80 and the total fire load of the seats was nearly 9000 MJ (note that the type 
of seat was not stated in the report). The fire load for the train car was calculated to be 
77000 MJ. The ignition source was 7.3 litres of isopropanol, corresponding to 200 MJ, 
which is the fire load of one seat (Richter and Vauquelin 1994). The HRR reached 
13.5 MW after 25 minutes with a second peak of 12 MW after 100 minutes. The heat 
release rate curve is shown in Figure 2.2. 
 





Figure 2.2: HRR curve for a passenger train car (reproduced from Ingason et al. 
(1994)) 
 
From the HRR curve, it can be seen that the passenger train car has not burnt out even 
after 130 minutes. This might be due to the high fire load content of the passenger 
train car. A total heat released of 58500 MJ was estimated by integrating the HRR 
curve from 0 to 130 minutes. This total heat released value was approximately 80% of 
the total fire load estimated for the passenger train car. However, this total heat 
released value was likely to be underestimated since the passenger train car was still 
releasing high amount of energy at 130 minutes. 
 
Metro train car 
The metro train car was 18 m long by 2.8 m wide and 3 m high made of aluminium. 
The number of seats was 40 and they were made of polyurethane foam covered with 
textiles (note that the type of textiles was not stated in the report). The total fire load 
of the seats was calculated to be 6000 MJ whereas the total fire load of the metro train 
car was calculated to be 41300 MJ. Two ignition source sizes were quoted by two 
independent references. Richter and Vauquelin (1994) quoted 0.77 litres of 
isopropanol while FIT Workpackage2 (2003) quoted 6.3 kg (≈  8 litres) isopropanol. 
It is not clear which quoted ignition source size is correct. In the experiment, the HRR 
reached 35 MW in about five minutes. The HRR curve for the metro train car is 
shown in Figure 2.3. A total heat released of 36900 MJ was estimated by integrating 
the HRR curve from 0 to 117 minutes. This total heat released value was 
approximately 90% of the total fire load estimated for the metro train car.    







Figure 2.3: HRR curve for a metro train car (reproduced from Ingason et al. (1994)) 
 
It was noted that although it was the same experiment, Steinert (1994) reported a peak 
HRR of only 24 MW for the same test. The difference was due to the method used to 
evaluate the HRR. Ingason et al. (1994) used the oxygen consumption technique 
while Steinert (1994) used the enthalpy flows of 2CO / CO  mass flows for the 
determination of the HRR. Even so, both have assumed that the heat release per unit 
mass of 2O  consumed is 13100 kJ/kg of 2O in their calculation. 
 
From Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, it can be seen that the peak HRR of the metro car was 
much higher (almost 3 times) even though its fire load was lower than the passenger 
train car. This indicated that fire load tells nothing about burning behaviour of 
materials. The results suggested that for the full-scale tests, the seats used in the metro 
train car were much easier to burn compared to the seats of passenger train car.  
 
Wood cribs tests 
The wood cribs tests consisted of 950 kg wood crib stacks measuring 3.2 m long by 
0.8 m wide and 2.4 m high. Two tests were conducted, one with forced ventilation and 
the other without. For the test with forced ventilation, the average air velocity over the 
tunnel cross section was 2.9 m/s. The HRR curves for the two tests are shown in 
Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5. 






Figure 2.4: HRR curve for wood cribs 
(without forced ventilation) (reproduced 
from Ingason et al. (1994)) 
Figure 2.5: HRR curve for wood cribs 
(with forced ventilation) (reproduced from 
Ingason et al. (1994)) 
 
From the HRR curves for the two wood cribs tests, it can be seen that the peak HRR 
increased by almost 3 times under the influence of the forced ventilation. How the 
forced ventilation might affect the HRRs of the passenger train car, metro train car or 
other vehicles tested however was not discussed in Ingason et al. (1994).  
 
Important findings from EUREKA-project (Haack 1994; Richter 1994) 
The following important findings from EUREKA-project as reported in Haack (1994) 
and Richter (1994) are relevant to this project: 
a) Vehicles with roof constructed of steel were able to withstand the heat 
whereas vehicles with roof constructed of aluminium were completely 
destroyed at a rather early stage of the fire tests.   
b) Maximum temperatures of about 700 to 1000°C were measured for fire tests 
of rail cars. The metro car with aluminium body resulted in higher 
temperature compared to the metro car or passenger cars with steel bodies.   
c) Modern outfitting in newer rail cars makes them much more resistant to 
ignition than older vehicles.  




2.1.2 Japanese full-scale tests (Hasemi et al. 2004) 
 
It was reported in Hasemi et al. (2004) that based on the full-scale tests of trains 
compliant with the Japanese regulations, the HRR values of the trains were between 
10 to 20 MW. However, the details of the full-scale tests were not covered in the 
paper. 
 
2.1.3 HRRs – Estimated /calculated based on actual fires  
 
Usually, tunnel fire incidents are thoroughly investigated. The details such as the fire 
development, extinguishing and rescue work, etc will not be discussed here. However, 
the causes of the fires and the HRRs estimated /calculated based on information 
available on the fires as reported in various literature are presented.  
 
Daegu metro train fire, Korea, 18 Feb 2003 
The cause of fire was due to arson. The arsonist started fire when he was on a train of 
Subway Line 1 in Daegu, South Korea, by spreading flammable liquid (reportedly 
two PET bottles full of petrol) into one of the carriages of a six-car train when it 
reached Jungangno Station (Anon 2004c). An estimated HRR value of at least 20 MW 
was reported in Chow (2004) and Park (2004). 
 
Kaprun tunnel fire, Austria, 11 Nov 2000 
This was not a metro train fire but a cable-rail fire within a 43° inclined, 3.4km long 
tunnel. The cause of the fire was due to faulty heater (radiator) in the driver’s cab. 
Peak HRR of between 15 to 50 MW was reported in FIT Workpackage2 (2003). The 
estimation was based on model scale experiments performed in a tunnel with the same 
slope.   
 




Baku metro train fire, Azerbaijan, 28 Oct 1995 
A fully loaded five-car metro train stopped about 200 m after the Uldus station due to 
sparkover/ electric arc in the electrical equipment in the rear bogie of the fourth car. A 
hole was created through the floor of the fourth car (blowtorch effect due to a hole in 
an air compressor) and the cable fire under the car started to spread upwards through 
the hole and ignited the seats. The fire spread rapidly to the fifth car. The peak HRR 
value for the fourth and the fifth cars was estimated to be about 100 MW at around 30 
to 45 minutes after the train came to a stop as reported in FIT Workpackage2 (2003). 
The HRR was estimated based on the time frame of fire development and the size of 
the tunnel cross-section.   
 
Montreal metro train fires, Canada, 12 Dec 1971 and 23 Jan 1974  
On the 12 Dec 1971, a train collided with the end of the tunnel at the Henri Bourassa 
metro station, followed by a short circuit and a fire which spread to train-sets 
stationed nearby. An average HRR value of 20.5 MW was reported in Associated 
Engineers (1980).  
 
On 23 Jan 1974, faulty rubber tyres on a train caused a short circuit south of the 
Rosemard station, starting a fire and leading to the destruction of nine vehicles and 
300 m of cabling. An average HRR value of 26.4 MW was reported in Associated 
Engineers (1980). 
 
Comments on HRRs estimated /calculated based on actual metro train fires 
The quoted HRR values for the Kaprun tunnel cable-rail car fire (15 MW to 50 MW) 
and the Batu tunnel metro fire (100 MW) were extremely high. If the HRR values for 
these two fires were estimated based on the size of the tunnel or the slope of tunnel 
(for the case of the Kaprun tunnel cable-rail fire), it was likely to be over estimated.  
 
The average HRR values were quoted for the two Montreal metro train fires. The peak 
HRR values were expected to be much higher.   




2.2 Current methods of estimating the HRR of a metro train 
 
This Section reviews and comments on the current methods of estimating the HRR of 
a metro train. A total five methods are presented namely the traditional method, the 
summation method, the post-flashover model method, the Arup Fire method and the 
Frankfurt metro fire model.  
 
2.2.1 Traditional method 
 
The traditional method (Dowling and Delichatsios 2000; Dowling and White 2004) of 
estimating HRR involves taking the complete fire load in MJ and dividing it by an  
assumed time. This method was first used to estimate the HRR of a metro train in 
1975 (Later discussion referred to as Design scenario – 1975). The assumed time is 
based on observations of two Montreal metro system fires. Since then, the method has 
gone through a few revisions in order to reflect the observations from other train fires  
(Later discussion referred to as Design scenario - 1983) and also to account for metro 
car design and construction advancements especially in terms of materials selection 
(Later discussion referred to as Design scenario – 1989) (Hettinger and Barnett 1991; 
Kennedy et al. 1998). The different revisions are discussed below. 
 
Design scenario - 1975  
The 1975 fire scenario was developed to reflect the observations of two Montreal 
metro system fires (January 1974 and December 1971). In both fires, flashover 
occurred about twenty minutes after the onset of the fire and the average time of 
combustion of each vehicle was about one hour. A relatively constant heat release rate 
is estimated for this scenario based on the assumption that the average heat release 
rate over the duration of the fire is equal to the rate of a single burning car i.e.: 













This method of estimating the HRR was used for the design of emergency tunnel 
ventilation system of the original sections of the Atlanta (MARTA) system as well as 
the Baltimore, Buffalo, Hong Kong and Pittsburgh metro systems (Hettinger and 
Barnett 1991). 
 
Design scenario - 1983 
The first revision to the design fire scenario was made as a result of the observations 
of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) metro system fire in San Francisco, California, 
in January 1979 and the Toronto metro system fire in Canada in October 1976. 
Multiple cars were involved in these fire incidents, with the fire transmitted to the 
adjacent car approximately twenty minutes after flashover. In each incident, all 
combustibles above and below the car floor1 and less than one-half of the floor 
material were burnt in the first car. The fires were generally limited to the above-floor 
combustibles in the second and succeeding cars.  
 
In calculating the HRR for this scenario, an initial fire size intQ&  of 0.7 MW is assumed 
for the metro cars and lasted for 20 minutes. The HRR for the first involved car 1Q&  is 
calculated using Equation 2.2 while the HRR for the second and succeeding cars 2Q&  
is calculated using Equation 2.3. The peak HRR is then obtained by summing up the 


































1 The train is divided into above floor, floor and below floor when calculating the HRR using 
the traditional method. Above floor refers to the car interior equipment and materials, which 
also includes the floor covering. Floor refers to the structural floor of the train whilst below 
floor refers to the undercarriage equipment and materials.   









HRR of car 
(MW) 
Peak HRR (MW) Remark 
0 – 20 1 
intQ&  intQ&  1
st car at initial burning 
phase. 





1Q& + intQ&   1
st car flashover. 2nd car at 
initial burning phase. 






1Q& + 2Q& + intQ&  1
st continues to burn. 2nd 
car flashover. 3rd car at 
initial burning phase. 








1Q& + 2Q& + 2Q& + intQ&  1
st and 2nd cars continue 
to burn. 3th car flashover. 
4th car at initial burning 
phase. 








2Q& + 2Q& + 2Q& + intQ&  1
st car completely burnt 
out. 2nd and 3rd cars 
continue to burn. 4th car 
flashover. 5th car at initial 
burning phase. 
Table 2.1: Fire development based on design scenario - 1983 
   
 
This scenario was used for the designs of the MOS-1 section of the LA Metro Red 
Line system as well as the Los Angeles (Blue Line), Philadelphia (SEPTA), and the 
newer sections of the Atlanta metro system (Hettinger and Barnett 1991).  




Design scenario - 1989 
The second revision to the design fire scenario was made to incorporate the impact of the 
recommendations contained in NFPA 130 “Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit 
Systems” (NFPA-130 2003 edition), originally issued in 1983 by the Fixed Guideway 
Transit Systems Technical Committee of the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA). NFPA 130 contained guidelines developed by the Urban Mass Transit 
Administration (UTMA), now Federal Transit Administration (FTA), for test standards 
which limit flammability and smoke emission characteristics for materials used in 
construction of transit vehicles. Note that the 2000 and 2003 edition of NFPA 130 
addressed fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems, and changes have been made 
throughout the document to incorporate passenger rail requirements. 
 
Subsequently, the vehicles for many older metro systems (including BART and Toronto) 
have been retrofitted and fire-hardened to meet the NFPA 130 requirements. Vehicle seats 
which previously could be ignited by a newspaper are now fire-resistant to the point that a 
kerosene-soaked rag will not ignite the seat material. New vehicles are specified to meet 
(or exceed) the NFPA 130 requirements (Hettinger and Barnett 1991; Kennedy et al. 
1998).  
 
The flashover and fire-transmission rates for the design of metro systems whose vehicles 
met these more stringent design standards were re-evaluated. However, because there 
were no major fires involving metro vehicles in US since the development of the NFPA 
130, the recognised improvements due to the NFPA 130 cannot be directly quantified. 
Therefore, the revised value for these parameters were assumed to increase from 20 
minutes to 30 minutes (Hettinger and Barnett 1991; Kennedy et al. 1998). The design 




































For this scenario, up to two cars are considered to be fully involved at any given time 
due to the thirty minutes fire development (flashover) and fire transmission times. 
This scenario was used in the design of the Seattle, Shanghai, Taipei (Hettinger and 
Barnett 1991) and Singapore East West Line (EWL), North South Line (NSL) and 
North East Line (NEL) metro systems (Lim 2005).    
 
Although the traditional method was usually used to estimate the HRR for the design 
of emergency tunnel ventilation system, however it has been noted that in some 
designs, a safety factor of e.g. 2, was included to account for uncertainties (Amtrak 
2004). 
 
Circle Line, Singapore 
Circle Line (CCL), Singapore is currently under construction. The HRR of the CCL 
metro train was estimated based on the same methodology as the design fire scenarios 
–1983 and 1989 for the design of emergency tunnel ventilation system. Although the 
same methodology is used, there are a few modifications to the assumptions. In the 
CCL design, the design consultant has conservatively assumed that the fire 
transmitted to the adjacent car in 10 minutes after flashover (compared to 20 minutes 
in design scenario - 1983 and 30 minutes in design scenario 1989). The initial fire size 
intQ  of 0.7 MW was also used with a burning period of 30 minutes (same as design 
fire scenario – 1989).  
 
In their design, they have included a combustion efficiency factor χ  of 0.7 
(Meinhardt 2002) noting the fact that not all combustibles will be consumed during 
the fire (Drysdale 1998; Karlsson and Quintiere 2000). The metro car’s floor has 45 
minutes fire resistance rating (Renie and Prevot 2003). This was also accounted for in 
the design calculation.  
 




As in design scenario – 1989, up to two cars are considered to be fully involved at any 








































































Equations 2.6 and 2.8 are newly added to account for the fire resistance rating of the 
floor. Equations 2.7 and 2.9 are modification of Equations 2.4 and 2.5 respectively to 
include the combustion efficiency factor χ . A 10 MW fire was estimated for the 
design of emergency tunnel ventilation system in CCL (Meinhardt 2002).  




2.2.2 Summation method 
 
NFPA 130 (2003 edition) Annex D contains a non-mandatory method for determining 
“hazard load” in MJ/m3 of train car volume. Based on previous work by Smith (1976), 
a heat release rate test is utilised to determine a 180-second average heat release and 
smoke emission. The Ohio State University (OSU) apparatus (ASTM-E-906 2004) is 
specified for use in an example calculation. 
 
The surface materials are exposed to exposure heat flux levels as shown in Table 2.2 
to simulate an initiating fire. The exposure heat flux levels are selected according to 
the surface materials’ orientation and location.  
 





Light fixture cover 15 
Lower wall 15 
Ceiling 35 
Table 2.2: Exposure heat flux on surface materials 
 
The 180-second average heat release and smoke emission values are multiplied by the 
exposed surface area for each material and totalled.  Finally, the total values are 
divided by the volume of the vehicle to obtain “fire and smoke load” for the vehicle 
per unit volume. A suggested performance criterion of 3 MJ/m3 is included, as the 
maximum allowable loading to assure self-propagating fire would not occur with an 
initiating fire consisting of the equivalent of 0.45 kg of newsprint or 0.23 kg of lighter 
fluid. This method is used to evaluate the overall material flammability in the metro 
car. It did not provide a complete description of a fire (Peacock and Braun 1999) nor 
was it used to estimate the fire size. 
 




In 1997, Duggan (1997) published a method that summed rates of heat release per unit 
area of exposed surface materials. In this method, the surface materials or components 
are tested in Cone Calorimeter and the entire HRR curve for each material is used. 
Higher exposure heat flux levels are proposed so as to reflect the exposure conditions 
of a real fire. The exposure heat flux levels used are shown in Table 2.3.   
 
Surface Exposure heat flux (kW/m2) 
Horizontal supine (‘Floor-like’ orientation) 
– Floor covering and seat trim base 
20 or 25 
Vertical (‘Wall-like’ orientation) – Wall 
panels, seat trim back and seat shell back 
35 
Horizontal prone (‘Ceiling-like’ 
orientation) – Ceiling panels 
50 
Table 2.3: Exposure heat fluxes for Cone Calorimeter testing in Duggan (1997) 
method 
 
The heat release rate per unit area (HRRPUA) curves of these exposed surface 
materials (determined from Cone Calorimeter tests) are multiplied by their exposed 
areas in the metro car. The ‘HRR curves’ of all the exposed surface materials are then 
summed up.  A notional 1.5 MW continuous ignition source is added and taken to 
represent a severe luggage stack fire.  In the example calculation given in Duggan 
(1997), the result was smoothed using a rolling average of 20 s to merge the peaks 
which were close together as Duggan is in opinion that the peaks are unlikely to be 
close together in a real fire. When the data was reviewed against the emergency tunnel 
ventilation system design capacity, Duggan suggested a notional value be included to 
account for other miscellaneous surfaces and items within the car. In the example 
calculation, he used a notional value of 3 MW for these unknown.  
 
Dowling and Delichatsios (2000; 2001) reported that in Hong Kong, the Mass Transit 
Rail Corporation (MTRC) has included a requirement that the total sum of HRR of all 
the surface materials in a metro train car shall not exceed 5 MW at any time. In order 
to obtain this data, all the surface materials must be tested in the Cone Calorimeter. 
MTRC accepts the calculations based on the method published by Duggan (1997). 




Dowling and White (2004) commented on the above method, highlighting that the 
assumption is at odds with what is known about fire growth in an enclosure. The 
method may result in a grossly over estimation of HRR because it assumes all surface 
materials to be involved in the combustion simultaneously. Furthermore the 
calculation is usually done for one car only, and disregards any contribution from the 
sub-floor components. They stated that even though the result is expressed in MW, it 
does not provide any estimation of a likely fire size. 
 
In 2000, Dowling and Delichatsios (2000) published a methodology that attempted to 
allow for fire spread within a train car. The method is similar to Duggan method 
except that it assumed that because of the square cylinder shape of a train car, fire 
could not commence on all surfaces at the same instance. It arbitrarily chooses a 
rolling ignition that involves 10 % of a train car each minute.   
 
2.2.3 Post-flashover model method 
 
In 1991, Hettinger and Barnett (1991) published a method that used the post-flashover 
computer model, COMPF2 (Babrauskas 1979) to predict the HRR of a metro train car 
interior (above floor). The assumption for the model is that fire is ventilation 
controlled during the post-flashover regime and therefore the burning rate is simply a 
function of the oxygen available for combustion.  
 
The technique used to predict the ventilation controlled burning rate was to have the 
COMPF2 model automatically adjusts the burning rate during the simulation so as to 
produce the maximum temperature in the fire compartment. 
 
Two basic scenarios were modelled. The first scenario assumed that the vehicle’s 
doors remained closed and all of the windows opened. The latter assumption was 
made because it was expected that the maximum fire temperatures would result in 
failure of either the window safety glass or the elastomer which hold the window 
glass. The second scenario was modelled with opened side doors as well as opened 
windows. 




As the original version of COMPF2 could only account for one opening, the source 
code of COMPF2 was modified so that multiple opening at various elevations could 
be modelled. 
 
In their study, they reported that the excess oxygen introduced by the emergency 
tunnel ventilation system would not significantly increase the estimated HRR.  
 
Heat loss from the compartment by conduction was modelled but due to the 
limitations of the COMPF2 model, fixed thermal properties were used and only one 
value was used for the door, partition and ceiling even though they were constructed 
of different materials with different thickness. Because COMPF2 is not able to model 
more than one burning item, material properties of a generic polycarbonate were used. 
Polycarbonate was selected because Hettinger and Barnett were in opinion that after 
vehicle flashover, the fire-resistant plastics would exhibit material properties similar 
to those of polycarbonate plastics. Combustion efficiency factor χ  was included and 
‘net’ heat of combustion was based on weighted average for the combustible materials 
in the train.  
 
Hettinger and Barnett carried out sensitivity analyses, varying the combustion 
efficiency factor χ  from 0.55 to 0.8, and varying the ‘net’ heat of combustion from 
13.65 to 19.77 MJ/kg. In all cases, the mass of fuel was varied so that the total heat 
content of the rail car was constant. The calculated HRRs varied from 4 to 15.1 MW 
depending on the scenario simulated; the combustion efficiency factor and ‘net’ heat 
of combustion used. A HRR of 12.9 MW (based on the second scenario, combustion 
efficiency factor χ of 0.8 and ‘net’ heat of combustion of 13650 kJ/kg) was 
recommended in the paper. 
 




As the HRR obtained using COMPF2 only accounted for the combustibles in the train 
car interior (above floor), the traditional method was used to calculate the HRRs of 
the floor and below floor combustibles. The HRRs were then added up to give a peak 
HRR value of 18 MW for the train car.  It has been noted that in calculating the HRR 
for the floor, Hettinger and Barnett assumed 25 % of the floor assembly to be 
consumed during a fire (compared to 50 % in traditional method). This value was 
based on observation during factory fire tests of the floor assembly.         
 
Only one car was assumed to be involved in the fire for the above study. Hettinger 
and Barnett concluded that fire was unlikely to spread to other cars because gas 
temperature of 540°C (from their study) was not high enough to cause failure of 
safety glass windows in the train cars downstream of the fire. Furthermore, the car 
ends had a stainless shell therefore fire would not be able to transmit directly from car 
to car.   
 
The above method was used for ventilation system upgrade study for the Washington 
DC (WMATA) system and several other ventilation studies.  
 
The use of COMPF2 to predict the HRR of a metro train was also reported in 
Kennedy et al. (1998). The approach was the same as Hettinger and Barnett study 
including the fire load for the train cars. However, the train cars in Kennedy et al. 
study were assumed to have polycarbonate windows instead of safety glass windows. 
It was assumed in Kennedy et al. study that the polycarbonate windows would melt 
and fall out in cars downstream of the fire, resulting in a multi-car fire with 
succeeding cars being involved every 30 minutes. The peak HRR for the duration of 
the fire was estimated to be 23.1 MW, with two cars being fully involved at any one 
time.   
 




2.2.4 Arup Fire method 
 
Arup Fire developed a fire dynamics model to predict the HRRs of an older type train car 
and a modern train car (used in St Paul's City Thameslink, London) based on a scenario 
where the train car was approaching flashover when it entered the underground station 
(Arup 2004). The model used results from Furniture Calorimeter tests specified for 
upholstered car seats and lining materials. The older type train car had upholstered seats 
and combustible linings and a HRR value of 16 MW was computed (Arup 2004).  The 
modern train car had retardant upholstered seats and a HRR value of 7 MW was estimated 
(Barber et al. 1994). 
 
The techniques developed for the model were later used to assess the rail cars in Thailand. 
No Furniture Calorimeter test was conducted. The HRR data of major items was mostly 
obtained from SFPE Handbook (SFPE 2002). Peak HRR values of 16.3 MW and 14 MW 
were reported for a sleeper car and a wooden seat car respectively (Barber et al. 1994).   
 
2.2.5 Frankfurt metro fire model 
 
According to research work done by Wilk (2002), a HRR value of 5.6 MW 30 minutes 
after the start of the fire was computed for the underground metro train car (U-Bahn) used 
in city of Frankfurt. The HRR was derived by performing a series of fire tests and detailed 
combustion analysis for the train car (Könnecke and Schneider 2004). The ignition source 
was assumed to be a baby carriage (buggy) loaded with shopping goods inside the motor 
coach (train car) caused by arson (Mauser 2005) and the fire spreads successively to the 
benches (seat), doors, enclosure (wall) lining materials and the driver’s cab. A delay time 
before ignition was estimated for each component depending on their location in train car 
and the HRRs totalled to obtain the peak HRR.  
 




2.2.6 Comments on the current methods 
  
Traditional method 
a) In the traditional method, the fire load of the combustible materials in the train is 
the key parameter used to estimate the HRR but fire load tells nothing above the 
burning behaviour of the materials. The EUREKA-project full-scale tests for the 
passenger train car and metro train cars illustrated this point. Therefore this 
method is unable to distinguish whether the materials have good fire performance.  
b) The burning duration, the fire development (flashover) time and the fire 
transmission time are approximated based on historical observations of metro train 
fires. But not all the trains and tunnels are identical. The quantity and burning 
behaviour of materials; the geometries of the train and tunnel; and the ventilation 
will have major influence on the fire development and burning duration.  
c) Nevertheless, this method does have an advantage, as it seems to be able to 
‘account’ for all the combustibles in the train car. 
 
Summation method 
a) NFPA Standard 130 “hazard load analysis” and Duggan method of estimating the 
HRR assumes that every part of every material ignites and burns simultaneously. 
In reality, different propensities for ignition, flame spread, and heat release make 
both the hazard load analysis and the HRR estimation highly conservative.  
b) Although Duggan method of estimating the HRR may be an improvement of the 
traditional method because it accounts for the burning behaviour of the materials 
inside the train car, improvements are needed to ensure the estimation is realistic.  
c) The calculation is done for one car only, and ignores any contribution from the 
sub-floor components. Furthermore, the geometries of the train car and tunnel; and 
ventilation are not considered. All these will be dealt with in this research project. 




Post-flashover model method 
a) In the paper, the authors reported that the excess oxygen introduced by the 
emergency tunnel ventilation system would not significantly increase the 
estimated HRR. This might be because the effect of the emergency tunnel 
ventilation was evaluated along the length of the train car exterior (with the side 
windows and side doors opened). If there is scenario where the emergency tunnel 
ventilation airflow is able to flow directly into the train car compartment, this 
might not be the case.    
b) COMPF2 is only able to account for burning within a compartment. Burning 
outside the compartment is not accounted for. The HRR may be under-predicted 
because of this reason. 
c) For a ventilation-controlled fire, the HRR can be calculated using Equation 2.10 
(Drysdale 1998). 
r
H effc,∆  in Equation 2.10 gives the energy released per unit mass 
of air (kJ/kg of air). In the study, the stoichiometric air/fuel ratio r  was calculated 
based on a generic material (polycarbonate) but the ‘net’ heat of combustible 
based on weighted average for the combustible materials in the train was used. 
This has resulted in relatively low energy released per unit mass of air (1039 to 
1505 kW/kg of air compared to 3050 kW/kg of air given in most literature such as 
Drysdale (1998); Karlsson and Quintiere (2000) and Tewarson (2002)) during the 
combustion process. After flashover, if the fire-resistant plastics exhibit material 
properties similar to those of generic polycarbonate plastic as suggested by the 
authors, the HRR may be under-predicted because a generic polycarbonate plastic 
has an effective heat of combustion of about 30000 kJ/kg (SFPE 2002). 




,∆= &&                                   Ventilation Controlled Fire Equation 2.10 
 
d) The burning behaviour of the actual materials in the train car used was not 
considered even though material properties of polycarbonate were used. 
 
 




Arup Fire method and Frankfurt metro fire model 
a) The ARUP Fire method and the Frankfurt metro fire model of estimating the HRR 
for a metro train are almost identical. The HRRs of major items such as seat and 
lining materials are first obtained. Ignition of second and succeeding items are 
then estimated by analysis. Among the methods used to determine the HRRs of 
major items, conducting fire tests are considered to be the most appropriate but 
conducting full-scale fire tests are expensive. Furthermore the HRRs obtained from 
the open-air burning experiments may not represent the HRRs in the metro train 
compartment and the tunnel environment because of radiant heat feedback from the 
fire and the influence of airflow from the emergency tunnel ventilation system.    
b) It also seems that the calculation is done for one car only, and ignores any 
contribution from the sub-floor components.   
 




2.2.7  Peak HRR values adopted by various metro lines   
 
Different peak HRR values were being used for the design of emergency tunnel 
ventilation system. The peak HRR values ranged from 5 MW to 31.1 MW, depending 
on the method used to derive the HRR.  The peak HRR values adopted by some metro 
lines are shown in Table 2.4. 
 
Country Metro Line Peak HRR 
(MW) 
Reference 
Singapore North South Line (NSL) 24 MW (Chua 2003) 
Singapore East West Line (EWL) 24 MW (Chua 2003) 
Singapore North East Line (NEL) 15 MW (Chua 2003) 
Singapore Circle Line (CCL) 10 MW (Chua 2003) 
Australia New South Link 10 MW (Chua 2003) 
Hong Kong Lantau Airport Line (LAL) 5 MW (Chua 2003) 
Hong Kong Airport Express Line 
(AEL) 




MRT line, Bangkok 
7 MW (Drake and Meeks 2000; 
Yau et al. 2002) 
Greece  Athens metro 10 MW (Castro et al. 1997) 
UK St Paul's City Thameslink, 
London 
16 MW (Arup 2004) 
USA Mount Lebanon Tunnel 
light rail transit, Pittsburgh, 
PA 
13.2 MW (Kennedy and Patel 1988) 
USA Amtrak New York City 
Tunnels 
31.1 MW (Amtrak 2004) 
USA Ventilation system upgrade 
study for Washington DC 
(WMATA) system 
18 MW (Hettinger and Barnett 
1991) 
USA Ventilation system upgrade 
study for Washington DC 
(WMATA) system 
23.1 MW (Kennedy et al. 1998) 









2.3 Fire safety studies of rail cars 
 
This Section reviews the work done on fire safety studies of rail cars. All the studies 
reviewed focused on assessing the potential fire hazard of interior materials used in 
rail cars except one which was conducted to assess the HRR of a rail car.  
 
Although some of the fire safety studies were not specifically for metro train cars, 
they provided useful information such as size of ignition sources, fire scenarios, etc. 
Most importantly some of the studies supported the approach and methodology taken 
in this research project.     
 
2.3.1 A Fire Hazard Evaluation of the Interior of WMATA Metrorail 
Cars (Braun 1975)  
 
In 1975, under a contract with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
(WMATA), the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), now NIST, conducted a series 
of fire tests to assess potential fire and smoke hazards represented by various 
materials that were being incorporated in the new metro cars. The study was 
conducted in three parts: 
a) Small-scale laboratory tests were performed on materials from the various 
components used on the interior of the new metro car. 
b) For economic reason, a non-destructive test using smoke bomb was conducted 
to ascertain the likelihood of fire or smoke from an ignition below the floor 
system to penetrate to the car interior through the floor.  
c) Seven fire tests were conducted on a mock-up car interior in order to 
determine the overall effects of an assembled system as compared to the fire 
performance characteristics of the individual components   
 
The criteria used to evaluate the full-scale tests were: a) there shall be no significant 
spread of fire from the seat of ignition; and b) the smoke level shall be such as to 
allow egress in a reasonable time from a burning car.  
 




The tests were conducted using one of the following ignition sources: 
a) A paper trash bag containing one full sheet of newspaper – 0.03 kg 
b) 0.45 kg of loosely stacked newspaper 
c) 0.91 kg of loosely stacked newspaper equivalent of a ‘Sunday newspaper’    
 
The fire was at one of the following locations: 
a) On the floor – in the aisle 
b) On the floor - beneath the seat 
c) On a seat 
 
Main conclusions and recommendations from the study were: 
a) The floor was unlikely to allow rapid penetration of fire and smoke from a fire 
beneath the car.   
b) The carpet and the ceiling did not contribute significantly to the initial fire 
hazards 
c) While the small-scale test results indicated that the car interior materials might 
not be readily ignited by very small ignition sources, the full-scale results 
showed that the materials failed to perform in their end-use configuration as 
would have been predicted. 
d) The nylon-covered polyurethane seat cushions and PVC acrylic wall linings 
were potential sources of hazard since fire spread did occur beyond the area of 
origin. These components were recommended to be replaced or upgraded. 
   




2.3.2 Fire Hazard Evaluation of BART Vehicles (Braun 1978)  
 
In 1978, at the request of the UMTA, the NBS conducted a limited fire hazard 
analysis of the metro cars used on the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) metro system 
in San Francisco, California. The purpose of the study was to ascertain if any aspect 
of the design details or the material specifications relating to the metro car could 
result in an environment that had a high probability for developing into hazardous fire 
situation. 
 
A survey of fire and smoke incidents on metro cars of the BART metro system from 
March 1975 to Nov 1976 revealed that majority of the incidents were found to start 
below the floor due to subsystem failures such as brake failure. The importance of fire 
penetration resistance of the floor assembly was highlighted. By comparing the floor 
assembly with earlier tests (see Section 2.3.1), the report recommended that the floor 
assembly to be hardened.  
 
Except for electrical fires, the report considered three probable locations for an 
interior ignition source. They were: 
a) On the floor – in the aisle 
b) On the floor – beneath the seat 
c) On a seat 
 
The likelihood of occurrence of the ignition source located in the aisle to result in 
flame spread was concluded to be low as it would require an ‘inordinately large 
amount’ of fuel (unfortunately, “inordinately large amount’ was not defined). This 
scenario was not considered further.  For the two other ignition locations, flame 
spread was postulated. The report recommended the nylon/vinyl-covered 
polyurethane seats to be replaced as they represented a significant hazard based on 
earlier tests (see Section 2.3.1). The report also recommended using an intumescent 
coating on the wall and ceiling liner to improve fire protection and installation of fire 
detection system to indicate the presence of a fire on board a train.    
 




It has been noted that the study relied on limited test results from fire tests conducted 
by BART for the fire hazard analysis. No fire test was conducted in the study itself. 
From the report, it also has been noted that the test methods specified by the Operator 
were no longer in use in the current guideline/standard (FRA requirement/ NFPA 130).    
 
2.3.3 Fire Test of Amtrak Passenger Rail Vehicle Interiors (Peacock and 
Braun 1984) 
 
In 1984, under the funding by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the NBS 
conducted a series of fire test to assess the burning behaviour of the interior of 
passenger rail vehicles. Three types of fire tests were performed: 
a) Small-scale laboratory tests to study the flammability and smoke generation 
characteristics of individual materials. 
b) Full-scale calorimeter tests on seats to determine the rate of heat release from 
burning seat assemblies. 
c) Full-scale tests on mock-up of the interior of cars to investigate the potential 
for fire hazard in a fully furnished vehicle. 
 
The materials used in the tests were typical materials from the Amtrak fleet of 
1984.The small-scale tests, included in the study, were used to evaluate ignition, 
flame spread, smoke emission and rate of heat release of individual materials. The 
results were compared to the results from the full-scale tests. In the full-scale 
calorimeter tests of seats, full size upholstered specimens of seat cushions and seat 
backs were tested to measure the rate of heat release. The seats were mounted on 
incombustible seat frames, which were similar to the seat frames used in the Amtrak 
fleet. Four seats were tested in the furniture calorimeter. The upholstery of the 
different seats was made of polyurethane, fire resistant polychloroprene, fire resistant 
polyurethane and low smoke polychloroprene. Ignition of the seats was accomplished 
with an ignition source consisting of 50 sheets of newspaper weighing approximately 
1.06 kg. The maximum heat release rate of the burning seats ranged from 30 kW for 
the fire resistant polyurethane seat to 139 kW for the polyurethane seat (see Figure 
2.6).  





Figure 2.6: HRR curves for the experiments with seats in the Furniture Calorimeter 
(reproduced from Peacock and Braun (1984)) 
 
A total of eight full-scale mock-up tests were performed in the study. The enclosure 
(see Figure 2.7) used in the tests was made of steel studding with a covering of 
perforated steel sheets on the walls and the ceiling. The size of the enclosure was 
2.4 m wide by 3.6 m long by 2.4 m high which was identical to an ISO 9705 room.  
 
Figure 2.7: The full-scale mock-up (reproduced from Peacock and Braun (1984)) 
 
The wall and ceiling carpeting were glued directly onto the perforated steel sheets. A 
luggage rack, lined with carpeting materials, extended to the rear of the second seat 
assembly in three of the tests (tests 1 to 3) and the entire length of the compartment in 
five tests (tests 4 to 8). In four of the tests (tests 1 to 4), the seats were mounted in the 
enclosure and in the remaining four tests (tests 5 to 8), only the incombustible seat 




assemblies (steel seat frame and calcium silicate board supported the newspaper for 
ignition) were installed. The window glazing and the window masks were installed 
close to the seat assemblies. The only opening to the enclosure was the 0.76 m wide 
and 2.04 m high doorway. In the eight mock-up tests different combinations of 
materials were used to simulate present as well as possible future interior material 
configurations. 
  
The ignition source used was 50 sheets of newspaper (100 sheets of newspaper for 
tests 6 and 8) placed on the rear seat closest to the window. During the tests, 
measurements of temperature, heat flux, gas velocity, gas concentration, smoke 
density and rate of heat release were made. The maximum heat release rate varied 
from 40 to 4400 kW in the experiments as shown in Figure 2.8.  
 
Figure 2.8: HRR curves for the full-scale tests (test 1 upper left, test 2 upper right, 
test 3 lower left and test 4 lower right) (reproduced from Peacock and Braun (1984)) 




The four fully furnished full-scale mock-up tests (tests 1 to 4), i.e. the tests where 
combustible seating arrangements were used, could be divided into two categories. 
The two categories were those tests in which full room involvement was obtained 
(tests 1 and 4) and those tests in which few, if any, hazardous conditions were 
observed (tests 2 and 3). In test 1 and 4, the initial fire in the seats caused the 
carpeting beneath the luggage rack to ignite, which lead to a serious fire. The lower 
HRR from the seats as well as the shortened luggage rack in tests 2 and 3 prevented 
the carpeting from being ignited, which in turn, prevented a severe fire. Thus, it was 
concluded that an ignition source that provided enough heat for a sufficient period of 
time to ignite the carpeting material beneath the luggage rack was likely to cause a 
severe fire.  
 
Another conclusion drawn from the study was that the small-scale tests on individual 
materials could be used to predict trends in a full-scale fire performance for a given 
full-scale geometry. However, when the geometry of the full-scale test room was 
changed, the chosen small-scale tests failed to reflect the effects of these changes. In 
the light of this conclusion a vehicle interior evaluation protocol was suggested. 
According to the protocol a small number full-scale tests should be performed to 
determine a set of acceptable materials for the given geometry of the evaluated 
vehicle. This could be followed by a series of small-scale tests to evaluate alternative 
materials. Materials, which are equal or better than the materials tested in the full-
scale tests, can then be substituted without further full-scale testing.  
 
One of the specific recommendations made in the study based on the results of the 
performed tests was that particular attention should be paid to ensure that the 
materials used as wall coverings adjacent to seating would resist ignition and 
subsequent spread of fire. 
 




2.3.4 Fire Safety of Passenger Trains (Peacock et al. 2004; Peacock and 
Braun 1999; Peacock et al. 1998; Peacock et al. 2002; Peacock et al. 
1995)   
 
In a paper presented by a group of researchers from NIST (Peacock et al. 1995), they 
concluded that an alternative approach that used HRR-based test methods, 
incorporated with fire modelling and fire hazard analysis, to assess potential hazards 
under real fire conditions could provide a more credible and cost-effective means to 
predict the fire performance of passenger train materials. They quoted that studies by 
Barnett (1992); Cappuccio (1992); ERRI (1992a); ERRI (1992b); Parker (1994); 
Smith (1983) on transit system analysis; Schirmer Engineering Corporation (1990) on 
Amtrak stations, tunnels, and train cars; and Burdett et al. (1989) on King’s Cross 
subway station, all supported this new direction for passenger train fire safety. 
 
As the current FRA-cited test methods and performance criteria only provide a 
relative ranking of materials under the specified exposure conditions, quantitative data 
which can be used for the fire modelling and hazard analysis are not available (note 
that the test methods and performance criteria contained in the FRA fire safety 
guidelines and the NFPA 130 are almost similar as they were adapted from guidelines 
developed by the UMTA (also see Section 2.2.1). NFPA 130 and FRA test methods 
and performance criteria are summarised in Appendix A of this report for comparison 
and reference.). 
 
To assess the feasibility and to demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of HRR-
based test methods and fire hazard analysis techniques, a comprehensive three-phase 
passenger train fire safety research program was developed by Volpe Transportation 
Systems Center (Volpe Center) and conducted by NIST under the sponsorship of the 
FRA Office of Research and Development (R&D). The results from the research 
program are intended to provide:  
a) The FRA with addition information so that appropriate fire safety performance 
requirements can be developed for inclusion in the proposed passenger 
equipment rule. 




b) Rail car builders and passenger train system operators with increased 
flexibility to permit incorporation of innovative materials and designs in future 
passenger rail cars. 
 
Phase I of the research focused on the evaluation of passenger train interior materials 
using the Cone Calorimeter test method which provided the quantitative data for the 
fire modelling. The Cone Calorimeter test data was compared with data from FRA-
cited small-scale test methods to determine relative material fire performance. In 
Phase II, large-scale tests were conducted with selected interior material component 
assemblies using Furniture Calorimeter. The data from the Cone Calorimeter (smoke 
data) and Furniture Calorimeter (HRR data) tests was used as input into fire model as 
part of the fire hazard analysis. The impact of car geometry, detection and suppression 
systems, and egress time on the safety of passengers and crew for representative 
intercity passengers coach, dining, and sleeping railcar designs were also evaluated.  
Phase III involved real-scale testing of a full size rail car. The real-scale test results 
were compared with the small and large-scale tests results conducted in the first two 
phases of the research and were used to verify the use of the fire hazard analysis based 
on the computer model.   
 
Phase I (Peacock and Braun 1999)  
Extensive survey of the U.S passenger train and other transportation vehicles fire 
safety requirements, European passenger train fire safety requirements (French, 
German, British, and the International Union of Railways (UIC)) were covered in 
Chapter 2 of the Phase I report. The survey of the U.S passenger train and other 
transportation vehicles fire safety requirements revealed that there was considerable 
overlap in the existing U.S. transportation approach to fire safety. It has been noted 
that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have 
both accepted the use of HRR as a means to evaluate material fire performance for 
aircraft and marine vessels.     
 




The survey also concluded that the existing European approaches to passenger train 
fire safety were generally similar to U.S approach. All of them relied on small-scale 
test methods to evaluate individual material fire performance with key objectives of 
prevent fire, retard its growth and spread, and provide adequate evacuation time for 
passenger and crew. Although the current small-scale test methods are useful as a 
screening tool to select materials, they are unable to account for interactions between 
materials and for different end-use geometries which is a major concern. It was 
reported that this has led to several European country efforts and coordinated 
European Railway Research Institute (ERRI) and Commission for European 
Standardisation (CEN) activities to develop assessment tools for fire hazard 
evaluation based on a combination of Cone Calorimeter, Furniture Calorimeter, real-
scale testing, and computer modelling of passenger train interior assembly fires.         
 
The cited European research programs and brief reviews of the programs in Peacock 
and Braun (1999) are partially reproduced below (points a to e) as they contained 
information relevant to this project: 
a) The British Rail (BR) small-scale (Cone-Calorimeter) test program which was 
targeted at developing a database of HRR data for all rails materials in current 
use (Young 1995). Real-scale assembly tests in a Furniture Calorimeter were 
also conducted as part of the ERRI research effort. BR has also conducted 
several real-scale test burns of existing coaches and sleeping cars on open 
trackways.  
b) The London Underground Limited (LUL) worked on testing of materials using 
Cone Calorimeter. In the test, LUL selected an exposure of 50 kW/m2 for 
20 minutes as a suitable exposure for material evaluation consistent with 
testing exposures and fire experiences in the United Kingdom (Young 1995). 
c) Study by SP-Fire Technology on seat flammability in buses and rail transit 
trains using small-scale and real-scale tests. In the small-scale tests, the Cone 
Calorimeter was selected to provide ignition and heat release rate data. In real-
scale tests, the maximum heat release rate of a seat assembly, about 200 kW, 
was not sufficient to ignite the panels or the ceiling ‘fast enough’. Ignition of 
adjacent seats was noted in the real-scale mock-up tests (Göransson and 
Lundqvist 1990). 




d) The EUREKA project (also see Section 2.1.1) whereby the following major 
conclusions were made (EUREKA 1995): 
- Large amounts of smoke and hot gases produced can quickly fill the 
entire tunnel reducing visibility to less than 1m. 
- In major incidents, flashover occurred after 7 to 10 minutes and total 
burning duration lasted from 30 minutes to several hours. 
e) Research by ERRI where they considered the use of the Cone Calorimeter to 
be the only small-scale apparatus suitable for providing useful data for 
computer modelling (ERRI 1992a). In a test application, ERRI used the 
HAZARD I fire model (Peacock et al. 1991) to simulate a fire in the British 
3 m test cube and concluded that the use of the model to simulate fires in a 
railway vehicle was feasible (ERRI 1992b). ERRI has conducted Cone 
Calorimeter and Furniture Calorimeter to provide input data for fire and 
hazard modelling of passenger coaches (ERRI 1994; ERRI 1995).  
 
In NIST’s Phase I study, a total of 30 materials classified into five board categories 
were selected for the Cone Calorimeter tests. They were:  
a) Seat and mattress assemblies  
b) Wall and window surfaces  
c) Curtains, drapes and fabrics  
d) Floor covering  
e) Miscellaneous components.  
 
Although the materials were from Amtrak rail car, they represented a range of those 
typically used in US passenger trains. 
 
An exposure level of 50 kW/m2 was chosen as a suitable exposure for material 
evaluation consistent with exposure level in the existing FRA-cited test methods and 
exposure levels in actual fires.  
 




The Cone Calorimeter test data was compared with data from FRA-cited small-scale 
test methods to determine relative material fire performance. For majority of the 
materials, the Cone Calorimeter results provide a good correlation with the FRA-cited 
test results. However, some materials which had low flame spread index sI  
(calculated from ASTM E 162 or ASTM D 3675 test data) had higher HRR values in 
the Cone Calorimeter tests. The results suggested that although these materials had 
low flame spread index sI , they might contribute to fire development by releasing 
high amount of heat when ignited.    
 
Phase II (Peacock et al. 2002) 
The Phase II study includes conducting large-scale tests of selected interior material 
component assemblies using Furniture Calorimeter. The data from the Cone 
Calorimeter and Furniture Calorimeter tests was used as input into the CFAST zone 
model of the fire model HAZARD I developed by NIST. The egress time was 
calculated using egress model from HAZARD I, airEXODUSTM (Galea et al. 2001) 
and network model developed by Hagiwara. The latter two egress models were used 
so that relative comparison could be made since egress model from HAZARD I is 
only appropriate for residential occupancies.  The available safe egress time (ASET) 
was then compared with the required safe egress time (RSET) as part of the fire 
hazard analysis (note that the fire analysed were only examples demonstrating the use 
of fire hazard analysis techniques and did not represent an evaluation of any particular 
existing car configuration or actual hazard as highlighted in the report). Three types of 
rail passenger cars were evaluated: typical single level coach, bi-level dining and bi-
level sleeping cars.  
  
In considering the fire scenarios, both interior fire and exterior fire were evaluated. 
Besides electrical-related interior fires, the report also identified several locations of 
interior ignition source in a passenger train which include: 
a) On the floor; 
b) On the floor - beneath a seat, mattress, or table; 
c) On a seat, mattress, or table; 
d) In a trash container; or 
e) On a luggage rack.   




For exterior fire, it was reported that hot wheels caused by problems with brakes or 
bearings were the source of most exterior fire using conventional rail. Exterior fire 
sources for metro systems were also mentioned in the report, which included third rail 
power, propulsion, and braking systems. It was highlighted that consideration must be 
given to the probable results of sub-floor ignition because detection could come late in 
the fire development and suppression could be difficult.   
 
However, modelling of the exterior fire impact upon rail car passengers and train crew 
is beyond the capabilities of computer models or other computational methods. 
Therefore, the focus of the fire scenario development for the Phase II study was only 
on interior fire scenarios. 
 
The following fire scenarios were identified: 
a) An ignition under a coach seat by a small source (crumpled newspaper) 
b) Fire in a trash bag on a coach seat or in a sleeping compartment 
c) Overheated equipment (motor, pump, battery failure) in a sleeping car; and 
d) A ‘Sterno’ can igniting a tablecloth in a dining or lounge car. 
 
The scenarios identified were consistent with past passenger fires and those described 
in the ASTM rail assessment guide (ASTM-E-2061 2000). 
 
Ignition sources used for the large-scale tests are shown in Table 2.5. They were 
selected to represent a range of initial fire conditions that might occur in a passenger 
train (in line with the ignition sources in the fire scenarios identified).  





S/no Ignition Source  Remark 
1 TB 133 burner 
(Ohlemiller and 
Villa 1992) 
- At 17 kW for 80 s  
- Used for flammability of commercial seating furniture. 
- Simulate ignition of several sheets of crumpled newspaper 
- Burner located 0.025 m above seat cushion and 0.05 m 
from back cushion. 
2 Gas sand burner  - At 25 kW or 50 kW throughout the experiment  
- 0.17 square burner 
3 Round gas burner  - At 280 kW at the start of the test and was increased to 
400 kW approximately 300 s into the test  
- 0.27 m diameter burner 
4 Trash bag filled 
with newspaper, 
2.7 kg 
- Simulate the burning characteristics of actual Amtrak train 
trash bags  
- Represent a severe ignition source that may be present on 
the train 
- Peak HRR for the trash bags averaged 203 ±  35 kW 
including the 25 kW sand bag burner used to ignite the 
bags. Average HRR over the entire duration of burning was 
77±  24 kW 
Table 2.5: Ignition sources used for the large-scale tests 
 
A total of twenty-nine large-scale tests of selected interior material component 




Assemblies tested in Furniture 
Calorimeter 
Ignition source 
1-7 Trash bag from Amtrak train (of different 
weight) 
Gas sand burner at 25 kW 
8-10 Trash bag filled with newspaper, 2.7 kg Gas sand burner at 25 kW 
11-14 Coach seat assembly TB 133 burner, Round gas burner 
at 280 and 400 kW, Trash bag 
filled with newspaper, 2.7 kg 
15-16 Lower bed with bedding and pillow Trash bag filled with newspaper, 
2.7 kg 
17 Upper & Lower beds with bedding, 
pillow, and window drapes 
Trash bag filled with newspaper, 
2.7 kg 
18,19 Wall carpet on wall Gas sand burner at 50 kW 
20,21 Wall carpet on wall and ceiling Gas sand burner at 50 kW 
22-24 Window drape Gas sand burner at 25 kW 
25-27 Privacy curtain Gas sand burner at 25 kW 
28 Window with gaskets, frame, and mask Gas sand burner at 50 kW 
29 Window with gaskets, frame, mask, and 
drapes 
Trash bag filled with newspaper, 
2.7 kg 
Table 2.6: Large-scale tests of selected interior material component assemblies using 
Furniture Calorimeter 




Main conclusions from the large-scale tests were: 
a) Trash bags were considered to be a credible large ignition source that could 
lead to fire growth and spread. The HRR values of actual trash bags from an 
Amtrak overnight train ranged from 53 to 284 kW. For the trash bag filled 
with newspaper which was used as the ignition source for many of the 
assembly tests, had a peak HRR of 203±  35 kW. 
b) Component materials that comply with the current FRA fire safety criteria 
were difficult to ignite. The Phase II report stated that it would require ignition 
source strength of 2 to 10 times those used for similar materials and products 
found outside of the rail transportation environment. 
c) However, if severe ignition existed, some of the materials e.g. wall carpeting 
and window glazing, which were difficult to ignite, would produce high HRR 
values once ignited and would contribute to the fire growth.   
  
Phase III (Peacock et al. 2004) 
Seventeen real-scale assembly tests were conducted within an Amtrak passenger rail 
coach car. Among the seventeen tests, five were fire growth and spread tests 
conducted to evaluate the representative hazard of existing passenger rail car 





Test type Ignition source 
13 Window drape Gas sand burner (at 25 kW) on lower edge 
14 Corner test Trash bag filled with newspaper, 2.7 kg, in corner next 
to wall carpet and FRP panel 
15 Gas sand burner at 25 kW below seat 
16 TB 133 burner (at 17 kW for 80 s) on seat 
17 
Seating area 
Trash bag filled with newspaper, 2.7 kg, on seat 
Table 2.7: Five fire growth and spread tests 
 
Most of the tests were terminated when there was significant flame spread. This was 
to prevent extensive damage to the car so that additional tests can be conducted.  
 




For the five flame spread and growth tests, significant flame spread was observed for 
tests using trash bag as ignition source. This was consistent with the conclusions from 
the Phase II report.  
 
One of the objectives of the Phase III study was to compare the real-scale test results 
with the small and large-scale tests results conducted in the first two phases of the 
research. It has been found that the small-scale Cone Calorimeter test results, full–
scale components material assembly tests and real-scale tests all showed similar 
ranking of materials from low HRR to high HRR.  It is also worthwhile to mention 
that the report recognized that in practice, a major advantage of HRR data from a 
device like the Cone Calorimeter has the ability to use these data in appropriate model 
to predict full-scale performance which coincides with the approach taken in this 
research project.   
 
2.3.5 FIRESTARR (Briggs et al. 2001a; Briggs et al. 2001b; Tallec et al. 
2001) 
 
FIRESTARR is a European joint project established to assist the work of European 
standardisation committees CEN/CENELEC in drafting a Part 2 (Requirements for 
the fire behaviour of materials and components) for a 7-part European Standard 
prEN45545 “Fire protection on railway vehicles”. The aim of the new standard is to 
protect passengers and staff from danger caused by fire onboard a train. 
 
FIRESTARR project was initiated as the CEN group realised that there were no 
common test procedures and that the fire safety of different products was not properly 
investigated.  
 




FIRESTARR stands for FIRE STAndardisation Research of Railway vehicles and is a 
joint project that consists of 11 different partners around Europe. The main technical 
objectives of the project were: 
a) To identify the fire risks onboard European trains and to define the most likely 
and relevant fire scenarios 
b) To select the most appropriate test methods to evaluate the reaction-to-fire 
behaviour, according to key fire critical effects like ignitability, time to 
uncontrolled fire (flashover), time to loss of visibility and time to lethal 
conditions 
c) To obtain test results for a representative range of railway products. The 
products are divided into the three groups: surface products (e.g. wall, ceiling 
panels, seat frame and floor coverings), furniture and electrical components. 
d) To recommend a classification system for these ranges of products and to 
validate the proposals with real-scale experiments on different parts of 
European trains.  
 
Note that the review of FIRESTARR project will be on the surface products only as 
they are considered more relevant to the metro train evaluated in this research project.  
  
Statistical analysis of fires from the FIRESTARR study revealed that except in 
particular cases e.g. electrical defect, arson was the main fire risk on board European 
trains and that in most cases, the fires started on the vandalized seat. Three fire 
scenarios were identified in the interior of railway vehicles for the study:  
a) Arson on a seat due to a cigarette lighter or burning newspaper  
b) High temperature in electrical components due to electrical defects  
c) Fire in toilet due to a cigarette or burning newspaper.  
 
Exterior fire scenario e.g. sparks from brakes or by combustion of fuel after a major 
collision, was not considered because model trains are protected against sparks and 
because major collisions were extremely rare in railways as quoted in the report.  
 
The FIRESTARR group assumed the fire was ventilation controlled when the 
windows were sealed but when the windows were broken, the fire became fuel 
controlled. Fuel controlled fire was used as the basis for the test.  




Small-scale, large-scale and real-scale tests were conducted. The set of test methods 
selected must be able to measure the five parameters identified as FIRST (flame 
spread (F), ignitability (I), heat release (R), smoke opacity (S) and toxicity (T)) for 
evaluation of reaction to fire for the three product groups. These five parameters were 
found to be similar to what Rakaczky (1980) considered as the most important 
flammability areas. The test methods must also be representative of at least one of the 
fire development stages (Initial stage, early developing stage, developing stage (pre-
flashover) and developed stage (post-flashover)).  
 
A number of test methods were selected for the small-scale tests. Test methods were 
either EN or ISO/IEC standard. Where international method was found not to be 
applicable, national standards e.g. French NFX, Germany DIN, were used. Among the 
small-scale tests selected for surface products, the Cone Calorimeter was utilised to 
measure the ignitability parameter (ISO 5660 Part 1), heat release parameter (ISO 
5660 Part 1) and smoke opacity parameter (ISO 5660 Part 2). The key parameters for 
analysis from the Cone Calorimeter tests are: 
a) Time to ignition igt  
b) Peak heat release rate "peakq&  
c) Average "q& values for the first 180 and 300 s after ignition i.e. "180q&  and 
"q300&   
d) Total heat released "q   
e) Total smoke produced using specific extinction area SEA 
f) Maximum extinction coefficient maxk  
 
In the Cone Calorimeter tests, an exposure heat flux level of 35 kW/m2 was used to 
simulate an early developing fire and 50 kW/m2 was used to simulate a developing 
fire.   
 
For real-scale tests of surface products, a room (see Figure 2.9) with dimensions of a 
real railway compartment (about 9 m3) was placed under the hood of room corner test 
ISO 9705 (ISO-9705:1993). In order to define the burner (burning seat) and simulate 
thermal attack (on wall and ceiling) during real fire, a series of preliminary tests with 
seats were conducted. From the preliminary tests, FIRESTARR group came out with 
the following conclusions:  




a) An open door condition allowed the seat to produce higher intensity fire. This 
was the fire considered to reproduce the thermal attack on walls and ceilings 
during real fire. 
b) The thermal attack on ceiling was never bigger than the attack on the wall. 
 
Two burner sizes were stated in different sections of the report.   
a) Burner which was able to reach 180 kW in 5 minutes producing thermal attack 
of 40, or maximum 50 kW/m2 on the walls  
b) Burner which reached 75 kW for 2 minutes followed by 150 kW for 8 minutes 
producing thermal attack of 40 kW/m2.  
The latter was likely to be the one used in the real-scale tests.   
 
Figure 2.9: Schematic view of 9 m3 compartment (reproduced from (Briggs et al. 
2001a)) 
 
Some correlations were found between the small-scale and real-scale tests for surface 
products (mainly wall and ceiling) as discussed below: 
a) For materials which provide flashover, there is a correlation between the real-
scale and small-scale (ISO 5660 at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level).  
b) For fire growth parameters, the following correlations were found: 




- Heat release rate (real-scale) and "180q&  and 
"
180q&  (ISO 5660 at 35 and 
50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux levels) 
- Total heat released (real-scale) and total heat released (ISO 5660 at 
35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level) only for materials with flashover. 
c) For smoke parameters, correlation was found between smoke production rate  
(real-scale) and rate of smoke generation in the first 4 minutes (VOF4) 
(ISO 5659-2 at 25 kW/m2 with pilot flame and 50 kW/m2 without pilot flame)  
d) For toxicity parameters, fractional effective dose (FED) (real-scale) was found 
to correlate with combination of parameters in small-scale that was, index 
toxicity multiple by total mass loss (with the index toxicity from UITP E6 test 
at 400 or 600°C and the total mass loss from ISO 5660 test at 35 or 50 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux levels). 
 
Following these findings, the FIRESTARR group recommended test methods, test 
conditions and classification criteria for wall and ceiling products as shown in Table 
2.8. 
 
Class A is for high performance product suitable for use in train with underground or 
tunnel operations. Class B is medium performance product for use in train with non-
underground or non-tunnel operations and Class C is for low performance product 
which is only suitable for use in low risk, limited use applications only.   
 
For flooring products, no real-scale compartment/corridor tests were carried out in the 
FIRESTARR project. The recommended test methods were based on the analysis of 
results obtained in small-scale and also information coming from the EN work for 
building product. The test methods, test conditions and classification criteria for 
flooring products are shown in Table 2.9. 





Classification Criteria Fire 
Critical 
Effect 
Parameter Test method Test condition 
Class A Class B Class C 
F ISO 5658-2 Exposure heat flux gradient from 50 
to 1.5 kW/m2 
CFE≥ 37 kW/m2 CFE≥ 30 kW/m2 CFE≥ 10 kW/m2 Ease of 
Initiation 
I ISO 5660-1 Exposure heat flux level of 50 kW/m2 No ignition Ignition Ignition 
Fire 
Growth 
R ISO 5660-1 Exposure heat flux level of 50 kW/m2 No FO or 
FOt ≥ 390 s  
FOt ≥ 240 s  n/r 
Smoke 
opacity 
S ISO 5659-2 Exposure heat flux level of 50 kW/m2  
(Without pilot flame) 
VLt ≥ 390 s  VLt ≥ 390 s  n/r 
ISO 5660-1 Mass loss measurement at 35  kW/m2 




UITP E6 400°C 
FED<1.0 FED<10.0 n/r 
Table 2.8: Test methods, test conditions and classification criteria for wall and ceiling products (adopted from Briggs et al. (2001a)) 
 
Note:  
1) CFE is critical flux at extinguishment (ISO 5658-2) 
2) FO is flashover in 10 m3 compartment as calculation from ISO 5660-1 data at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level using the correlation 
equation derived  
3) FOt  is time to flashover in compartment as calculation from ISO 5660-1 data at 50 kW/m
2 exposure heat flux level using the correlation 
equation derived  
4) VLt is time to loss of visibility in 40 m
3 corridor as calculation from ISO 5659-2 data using the correlation equation derived  
5) FED is fractional effective dose calculated from UITP E6 data and ISO 5660-1 data at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level using the 
correlation equation derived  
6) n/r is not required 
 





Classification Criteria Fire 
Critical 
Effect 
Parameter Test method Test condition 
Class A Class B Class C 
F Pr EN ISO 
9239-1 
Exposure heat flux gradient from 
11 to 1 kW/m2 
CRF≥ 8.0 kW/m2 CRF≥ 4.5 kW/m2 CF≥ 3.0 kW/m2 Ease of 
Initiation 
I ISO 5660-1 Exposure heat flux of 25 kW/m2 No Ignition Ignition Ignition 
Fire 
Growth 
R ISO 5660-1 Exposure heat flux of 25 kW/m2 "q ≤ 75 MJ/m2 "q ≤ 120 MJ/m2 n/r 
Exposure heat flux of 25 kW/m2  
(+pf)  
VOF4≤ 100 VOF4≤ 1000 n/r Smoke 
opacity 
S ISO 5659-2 
Exposure heat flux of 25 kW/m2  
(-pf) 
VOF4≤ 100 VOF4≤ 200 n/r 
ISO 5660-1 Mass loss measurementa Smoke 
Lethality 
T 
UITP E6  400 or 600°C 
FED<1.0 FED<10.0 n/r 
a Exposure heat flux level for Cone Calorimeter test 5660-1 was not stated in Briggs et al. (2001a) 
Table 2.9: Test methods, test conditions and classification criteria for flooring products (adopted from Briggs et al. (2001a)) 
 
Note:  
1) CRF is critical radiant flux. It is the radiant flux at which the flame extinguishes or the radiant flux after a test period of 30 minutes, 
which ever is the lower (i.e. the flux corresponding with the further extent of flame spread).  
2) VOF4 is smoke rate index in the first 4 minutes 
3) ISO 5660-1, ISO 5659-2 and UITP E6 tests with the proposed test conditions are optional for measurements on parameters smoke 
production rate and are only required if specified by Regulators. 
4) n/r is not required 
 
 




2.3.6 Conducting a Full-Scale Experiment on a Rail Passenger Car 
(White and Dowling 2004)  
 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO)’s Fire 
Science and Technology Laboratory (FSTL) conducted a series of rail passenger car 
fire experiments on a collaborative basis with a rail operator and Queensland Fire and 
Rescue Service (QFRS). The objectives of the experiments were to: 
a) Investigate the fire size resulting from application of different ignition sources 
in a typical rail passenger vehicle; 
b) Establish an understanding of how fire develops and spreads in a typical rail 
passenger vehicle; and    
c) Enhance understanding of the link between material flammability properties 
and total fire size. 
 
Note that FSTL is currently analysing the experimental data therefore no results have 
been presented.   
  
A total of ten experiments were conducted. Nine of them were ignition experiments 
and one (fully developed fire) involved burning of approximately half the vehicle 
fitted with typical interior materials. The combination of interior car materials 
selected for the experiments was intended as representative of a typical Australian 
suburban rail passenger vehicle.  
 
As no suitable existing tunnel or large enclosure was available for the experiments, 
they were carried out in the open air. Therefore combustion products could not be 
collected for measuring heat release rate by oxygen consumption calorimetry. The 
analysis and estimation of heat release rate was by ‘other means’ using the 
temperature, flow, radiation heat flux, etc data collected during the experiments.   
‘Other means’ quoted in the paper include:  
a) Matching existing fire plume and ceiling jet correlations with observations to 
estimate the HRR. 
b) Based on conservation of energy and mass to estimate the HRR.   




c) Use of fire model such as FDS to estimate the HRR by iteratively 
inputting a “best guess” HRR to the CFD model and comparing the resulting 
temperature distribution and smoke plumes with those actually observed.            
 
The ignition sources and ignition source locations for the ignition experiments are 
shown in Table 2.10. 
 
Test no Ignition source 
1 300 g crumpled newspaper piled on seat against wall 
2 600 g crumpled newspaper piled on seat against wall 
3 150 g timber crib on seat against wall 
4 400 g timber crib on seat against wall 
5 500 ml kerosene poured onto slashed seat adjacent wall 
6 450 g crumpled newspaper piled on seat against wall 
7 450 g crumpled newspaper piled on floor in corner behind steel seat shell 
8 300 g crumpled newspaper piled on floor in corner behind GRP seat shell 
9 600 g timber crib on seat against wall 
Table 2.10: Ignition sources and ignition source locations for the ignition experiments 
 
As for the last experiment, the ignition source used was 1 kg of crumpled newspapers 
piled on the floor in a corner behind the end seat shell.  
 
Cone Calorimeter tests for major combustible materials present in the carriage were 
also conducted. The exposure heat flux levels for the materials were selected based on 
their end use orientations. Supine materials were tested at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat 
flux level, vertical materials were tested at 35kW/m2 and prone materials were tested 
at 50 kW/m2. The Cone Calorimeter heat release rate curves, as highlighted in the 
paper, will be used to calculate the HRR using method similar to Duggan (1997) (see 
Section 2.2.2). However, the calculation may be modified to match experimentally 
observed spread rates.    
 




2.3.7 Conclusions drawn from previous research 
 
The following conclusions are drawn from previous research. 
(The reference indicates from which study the conclusions are drawn.) 
a) In metro vehicle interior tests, the design of seat assemblies and wall linings 
are important factors in fire growth (Braun 1975; Braun 1978). In passenger 
rail car, the design of wall coverings adjacent to seating is the key to the fire 
growth (Peacock and Braun 1984).   
b) Ignition source sizes used for full-scale and real-scale tests have increased 
progressively for each newer study as interior materials used in newer rail car 
which complied with the current small-scale test methods’ performance 
criteria are more difficult to ignite (Braun 1975; Briggs et al. 2001a; Peacock 
et al. 2004; Peacock and Braun 1984; Peacock et al. 2002; White and Dowling 
2004). 
c) In almost all the studies, the newspaper is identified as an ignition source. An 
electrical fault is also considered but the ignition size is hard to define (Braun 
1975; Briggs et al. 2001a; Peacock et al. 2004; Peacock and Braun 1984; 
Peacock et al. 2002; White and Dowling 2004). 
d) In addition to electrical defects, the locations of ignition source to be  
considered are the corner area and the seat area (Braun 1975; Braun 1978; 
Briggs et al. 2001a; Peacock et al. 2004; Peacock and Braun 1984; Peacock 
and Braun 1999; Peacock et al. 2002).   
e) An ignition source size between 150 to 200 kW is required to reproduce a 
thermal attack of 40 to 50 kW/m2 on walls and ceilings and develop significant 
fire growth and flame spread (Briggs et al. 2001a; Peacock et al. 2004).    
f) In US, an exterior fire is still considered as a potential fire scenario. However 
in EU, exterior fire is less of a concern as modern trains are protected against 
sparks and because major collisions are extremely rare in railways (Braun 
1978; Briggs et al. 2001a; Peacock et al. 2002). 




g) Nearly all the current efforts in transportation vehicle fire safety are focused 
on the use of HRR data to measure material fire performance (Barnett 1992; 
Briggs et al. 2001a; Burdett et al. 1989; Cappuccio 1992; ERRI 1992a; ERRI 
1992b; Parker 1994; Peacock 1993; Peacock and Braun 1999; 
Schirmer_Engineering_Corporation 1990; Young 1995).       
h) Cone Calorimeter test data can provide useful data for computer modelling 
(ERRI 1992a; Peacock 1993; Peacock and Braun 1999) .  
i) An exposure level of 50 kW/m2 is chosen as a suitable exposure for material 
evaluation using Cone Calorimeter consistent with exposure level in the 
existing test methods and exposure levels in actual fires (Peacock and Braun 
1999; Young 1995). It has been found that at this exposure, there are 
correlations between HRR data from the Cone Calorimeter and real-scale tests 
(Briggs et al. 2001a; Peacock et al. 2004). 




2.4 Studies relevant to this research project 
 
Numerous studies have been carried out on fire safety in tunnels. While most studies 
focus on ensuring the systems are adequately designed (whereby in most cases, the 
HRR is predefined) e.g. Brennan and Lim (2003); Könnecke and Schneider (2004); 
Luo and Yau (2002) and Sinai (2004), some specific studies focus on examining 
factors such as tunnel and tunnel size; forced ventilation; tunnel slope, have on the 
HRR of a burning vehicle in a tunnel which are relevant to this research project.  
 
2.4.1 Tunnel and tunnel size 
 
Casale and Marlair (1994) conducted fire experiments for heptane and noted that the 
burning rate of a pool fire in a tunnel was higher than expected in the open air. They 
suggested that it might be due to significant re-radiation from the heated walls.     
 
Carvel et al. (2001a) from Heriot-Watt University investigated in detail the 
differences between the HRR of fires in tunnels with the HRR of similar fires in the 
open air. No fire test was conducted in their study. The data was from study of fire 
tests in tunnels recorded in various literature. The HRRs for car, wooden crib and pool 
fires were compared. From the study, they concluded that in many instances the 
confining geometry of the tunnel enhanced the HRR of a fire significantly and the 
degree of enhancement appeared to increase with the fire dimensions up to a point 
where fire became ventilation controlled. However for pool fires, they found that the 
amount of enhancement was very much dependent on the nature of the fuel.  
 
In another paper (Carvel et al. 2001c), they published an empirical formula which 
relates the fire width fW , tunnel width tW and HRR enhancement ψ . The formula is 














ψ             
Equation 2.11 
 




They suggested that the formula is valid for most fires involving cars, wooden cribs 
and kerosene & heptane pools in tunnels with a rectangular aspect. For fires in tunnels 
with a concave ceiling, the formula under-predicts the value of ψ   by up to 10%.  
 
2.4.2 Forced ventilation 
 
The researchers from Heriot-Watt University also investigated the influence of 
longitudinal ventilation on the HRR for fires in tunnels (Carvel et al. 1999a; Carvel et 
al. 1999b; Carvel et al. 2001b; Carvel et al. 2001d). Five different fires were 
investigated: fires involving heavy good vehicles (HGVs); passenger cars; and three 
different sizes of pool fires. The study was probabilistic in nature, producing a 
probability distribution of HRR for each of the cases at four different longitudinal 
ventilation velocities (2, 4, 6 and 10 m/s). The results from the study indicated that the 
HRR of a HGV would be greatly enhanced by longitudinal ventilation; there was a 
high probability that a HGV fire would have a HRR about five times and 10 times 
greater with a forced ventilation velocity of 4m/s and 10m/s respectively than with 
natural ventilation. The results were somewhat in line with findings by Bettis et al. 
(1994) who carried out reduced-scale experiments for HGVs. Bettis et al. (1994) 
reported that with decrease in ventilation rate, the HRR also reduced, particularly the 
large fires where a strong correlation between the HRR and the ventilation velocity 
was observed.  
 
For pool fires, however, the study predicted that forced ventilation would have an 
‘enflaming’ effect on small and medium pool fires at low ventilation rates, but that 
higher ventilation would tend to reduce the HRR of a fire. On the other hand, for large 
pool fires, forced ventilation appeared to have an ‘enflaming’ effect at all ventilation 
rates. For car fires, there was no significant variation of the HRR with forced 
ventilation.  
 




2.4.3 Tunnel slope 
 
Rail tunnel is normally sloped between stations for practical reasons. Depending on 
the tunnel alignment and the soil conditions, the gradient of a rail tunnel varies from 
0° to 3° (Lim 2005) and has direct influence on the critical velocity. Wu (2003) 
studies the effects of tunnel slope on the critical velocity both experimentally and by 
CFD simulations. When the tunnel is less than 15º, he found that the critical velocity 
increased linearly with slope.  
 
When calculating the critical velocity, the effects of tunnel slope is accounted for by 
grade correction factor gradeK  and is given by Equation 2.12 (Associated-Engineers 
1980). 
8.0)(0374.01 gradeKgrade +=            Equation 2.12 
 
A sloped tunnel increases the critical velocity and hence the ventilation rate of the 
emergency tunnel ventilation system. In Section 2.4.2, the effect of forced ventilation 
on the HRR has been discussed. Therefore, it can be concluded that a sloped tunnel 
will has ‘indirect’ effect on the HRR of a burning vehicle. However its ‘direct’ effect 
on the HRR is not clear, as there is little or no specific study in this area. The only 
study that may be relevant is study on trench effect.  However from studies on trench 
effect e.g. Drysdale et al. (1992), a gradient of 3° might be too gentle to have 
significant effect on the HRR. Therefore, it was decided not to investigate this further 
to limit the scope of this project.       
 




2.4.4 Conclusions drawn from specific studies  
 
Although the results from the above studies might not be directly applicable to this 
research project, they do highlight the significance of tunnel environment on the HRR 
of a fire in a tunnel.  For the effect of tunnel and tunnel size on the HRR, it can be 
accounted for in the simulation conducted in this research. The effect of forced 
ventilation can also be investigated. However, the direct effect of a sloped tunnel on 
the HRR will not be investigated to limit the scope of this research.        
 
It is important to highlight that there are others ongoing /completed research programs 
on tunnel fire safety e.g. Memorial tunnel fire tests (FHWA 2004), Runehamar fire 
tests (SP 2004), PIARC research program (PIARC 1999). However, these programs 
have different objectives (some only main for road tunnel) which are beyond the 


















3 Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
 
This Chapter outlines the main assumptions and equations behind the FDS to give a 
brief overview and broad understanding of the concepts behind the model. The 
underlying theory of FDS in predicting fire growth and flame spread will be described. 
The details covered in this Chapter are mainly referenced from Carlsson (2003); 
Cox (1995); Floyd et al. (2001) and McGrattan (2004).  
 
3.1 Hydrodynamics model 
 
FDS solves numerically a form of the Navier-stokes equations for low-speed, 
thermally driven flow with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires. The 
core algorithm is an explicit predictor-corrector scheme, second order accuracy in 
space and time. Turbulence is treated by means of the Smagorinsky form of Large 
Eddy Simulation (LES), in which large-scale eddies are computed directly and the 
sub-grid dissipative processes are modelled. It is possible to perform a Direct 
Numerical Simulation (DNS), in which dissipative terms are computed directly, if the 
underlying numerical grid is fine enough (McGrattan 2004). In this project, LES 
approach has been employed due to practical reasons (grid resolution and computing 
power) and therefore only theory behind LES approach is presented.  
 
Four conservation equations (mass, species, momentum and energy) for a thermally-
expandable multi-component mixture of ideal gases are being solved in FDS. They 
will be individually discussed in later Sections.  
  




3.1.1 Conservation of mass 
 
 
The general conservation of mass equation states that the rate of mass storage within a 
given control volume, due to density changes, is balanced by the net rate of inflow of 
mass by convection. In the case of a steady flow situation, the conservation of mass 











Where the first term describes the density changes with time and the second term 
defines the mass convection. u is the vector describing the velocity in the u, v and w 
directions. 
 
3.1.2 Conservation of species 
 
 
In the presence of a vector u , the conservation of mass fraction Y of a chemical 





∂ ρρρ  
Equation 3.2 
 
Where the first term on the left side represents the accumulation of species due to 
change in density with time, the second term is the inflow and outflow of species from 
the control volume due to convection. The right side gives the terms for the inflow or 
outflow of species from the control volume due to diffusion and the production rate of 
particular species within the control volume caused by chemical reaction.  
 




3.1.3 Conservation of momentum 
 
 
The equation for the conservation of momentum is derived by applying Newton’s 
second law of motion, which states that the rate of momentum of a fluid element is 












∂ ρτρ .).(  
Equation 3.3 
 
Here the left hand side represents the increase in momentum and inertia forces, while 
the right hand side comprises forces acting on it. These forces include pressure p , 
gravity g , an external force vector f  (which represents the drag associated with 
sprinkler droplets that penetrate the control volume) and a measure of the viscous 
stress tensor τ  acting on the fluid within the control volume. Among these forces, 
gravity is the most important because it represents the influence of buoyancy on the 
flow. 
 
3.1.4 Conservation of energy 
 
 
The equation for conservation of energy is the first law of thermodynamics which 
states that increase in energy of the control volume is equal to the heat added minus 






































Here the left side describes the net rate of energy accumulation, whereas the right side 
comprises of the various energy gain or loss terms that contribute to this energy 
accumulation. These include the pressure work term, energy driving the system, 
represented by HRR per unit volume '"q& , the radiative heat flux vector radq and the 
convective term Tk∇∇. . The last term represents the energy change associated with 
species inter-diffusion.  
  
3.1.5 Equation of State 
 
 
The conservation equations are supplemented by an equation of state relating the 
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3.2 Combustion model 
 
 
There are two types of combustion models used in FDS. The choice depends on the 
type of simulation approach chosen. For LES approach, a mixture fraction-based 
combustion model is used.  
 
The mixture fraction combustion model approximates the combustion process in both 
space and time so that the fire can be simulated more efficiently (Floyd et al. 2001). It 
assumes that large-scale transport phenomena due to convection and radiation can be 
simulated directly, but physical processes occurring at small length and time scales 
must be represented in an approximate manner (McGrattan 2004). This assumption is 
essential because the actual rate of chemical processes that control the combustion 
energy release are too complex and computationally expensive to be included, even in 
reduced form, in practical CFD simulations (Carlsson 2003).  
 




In mixture fraction-based combustion model, combustion is calculated from the 
mixing rates of fuel and oxidant. The chemical reactions between fuel and oxygen are 




iPOF vOvFuelv ,22 Products Equation 3.6 
 
Where the numbers iv are the stoichiometric coefficients for the overall combustion 
process that reacts fuel ‘ F ’ with oxygen ‘ 2O ’ to produce a number of products ‘ P ’. 
 
The model assumes that the combustion is mixing-controlled and that all species of 
interest can be represented by a single variable known as mixture fraction ),( txZ .  
The mixture fraction is a conserved quantity representing the fraction of material at a 
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Equation 3.7 
  
Where IFY  is the fuel mass fraction in the fuel stream, FM  is the fuel molecular 
weight, 2OM  is the oxygen molecular weight.   
 
By design, Z  varies from one in the region containing only fuel, to zero where the 
oxygen mass fraction equals its ambient value ∞2OY .  
 
The reaction is assumed to proceed infinitely fast, meaning that all mixtures of 
oxygen and fuel react instantaneously as they mix such that both fuel and oxygen 
cannot coexist. This will result in both fuel and oxygen vanishing at a certain instant 
where their mass fractions iY  drop to zero. Equation 3.7 can therefore be simplified to 




















The flame mixture fraction fZ  defines the flame by prescribing a two-dimensional 
surface, known as flame sheet, in a three dimensional space (McGrattan 2004).  
 
The assumption that fuel and oxidizer cannot co-exist also leads to the state relation 

















The mass fraction of all the other species of interest can be also described by 
individual state relations based on the mixture fraction. These state relations can be 
determined by analysis of the stoichiometric reaction of the particular fuel under 
consideration. Figure 3.1 illustrates the state relations of various species for propane. 
From Figure 3.1, the point where the fuel and oxygen lines meet at a mass fraction of 
zero is where the flame sheet is defined, as mentioned earlier.  
 
Figure 3.1: State relations for propane (reproduced from McGrattan (2004)) 
 




In FDS, the local HRR is estimated using a rather simple method based on oxygen 
consumption calorimetry. The oxygen consumption rate is calculated from the mass 
fraction and the corresponding local HRR can then be calculated from:  
 
'"
22 OO mHq && ∆=′′′  Equation 3.10 
 
This is the concept used in FDS. McGrattan (2004) explains in details how an 
expression for the local HHR is derived from the conservation equations and state 
relations for numerical simulation.     
 
3.2.1 Enhancements to the mixture fraction combustion model 
 
 
The mixture fraction model described in the previous Section has several limitations, 
both numerical and physical. Its numerical limitations are related to the grid resolution.  
If the grid is coarse, the fire will not be adequately resolved. This will result in the 
flame surface, as defined by the mixture fraction fZZ = , to underestimate the 
observed flame height. Consequently, the HRR will be under-estimated. To overcome 
this problem, a different value of Z is used to define the combustion region for a 
better estimation of the flame height.  
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Equation 3.11 
 
Where C  is an empirical constant (that is independent of the scenario being 




















and xδ is the nominal grid size.  




Another problem with coarse grid is that a disproportionate amount of the combustion 
energy is released near the edges of the fire source.  To avoid too much of the energy 
from being released too close to the fire source when coarse grid is used, there is a 
maximum bound imposed on the local heat release rate per unit area of flame sheet. 
This upper bound is based on a simple analysis in which the fire is assumed to be 
conical in shape with the surface area surA , and a flame height fH  given by: 
  
02.17.3 5/2* −= Q
D
H f &  
Equation 3.13 
 
The surface area of a real flame is larger than that of a cone, so the upper board 
estimate will prevent too much energy from being released too close to the fire when a 
coarse grid is used, but will be high enough not to interfere with the calculation when 
the grid is well resolved. Any energy that is ‘clipped’ off due to the upper bound is 
redistributed over the entire flame volume automatically (McGrattan 2004).  
 
The physical limitation of the mixture fraction combustion model is that it assumes 
the fuel and oxygen burn instantaneously when mixed. The assumption of fast 
chemistry does not normally place any restrictions on the calculations that are typical, 
i.e. well-ventilated fires.  However, if a fire is in an under-ventilated compartment, or 
if a suppression agent like water mist or 2CO is introduced, fuel and oxygen may mix 
but combustion may not occur. Also, a shear layer with high strain rate separating the 
fuel stream from an oxygen supply can prevent combustion to take place (McGrattan 
2004). To overcome this physical limitation, a simple model has been implemented 
for flame extinction in FDS. This model relates the flame extinction to the oxygen 
concentration and the temperature as shown in Figure 3.2. When the gas environment 
falls in the ‘No Burn’ zone, the state relations (see Figure 3.1) are no longer valid for 
values of Z  below stoichiometric, since now some fuel may be mixed with the other 
combustion products (McGrattan 2004).   
 
This enable FDS to simulate under-ventilated or fire suppression scenarios described 
above where most CFD codes fail to predict burning behaviour accurately (Carlsson 
2003). 





Figure 3.2: Oxygen-temperature phase space showing where combustion is allowed 
and not allowed to take place (reproduced from McGrattan (2004)) 
 
3.3 Thermal radiation model 
 
 
In FDS, a Finite Volume approach has been adopted in solving the Radiative 
Transport Equation (RTE) for a non-scattering grey gas to compute the radiative heat 
flux. This is explained in more detail in McGrattan (2004). 
 
A major point to be highlighted is that different approach (or equation) has been used 
to calculate the source term (radiation intensity) bI  for the grid cells through which the 
flame sheet cuts. This is because the temperatures are averaged across the grid cell 
and are therefore considerably lower than would be expected for a particular point in a 
diffusion flame. Because radiation is dependent on the forth power of temperature, 
this will affect the accuracy of radiation heat flux calculated from those particular 
grids. Elsewhere i.e. outside flame zone, there is greater confidence in the computed 
temperature, and the original equation for source term can assume its ideal value there 
(McGrattan 2004). The equations used to calculate the source term are shown in 
Equation 3.14. 
 




















Where σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant, '"q& is the HRR per unit volume and radχ is 
the local fraction of that HRR emitted as thermal radiation. κ  is the local absorption 
coefficient and is dependent on the mixture fraction and temperature; and is 
determined by a sub-model implemented in FDS called RADCAL (McGrattan 2004). 
 
3.4 Convection heat flux   
 
 
The calculation of convective heat flux depends on whether one is performing DNS or 
LES. In LES calculation, the convective heat flux to the surface is obtained from a 
combination of natural and forced convection correlations (McGrattan 2004). 
 














kTCh connatcon  
Equation 3.15 
 
Where T∆ is the difference between the wall and the gas temperature, connatC is the 
coefficient for natural convection, L  is the characteristic length related to the size of 
the physical obstruction, k is the thermal conductivity of the gas, and the Reynolds 
number Re and Prandtl number Pr are based on the gas flowing past the obstruction.     
 
3.5 Pyrolysis model   
 
 
FDS includes a simple model for ignition and surface-flame spread, in which an 
ignition temperature is assigned to the combustible surface. The rate of pyrolysis 
being governed by a user prescribed constant which is either a rate of heat release per 
unit of the surface area HRRPUA or a heat of vaporisation (gasification) vH∆ .    
 




If HRRPUA is prescribed, the surface will burn like a burner when it has reached its 
ignition temperature. If heat of vaporisation is prescribed, the burning rate of the fuel 
will depend on the net heat feedback to the surface from the fire. For thermoplastic 
fuel, the calculation of net heat feedback will depend on whether the surface material 
is thermally-thick or thermally-thin. 
 
If the surface material is assumed to be thermally thick, one-dimensional heat 
conduction equation for the material temperature ),( txT  is applied in the direction 
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Equation 3.16 
 
where ρ , c and k  are the temperature dependent density, specific heat and 
conductivity of the materials respectively; "conq& is the convective and 
"
radq is the (net) 
radiative heat flux at the surface, "m& is the mass loss rate per unit area and vH∆ is the 
heat of vaporisation.  Fuel pyrolysis is assumed to take place at the surface thus the 
heat required to vaporize the fuel is extracted from the incoming energy flux. The 
pyrolysis rate is estimated using a single-step Arrhenius rate law of the first order, 
written as:  
 
   TEAeAm ℜ−=′′ /ρ&  Equation 3.17 
 
The value of the pre-exponential factor A  and the activation energy AE are chosen 
such that the burning takes place very close to a given ignition temperature. These 
parameters are probably the most difficult to choose when using a model of this kind. 
The values found in the literature are not consistent with each other and can differ by 
one order of magnitude or more (Carlsson 2003). If A  and AE  are not known, which 
is usually the case, user can prescribe the critical mass flux rate and the ignition 
temperature. This will direct the code to choose A  and AE  so that the fuel burns at 
the critical mass flux rate when its surface temperature reaches ignition temperature 




(McGrattan and Forney 2004). The latter method is used in this project. Besides 
prescribing the critical mass flux rate and the ignition temperature, the maximum 
burning rate of the fuel will also be prescribed so that to prevent excess pyrolysis. The 
intent is to limit the burning rate of the fuel to its measured maximum. 
  
If the surface material is assumed to be thermally-thin, that is, its temperature is 
assumed uniform across its width, )(tT is affected by gains and losses due to 
convection, radiation and pyrolysis. The thermal lag of the material is a function of 
the product of its density, specific heat and thicknessδ . The heat transfer equation is 
given by: 
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Equation 3.18 
 
The convective and radiative fluxes are summed over the front and back surface of the 
thin fuel. The back surface is assumed to face an ambient temperature void by default 
in FDS unless otherwise specified (McGrattan 2004). The pyrolysis rate for a 
thermally-thin fuel is also estimated using Equation 3.17. 
 
The heat transfer and pyrolysis for the charring fuels e.g. wood and liquid fuels 
e.g. methanol are different from the thermoplastic fuel. They are not covered here 
since these fuels are not simulated in this project. The details however can be found in 
McGrattan (2004); McGrattan and Forney (2004).   
  
3.6 Stretching the grid    
 
In FDS, the grid cells that fill the computational domain are uniform in size by default. 
However, one or two of the three coordinate directions can be specified to be non- 
uniform (McGrattan and Forney 2004).  This can be done by using the TRNX, TRNY 
and/or TRNZ namelist groups. This function will be used in this project so that to 
capture the important features of the train that is much smaller than the defined grid 
size. 






This Chapter outlines the approach taken in this project to accomplish the objectives. 
Nine major steps are taken in this project and are discussed below.  
 
1) Train car construction; train car and tunnel geometries 
 
The first step is to identify the amount and type of combustible materials, its location, and 
orientation in the train car (to be discussed in Chapter 5). The focus will be on the 
exposed surface materials in the train car interior since they are the fuels being modelled 
in FDS. They are the main combustibles and will be the first to ignite and involve in the 
fire. Miscellaneous items such as electrical cables, electrical components, air-conditioning 
(air-con) duct, air-con components, thermal insulation, etc are not included because there 
items are either housed in the underseat boxes, equipped cubicle assembly, driver console 
assembly, behind wall construction or inside the ceiling. These items will only be 
involved when the exposed surface materials melt, drip or collapse and it is beyond the 
capabilities of fire models or other computational methods to simulate these phenomena. 
Therefore, it is assumed that these items will only involved during the late stage of the 
fire and have little effect on the peak HRR.  
 
The sub-floor components i.e. floor and below floor combustibles, are also not included. 
However means to incorporate the contribution of sub-floor components is proposed as 
discussed below.  
 
Sub-floor components 
Due to the complexity of undercarriage geometry, materials used, etc, it is beyond the 
scope of this project to model fire growth and flame spread in the undercarriage. When 
considering exterior fire scenario, it is assumed that the exterior fire has propagated above 
floor and burned in the car interior. The fire size of the exterior fire will be estimated 
using the traditional method. This will account for the contribution of the sub-floor 
components. The estimated fire size is used as an ignition source in the car interior for the 
simulation. This approach allowed both interior and exterior fire scenarios to be examined 
in the study.   




The train and tunnel geometries are factors that will affect the fire development and 
will also be accounted for in the simulation. 
 
2) Gather information on mechanical and thermal properties of bounding surfaces  
 
The material in the bounding surfaces of the train can affect the hot gas temperature 
considerably and thereby the heat flux to the burning surface. Most of the material 
properties are not available from the train supplier and therefore need to be gathered 
from references or calculated. Information required included the thicknessδ , thermal 
conductivity k , specific heat c and density ρ . Material properties for the concrete 
tunnel wall also need to be sought since they affect the tunnel temperature.  
 
3) Set up FDS model  
 
The third step is to set up FDS model. This will be carried out based on the actual 
train and tunnel geometries.  
 
4) Modelling approach 
 
Two modelling approaches are proposed in this project. The difference between the 
two is the prescribed constant which governed the rate of pyrolysis as discussed in 
Chapter 3 i.e. one modelling approach prescribed heat of vaporisation while the other 
prescribed HRRPUA. The modelling approach prescribing the heat of vaporisation is 
a more realistic method of simulating fire compared to the modelling approach by 
prescribing the HRRPUA as rate of pyrolysis is dependant on heat feedback from fire 
and not a user prescribed constant. However, the latter approach is included in the 
project as an attempt to improve on the HRR estimation method developed by 
Duggan (1997) by considering factors that affect the fire development  
 
In Duggan (1997) method, the surface materials are tested in the Cone Calorimeter at 
an exposure heat flux levels selected according to their orientation in the train car. The 
proposed exposure heat flux levels are in the range of 20 (or 25) kW/m2 (‘floor-like’ 
orientation material) to 50 kW/m2 (‘ceiling-like’ orientation material). 




These exposure conditions can be related to unwanted fires. Three types of flaming 
fires have been categorised by the British Standards Institution (BSI 1988) in its Code 
of Practice for the Assessment of Toxic Hazards in Fire in Buildings and Transport. 
They are: 
a) Developing fires, flaming (pre-flashover) 
b) Fully-developed fires, high ventilation (post-flashover fuel-controlled fires) 
c) Fully-developed fires, low ventilation (post-flashover ventilation-controlled 
fires) 
 
According to Peacock and Braun (1999), the heat flux levels found in fires are: 
a) Developing fires – 20 to 50 kW/m2 
b) Fully-developed fires – 50 to 75 kW/m2 
 
The heat flux levels for developing fires are found to be consistent with values quoted 
in a number of literature e.g. Babrauskas (2002) and Briggs et al. (2001a). In 
Briggs et al. (2001a), exposure heat flux of 35 kW/m2 and 50 kW/m2 were used to 
simulate early developing fire and developing fire respectively. Cone Calorimeter test 
at exposure heat flux level of 25 kW/m2 was included in their proposed test methods 
for floor products.  
 
However, for post-flashover fires, substantially higher heat flux levels were reported 
in Babrauskas (2002) as shown in Table 4.1 below. The reported values were based 
on experimental results of heat fluxes measurement in post-flashover room fires.  
 
Heat flux (kW/m2)  
Ceiling Walls Floor 
Maximum 106-176 116-229 119-143 
Average 68-147 91-194 - 
Table 4.1: Heat fluxes measured in post-flashover room fires (adopted from 
Babrauskas (2002)) 
  




This information suggests that the exposure conditions proposed by Duggan (1997) 
could only represent conditions within a train car which is progressing towards, or is 
at flashover.  For the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, the rate of heat release 
from the fuel surface will follow the prescribed Cone Calorimeter HRRPUA curve (of 
the fuel) once its surface reached the ignition temperature. FDS is not able to adjust 
the HRRPUA curve according to the heat feedback from the fire. This is one of the 
limitations of FDS. Therefore using the HRRPUA curve at heat fluxes proposed by 
Duggan (1997) is likely to over predict the HRR during the early stage of the fire. 
Because of add-on effect, it may inaccurately predict flashover even though in an 
actual fire, flashover may not happen.  
 
Therefore for material which is difficult to ignite, using the HRRPUA curve at heat 
fluxes proposed by Duggan (1997) will be conservative; however, for a material 
which is easily combustible, it may under predict the HRR. As rail car materials that 
comply with the stringent small-scale tests performance criteria are difficult to ignite 
(Peacock et al. 2002), it was decided that heat flux levels proposed by Duggan 1997) 
be used in the current study but modified according to the scheme as shown in Table 
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Table 4.2: Exposure heat flux levels for Cone Calorimeter testing in the modelling 
approach based on HRRPUA 
 
Note that as the Cone Calorimeter test will be conducted under controlled conditions, 
the computed HRRPUA curve may not represent the HRR of the material when the 
material is burning in a real train fire scenario especially under the influence of 
emergency tunnel ventilation airflow. However, in order to proceed with the 
simulation, it is assumed that the burning behaviour of material in the real fire 
scenario will be the same as small-scale test. This is one of the main assumptions 
made for modelling approach based on HRRPUA. 
 




5) Determine credible fire scenarios for CCL train  
 
The fifth step is to determine the credible fire scenarios for simulation. The common 
fire scenarios will be identified through statistical data, expert opinion, conclusions 
drawn from the literature review and analysis of the CCL metro train car construction. 
The credible type, size and location of ignition source will be identified. Ventilation 
factors also will also be addressed.   
   
6) Cone Calorimeter tests and material properties 
 
Cone Calorimeter tests will be carried out to evaluate the train car materials’ reaction 
to fire and to derive the material properties for input into the FDS model. The train car 
materials provided by LTA are shown in Table 4.3. 
 
S/no Component Material 
1 Seat Fiberglass reinforced polymer (FRP) 
polyester 
2 Floor covering Styrene butadiene 
3 Wall panel Aluminum panel with a thin coat of  
powder paint on its exposed surface 
4 Window Laminated safety glass 
5 Bellows (Inner) WPE Vamac compound ref 22-003  
6 Bellows (Outer) WPE Vamac compound ref 22-004  
7 Air-con duct Glass wool with the outer surface covered 
with aluminum paper sheet 
Table 4.3:  Train car materials provided by LTA 
 
The seat, floor covering, wall panel and window are exposed surface materials in the 
train. However only the seat, floor covering and wall panel samples will be tested in 
the Cone Calorimeter since the window is not combustible. These three samples will 
be tested under at least three exposure heat flux levels so that there is sufficient data to 
derive the material properties. Note that besides the seat, a number of components in 
the train car e.g. underseat boxes, driver console assembly, are also made of FRP 
polyester (see Chapter 5).  Since only the seat sample is available for the Cone 
Calorimeter test, it is assumed that other components made of the same material will 
have the same material properties as the seat sample. The ceiling and door panels are 
also assumed to have the same material properties as the wall panel sample since they 
are made of the same material. 





The bellows (Inner) and bellows (Outer) are part of the train car gangway (see 
Chapter 5, Figure 5.6). The gangway is the end sections of the train car used to couple 
and provide flexible connection between the train cars. The bellows (Inner) and 
bellows (Outer) are distinguished by their colour, which are grey and black 
respectively. The bellows and the air-con duct will be also tested in the Cone 
Calorimeter however the results will not be used for the modelling. They are tested to 
examine their ignitability and flammability which might be useful in future study.   
   
The following information will be derived from the Cone Calorimeter test data for 
input into FDS model: 
a) Cone Calorimeter HRRPUA curve at various exposure heat flux levels  
b) Ignition temperature igT  
c) Effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆  
d) Heat of vaporisation vH∆  
e) Critical mass flux "crm&  
f) Maximum burning rate "maxm&  
g) The thermal inertia ckρ i.e. the product of thermal conductivity k , density ρ  
and specific heat c  at ignition temperature if the surface material is thermally 
thick. The product of density ρ , specific heat c  and thickness δ at ignition 
temperature if the surface material is thermally thin 
 
7) FDS predictions of Cone Calorimeter test results  
 
FDS predictions of Cone Calorimeter test results i.e. the time to ignition and heat 
release rate, will be conducted. This step is particularly important as no full-scale test 
will be conducted to validate the train fire modelling results. Therefore it is essential 
to check whether the material properties derived (and used as input into the fire model) 
are able to provide reasonable prediction of the experimental test results before they 
are used for simulation of train fires. Depending on the results, the material properties 
may need to be adjusted /calibrated to improve the fire model prediction. 




8) Trial Simulations 
 
Trial simulations will be carried out a) for grid sensitivity study to decide on the grid 
size to be used for the final simulations b) to identify any unforeseen issue or problem 
that may be encountered during the simulations.   
 
9) Final Simulations 
 
Final simulations will be carried out to assess the fire spread within a metro train car 





























5 Train car and tunnel geometries 
 
This Chapter gives a brief description of the configuration and construction of the 
Circle Line (CCL) metro train. It also describes briefly the fire protection systems 
onboard the train; outlines the test methods and performance criteria for the metro 
train car materials; and gives a summary of fire loads in the metro train cars. The 
tunnel geometries are also briefly covered. The information for the CCL metro train is 
mainly obtained from Alstom (2004); Renie and Prevot (2003); RTI (2002) and Tan 
(2005b). 
   
5.1 Circle Line train  
 
CCL is the fourth metro line currently under construction in Singapore. The line will 
be 33.3 km long with about 29 stations. Like the previous metro line, North East Line 
(NEL), CCL will be driverless, fully automatic and entirely underground. The main 
features of CCL train will be the same as NEL which include: 
a) Air-conditioning system 
b) Passenger information system 
c) Closed circuit television (CCTV) system 
d) Public address (PA) system 
e) Fully equipped desk (driver console assembly) for manual operation. 
f) Fire and smoke detection system  
g) Fire rated floor construction (at least 45 minutes) 
h) Redundancy for every major components to ensure seamless train operation in 
automatic mode  
 
The CCL train cars come in two configurations, a MC-car and a T-car as shown in 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 respectively. Both configurations are almost identical. The 
main difference in layout between the two cars is that the MC-car has an end mask 
(train head) that housed the driving console assembly and the detrainment door. The 
driving console is used for manual operation of the train while the detrainment door is 
used for detrainment of passengers in a tunnel during an emergency incident. 




An operational train is made by coupling one T-car between two MC-cars. The gangway 
at the end section(s) of the train cars are used to couple and provide flexible connection 
between the cars. No door is fitted between cars and therefore passengers can move freely 
from one car to the other through the 1.4 m wide gangway access. When the train cars are 
mechanically coupled to each other, the cars are also automatically coupled electrically.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: MC-car – Side and front elevations (adopted from Alstom (2001a) and 
Alstom (2001c))   
 
 
Figure 5.2: T-car – Side and front elevations (adopted from Alstom (2001a) and Alstom 
(2001d)) 
 
The length of the MC-car and T-car are 23.45 m and 22.8 m respectively. When the cars 
are coupled together, the length of the train is about 70 m. The width of the train is 3.2 m 
and the height of the floor above the upper edge of the rail is about 1.1 m. 
 
There are six windows and four electrically driven bi parting type (sliding) passenger 
doors located on either side of each car. There are two smaller windows located at each 
set of passenger door. At the front of the MC-car is the end mask with an emergency 
detrainment door and two small side windows fitted to the front end of it. The driver 
console assembly is also located at the front of the MC-car.  
 
The ‘brain’ of the train is the Train Integrated Management System (TIMS). This system 
is designed to controls the major sub-systems (see Figure 5.3) within the train in a co-
ordinated manner so that to provide a safe and managed environment for train operation. 
Its major function is to monitor and provide overriding control of the major sub-systems 
and at the same time reports any variation to normal operation to the Operational Control 
Centre (OCC).  





Figure 5.3: TIMS and major sub-systems (adopted from RTI (2002)) 
 
A pick-up shoe mounted at the under carriage of the MC-car collects 750 volts dc 
power supply from the 3rd rail laid along the side of the rail track. A propulsion 
system converts the supply from 750 volts dc to a variable voltage/ frequency three- 
phase ac supply and delivers it to the traction motors to drive the train. An auxiliary 
supply invertor and Delta to Star connected transformer located at the under carriage 
of the T-car convert the supply to provide 400 volts ac and 230 volts ac to all the 
auxiliary equipment. 400 volts 3 phase power supply is required for the operation of 
air-conditioning module, battery chargers and the main compressor drive motor. A set 
of batteries and battery charger are provided on each car to supply 110 volts dc power 
for the control systems.   
 
5.1.1 Car interior design 
 
The seating arrangement in the MC-car and T-car are shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 
5.5 respectively. The MC-car has 50 seats while the T-car has 46 seats and spaces for 
two wheel chairs. The design capacity of the train is 960 passengers including the 
standing spaces. 
 
The passenger seat is made of moulded FRP polyester and is fixed to an aluminium 
frame. The FRP polyester is treated with flame retardant additive to improve the 
resistant against unwanted fire. The sides of each set of row of seats are against the 
sidewall and/or the glass screen. 





Figure 5.4: MC-car – Side and plan views (adopted from Alstom (2001a)) 
 
Figure 5.5: T-car - Side and plan views (adopted from Alstom (2001a)) 
 
The under seat boxes, located under designated seat locations, and the equipped 
cubicle assemblies, located at the right-hand end of the train cars, housed the electrical 
and electronic equipments. The Passenger Emergency Communication (PEC) module 
fitting, located at alternate door, housed the PEC. The PEC is used for direct 
communication with the OCC during emergency.  These three components are also 
made of FRP polyester. 
 
The walls and ceiling panels are made of aluminium with a thin coat of powder paint 
on its exposed surface. The noise and temperature insulation layer for the wall and 
ceiling consists of glass wool. Both sides of the passenger door are made of 
aluminium panels with glass wool sandwiched in between.  
 




Each car has two air-con evaporator units housed within the roof duct. The air-con 
duct is made of glass wool with the outer surface covered with aluminium paper sheet. 
The air-con supply slot diffusers run along each side of the car with the air-con return 
grilles located near the two ends of each car. The air-con diffusers and grilles are 
made of aluminium. Lighting is provided by fluorescent tubes under diffusers. 
Lighting strips run the full length of each car on each side of the car next to the air-
con diffusers.  
 
The floor covering is made of styrene butadiene, a type of synthetic rubber. The floor 
covering is also treated with flame retardant additive.  
 
The main components for the gangway are the bellows (Inner and Outer). The bellows 
(Inner) and bellows (Outer) are made of WPE Vamac compound, a type of elastomer 
material. The bellows (Inner) and bellows (Outer) are distinguished by their colour, 
which is grey and black respectively as shown in Figure 5.6. The inner surface of the 
gangway is protected with aluminium panel and therefore the bellows will not be 
exposed. The panel can be seen in Figure 5.7.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: Gangway – Bellows 
(Inner and Outer) 
Figure 5.7: Inner surface of gangway 
 
 
The wall (face) and ceiling panels at the end mask; the detrainment door and the 
driver console assembly are also made of FRP polyester. All the windows in the train 









5.1.2 Car exterior design  
 
The framework of the car body is made of aluminium with an outer covering of 
welded aluminium plates.  The end mask at the front of the MC-car is made of FRP 
polyester. The floor construction that separates the under carriage equipment from the 
train car compartment consists of Okoume plywood floor hut assembly and steel 
under frame. The floor construction is fire rated to at least 45 minutes. 
 
5.2 Fire protection systems onboard the train  
 
Two types of fire detection system are provided onboard the train. One system used 
smoke detectors while the other used fire wire. For the smoke detector system, optical 
smoke detectors are used to monitor the air circulating in the car and to produce an 
alarm signal when smoke is detected. The source of any smoke may originate from 
the car interior or be drawn in from the tunnel. For the fire wire system, fire wires are 
arranged in loops and run through selected equipment cases and cabinets. Excessive 
heat will cause the insulation to melt and the conductors to short together. This 
condition is detected by a fire control panel which then generate a fire detection signal. 
Information and/or alarm will be sent to the OCC for emergency response upon 
detection of fire. 
 
Besides the fire detection systems, there are also two dry chemical (Class ABC) type 
fire extinguishers provided in each car for early fire suppression.  
  
5.3 Test methods and performance criteria 
 
Based on information contained in Renie and Prevot (2003), the materials are tested in 
accordance with test methods and performance criteria specified in NFPA 130 (see 
Appendix A) or NFF (Normalisation Française – Chapitre F – Ferroviaire (French 
Standard – Chapter F – Railway rolling stock)) Standards.  The applicable NFF 
Standards are summarised in Table 5.1 below.  





S/no Standard Title 
1 NFF 16-101 Rolling stock - Fire behaviour – Materials choosing (Category 
A1) 
2 NFF 16-102 Rolling stock – Fire behaviour – Materials choosing, application 
for electric equipments 
3 NFF 63-808 Railway Rolling Stock – Halogen free, electrical conductors and 
cables with thin insulation, and protective layers 
4 NFF 63-826 Railway Rolling Stock – Halogen free electrical conductors and 
cables 
5 NFF 63-827 Railway Rolling Stock – Halogen free electrical conductors, 
class 120°C 
Table 5.1: Applicable NFF Standards 
 
5.4 Train cars fire load schedule  
 
Based on the information contained in Renie and Prevot (2003), the fire loads of the 
combustibles in the MC-car and the T-car are summarised in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 
below. The information will be used for HRR estimation based on traditional method 
in Chapter 10 of this report. From Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, it can be seen that the seat 
(including other components that are made of FRP polyester) and the floor covering 
represent the greatest percentage of above floor fire load found in the train. The paint 
is used on the interior and the exterior surfaces of the cars and is included as separate 
item in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, therefore the fire load for the wall, the ceiling and the 
door panels are shown as nil. The fire load contribution from the paint is found to be 
insignificant compared with the fire loads from other exposed surface materials 
mentioned above.  
 
As for the fire load below floor, the main contributors are the wire insulation and the 















Table 5.2: Fire loads of the combustibles in the MC-car 






















5.5 Tunnel geometries 
 
 
CCL will be entirely underground. The concrete tunnel is either constructed by cut 
and cover technique or by boring using tunnel-boring machine (TBM). The 
advantages of the latter method are that it can avoids almost any disturbance to 
existing streets and buildings; and the need to carry out diversion of utilities 
commonly buried not far below city streets.  
 
A typical cut and cover tunnel section on a straight alignment is shown in Figure 5.8 
and a typical bored tunnel section on a straight alignment is shown in Figure 5.9.  As 
shown in the Figures, the side walls of the tunnel are the tunnel services such as 
tunnel drainage pipe, tunnel lighting, power supply cables, signalling and 
communication cables, etc. The lower left hand side of the Figures show the 3rd rail 
which carry the electrical power supply for the train as discussed earlier. The lower 
right hand side of the Figures show a 0.8 m wide tunnel walkway which is used by 
authorised staff when maintaining / inspecting services during or after revenue hour.  
 
Figure 5.8: Typical cut and cover tunnel 
section on a straight alignment (adopted from 
Alstom (2001a) and Alstom (2001b)) 
Figure 5.9: Typical bored tunnel section 
on a straight alignment (adopted from 








6 Design fire scenarios 
 
This Chapter discusses the possible fire scenarios for the CCL metro train. The 
credible fire scenarios are identified and simulated using FDS to identify fire locations 
that will result in fire with the highest fire severity, assess the fire development and 
predict the HRR.   
 
A three-step process is applied to identify the credible fire scenarios. The first step 
involves review of existing fire statistics data of metro train fires. This will allow the 
common fire scenarios to be identified. A few simple but important questions can be 
answered in this step e.g. the cause of the fire, the type, size and location of the 
ignition source. The second step defines the fire scenarios for the simulation and the 
third step predicts how the fires could probably develop.  
 
6.1 Fire statistics 
 
No metro train fire incident was reported in Singapore since the first metro line 
opened in Nov 1987 (Soo 2005; Tan 2005a). In order to determine the main causes of 
fires in metro trains, it is necessary to use data from other countries e.g. USA, UK, etc. 
Appendix B provides a compilation of major metro train fires around the world from 
1970 to 2003.  The survey has revealed three causes of fires: 
a) An accident due to a derailment or a collision followed by an electrical short 
circuit  
b) Electrical faults either in the interior or exterior of metro train car  
c) Arson (Usually in the metro train car interior) 
  
Fire due to a derailment or a collision followed by an electrical short circuit was rare  
(only one incident – Montreal, Canada, 12 Dec1971), in line with the finding by 
Briggs et al. (2001a) that it only occurred in very old vehicles. Fire due to electrical 
faults and arson were the main causes of metro train fires which inline with the 
statistical data complied by Tipping (2004). Statistical data complied by Tipping 
(2004) is shown in Table 6.1 for easy reference.  





Cause of fire Frequency % 
Arson fires (interior) 145 68 
Electrical faults (interior) 8 4 
Small Fires (interior) 2 1 
Electrical faults (undercarriage) 57 27 
Total 212 100 
Table 6.1: Source of fire (adopted from Tipping (2004)) 
 
Analysing the data in Appendix B revealed that beside electrical faults, for interior car 
scenarios, the ignition sources ranged from discarded cigarettes to flammable liquid; 
and the locations of ignition sources were usually on the seat or on the floor. For 
exterior fire scenarios, short circuit and overheating of equipment in the undercarriage 
were the main causes of fires.     
 
Statistical analysis of the fires occurring in interior of rail cars by Briggs et al. (2001a) 
indicated that fires caused by arson on a seat due to a cigarette lighter or burning 
newspaper were the most probable. They have also identified high temperature in 
electrical equipment due to electrical defects as one of the common fire scenarios. 
Munro et al. (2002) analysed the data for rail vehicles fires from New South Wales 
rail safety incident database and concluded that seat fires had the highest 
consequences compared to other fire scenarios such as those due to electrical defects, 
started on the floor or occurred at the exterior of the rail car.    
 
Even though statistical data could provide useful information for developing fire 
scenario, Munro et al. (2002) and Peacock et al. (2002) have stressed that it would be 
inappropriate to select fire scenarios solely based on statistical data as it was only an 
indicator of the scenarios that have occurred. Relevant expert judgement would be 
required to identify a foreseeable (Munro et al. 2002) but potentially the most 
dangerous (Peacock et al. 2002) or with the highest consequences fire scenario. In this 
project, expert opinions were sought by having discussion with staff from the transit 
regulator when developing the fire scenarios. 
   




6.2 Fire scenarios 
 
From the statistical data, discussion with staff from the transit regulator, conclusions 
drawn from the literature reviews of fire safety studies of rail cars and detailed 
analysis of the train cars construction, the following common fire scenarios for train 
cars are identified.  
 
Common interior fire scenario 
Common fire 
scenario ‘1’ - 
Fire due to burning newspaper or flammable liquid placed on the seat 
in the centre of train cars (Arson) 
Common fire 
scenario ‘2a’ - 
Fire due to burning newspaper or flammable liquid in the corner next to 
the face panel and driver console assembly (Arson) 
Common fire 
scenario ‘2b’ - 
Overheating of electrical equipment at the driver console assembly 
(Electrical fault) 
Note: Common fire scenarios ‘2a’ and ‘2b’ are being investigated as one single fire 
scenario, which later will be known as ‘Common fire scenario ‘2’ - Fire in the corner 
next to the face panel and driver console assembly (Arson or electrical fault)’.  
 
Common exterior fire scenario 
Common fire 
scenario ‘3’ - 
Undercarriage fire due to electrical short circuit or overheating of light 
voltage (LV) equipment or battery charger (Electrical fault) 
 
These common fire scenarios are consistent with past metro train fires. The scenarios 
consider observations from real-scale tests that seat and wall linings are important 
factors in fire growth (Braun 1975; Braun 1978). The locations of ignition source are 
selected taking into account the locations of combustibles in the train car. The ignition 
source types simulate fires that have or could credibly occur.  
 
In all the above common fire scenarios, train is disabled in the tunnel. A non-incident 
train is stopped behind the incident train and therefore required the emergency tunnel 
ventilation airflow to be set in a direction that prevents smoke from flowing towards 
the non-incident train regardless of the train fire location. This is probably the worst 
situation that could happen during a metro train fire incident.  




The fire scenario is illustrated in Figure 6.1.  Appendix C of this report provides 
additional information on the emergency tunnel ventilation system operating 
directions for various fire scenarios, which can be referenced to for additional 
information.   
 
Figure 6.1: Train fire in a tunnel 
 
It is notable that the above only addressed the type and location of the credible 
ignition source in a train car and the emergency tunnel ventilation mode during the 
fire incident. It did not take into consideration if the train doors were opened or closed; 
or the windows would fail. These are important factors that would influence the fire 
development.  Furthermore the location where the fire initiated in the three-car train 
has also not been considered up to this point. 
 
This lead to the following questions to be answered: 
a) Is the detrainment door(s) opened? If yes, one end or two ends? 
b) Is the passenger door(s) opened?  If yes, how many doors opened? 
c) Would the window(s) fail? If yes, how many windows failed? 







1 Front car refers to the front MC-car in the direction of train movement. Centre car refers to the 
T-car and rear car refers to the MC-car at the rear of the train. These terms will be used 
throughout this and the later Chapters. 




The answers for the first two questions will depend on situations. Even though 
evacuation is normally through the detrainment door (in a direction whereby smoke 
free path is created by the emergency tunnel ventilation system), it is still possible for 
the passengers to open the detrainment door at the other end of the train by simply 
activating a push button on it as shown in Figure 6.2. They could also escape through 
the passenger door by turning on the emergency handle switch (EHS) beside each 
door as shown in Figure 6.3. According to the emergency procedure by the train 
operator, the train doors should be closed (by the staff) after the evacuation if it is 
possible and safe to do so (Tan 2005a). 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Detrainment door push button 
 
 
   
Figure 6.3: Emergency handle switch (EHS) 
 




The possibilities of failure for the window depend on the properties of the glass, the 
compartment gas temperature and the seal that holds the glass. Laminated safety glass 
is used for the window and door glass but there is no information on laminated safety 
glass performance under fire condition. The only information available is their 
performance during cold (normal) condition. It has been stated that when laminated 
safety glass fractured under impact, the broken fragments of the glass will remain 
bond to the plastic interlayer (Anon 2004b). This information is inadequate to assure 
that the safety glass will not fail because the plastic interlayer may melt during the fire. 
There is also a possibility of failure due to the seal that holds the glass (Mauser 2005). 
 
Fire can be in the rear car, middle car or front car (see Figure 6.1). Rear car fire is 
likely to have a high consequence if the detrainment doors are opened, as fire is likely 
to propagate in the direction of airflow. Middle car fire might result in higher 
consequence as fire could spread in two directions when the detrainment doors are 
closed. Front car fire however is likely to have less consequence compared to the 
other two locations and therefore will not be considered further. Note that for middle 
car fire, only fire on the seat (fire scenario 1) and undercarriage fire (fire scenario 2) 
are applicable.    
 
The possible sub-fire scenarios that could probably occur can be expanded as shown 
in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5. Figure 6.4 shows the possible sub-fire scenarios for rear 
car fire while Figure 6.5 shows the possible sub-fire scenarios for middle car fire.  At 
this stage, it is only limited to answering yes or no to the first three questions.  





Figure 6.4: Possible sub-fire scenarios for a rear car fire 





Figure 6.5: Possible sub-fire scenarios for a middle car fire 




It can be seen from Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 that each common fire scenario (i.e. 
common fire scenarios ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’) can expand to eight sub-fire scenarios. It is not 
feasible and practical to simulate all possible scenarios and therefore it is necessary to 
focus on scenarios with the highest consequence and/or of particular interest.  
 
The following five possible sub-scenarios are considered: 
 
Real car fire  
Sub-scenario ‘A’ – 
(path I-II-V-X) 
Both detrainment doors opened, all 
passenger doors closed, window failure  
Sub-scenario ‘B’ – 
(path I-III-VI-XII) 
Both detrainment doors closed, 1st and 4th 
passenger doors facing the walkway 
opened, window failure 
Common fire 
scenarios ‘1’, 











 Sub-scenario ‘C’ – 
(path I-III-VII-XIV) 
All doors closed, window failure 
 
Middle car fire  
Sub-scenario ‘D’ – 
(path i-iii-vi-xii) 
Both detrainment doors closed, 1st and 4th 
passenger doors facing the walkway 
opened, window failure 
Common fire 
scenarios 









Sub-scenario ‘E’ – 
(path i-iii-vii-xiv) 
All doors closed, window failure 
 
 
In all the sub-scenarios, it is assumed that window failure is possible. The failure 
might be due to the safety glass itself or the seal which holds the glass. This is the 
most onerous scenario that could happen as window failure will provide ventilation 
for the fire to grow to peak. Window failure will be simulated by assuming that 
window will fail when the ‘detectors’ located at the window (in the model) reach a 
specified temperature. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.     
 




In sub-scenario ‘A’, detrainment doors at both ends of the train are assumed to be opened. 
This sub-scenario is selected because it allows the forced (tunnel) ventilation airflow to 
‘fan’ the fire thus causing it to propagate in the direction of airflow as mentioned earlier. 
Having passenger doors opened might reduce the compartment temperature as hot gases 
could escape from those doors. If too much hot gas escapes, it might not or would take a 
longer time to attain full car involvement. Therefore it is more conservative to assume the 
passenger doors are closed.  
 
Sub-scenario ‘B’ assumes both the detrainment doors are closed while the 1st and 4th 
passenger doors of the train car are opened. 1st and 4th passenger doors are opened so that 
to resemble the opening condition of sub-scenario ‘A’ but to simulate scenario whereby 
there is little influence from the forced ventilation on the fire.  It is evident from studies 
by Carvel et al. (1999a); Carvel et al. (1999b); Carvel et al. (2001b) and Carvel et al. 
(2001d) that forced ventilation might not necessary promote fire growth. This sub-
scenario allows the effect of forced ventilation to be investigated. Most importantly, this 
scenario can also used to represent a train fire scenario at the station trackway i.e. the 
section of track next to the station platform. For a train fire at the station trackway, the 
passenger doors will be opened for evacuation. In CCL design, the tunnel ventilation fans 
at both ends of the station will be operated in exhaust mode (see Appendix C). There is 
little influence from the forced ventilation on the fire during a train fire scenario at the 
station trackway based on study by Hettinger and Barnett (1991) and therefore can be 
represented by sub-scenario ‘B’. 
 
Sub-scenario ‘C’ assumes that there is sufficient air within the compartment for fire to 
grow. Because hot gases and smoke are contained within the low ceiling compartment, 
the gas temperature might accelerate and cause window failure. This sub-scenario is 
included to examine whether this may occur; and if it does occur, what is the fire severity? 
 
Sub-scenarios ‘D’ and ‘E’ are similar to sub-scenarios ‘B’ and ‘C’ except that fire 
location is at the middle car. These two fire scenarios might result in higher consequence 
because fire could spread in two directions. Note that detrainment doors opened and 
passenger doors closed sub-scenario is not studied for middle car. This is because the 
forced ventilation is likely to cause the fire to propagate in the direction of airflow and 
therefore resulting in only up to two cars involved in the fire compared to three in other 
sub-scenarios. For sub-scenario ‘D’, it can also be used to represent a train fire scenario at 
station trackway for the same reason as discussed earlier. 




In summary, the fire scenarios to be studied in this project are tabulated in Table 6.2 
for easy reference. The fire scenarios to be studied are named according to the 
common fire scenario and sub-scenario combinations as shown in the last column of 
Table 6.2.  The various fire scenarios will be simulated using FDS to identify fire 
locations that will result in fire with the highest fire severity, assess the fire 
development and predict the HRR.   
 
S/no Description of fire 
location and type of fire 
Description of ventilation 
condition 
Fire scenario 
1 Rear car, fire on the seat 
(Arson) 
Both detrainment doors opened, 
all passenger doors closed 
1A 
2 Rear car, fire in the corner 
(Arson or electrical fault) 
Both detrainment doors opened, 
all passenger doors closed 
2A 
3 Rear car, undercarriage fire 
(Electrical fault) 
Both detrainment doors opened, 
all passenger doors closed 
3A 
4 Rear car, fire on the seat 
(Arson) 
Both detrainment doors closed, 
1st and 4th passenger doors facing 
the walkway opened 
1B 
5 Rear car, fire in the corner 
(Arson or electrical fault) 
Both detrainment doors closed, 
1st and 4th passenger doors facing 
the walkway opened 
2B 
6 Rear car, undercarriage fire 
(Electrical fault) 
Both detrainment doors closed, 
1st and 4th passenger doors facing 
the walkway opened 
3B 
7 Rear car, fire on the seat 
(Arson) 
All doors closed 1C 
8 Rear car, fire in the corner 
(Arson or electrical fault) 
All doors closed 2C 
9 Rear car, undercarriage fire 
(Electrical fault) 
All doors closed 3C 
10 Middle car, fire on the seat 
(Arson) 
Both detrainment doors closed, 
1st and 4th passenger doors facing 
the walkway opened 
1D 
11 Middle car, undercarriage 
fire (Electrical fault) 
Both detrainment doors closed, 
1st and 4th passenger doors facing 
the walkway opened 
3D 
12 Middle car, fire on the seat 
(Arson) 
All doors closed 1E 
13 Middle car, undercarriage 
fire (Electrical fault) 
All doors closed 3E 
Note: Forced ventilation and window failure will be simulated for all scenarios.  
  
Table 6.2: Summary of fire scenarios to be simulated 
 




It is important to highlight that the factors that influence the fire development include: 
a) Amount and type of fuel, its location, orientation in the train.  
b) Train and tunnel geometries.  
c) The material properties of the train boundaries.  
d) The size and location of the ignition source.  
e) The size and location of openings.  
 
Although this project attempts to address all these factors in the simulation, it is not 
possible to deal with the unknown. The greatest unknown is probably the items (fuels) 
being brought onto the train by the passengers. One of the possible items that might 
be brought onto the train is the luggage bag. Peacock et al. (2002) quoted a peak HRR 
of 200 kW for a burning luggage. Morgan and De Smedt (2002) quoted a peak HRR 
of 500 kW for two carry-on bags touching and burning simultaneously. The HRR 
curve for the latter is shown in Figure 6.6. From the Figure, it is found that the 
average HRR is approximately 200 kW with a burning period of about 1800 s.  
  
Figure 6.6: HRR curve of two carry-on bags (adopted from Morgan and De Smedt 
(2002)) 
 
As items brought onto the train will be scattered and not piled high in one localised 
location (note: there is no luggage rack in CCL train), it is unlikely that all the items 
would ignite at once and contribute significantly to the HRR of the metro train. 
However, the author does have to acknowledge that the item brought onto the train 
might contribute to the fire growth. Therefore in considering the ignition source for 




simulation, the fire size of the ignition source is assumed to be constant throughout 
the assumed burning duration to account for the contribution of this unknown. The 
ignition source fire size and burning duration for the simulations are discussed in 
Chapter 7 of this report. 
 
6.3 Fire development 
 
Once the fire scenarios have been identified, the next step is to predict how they could 
be developed. 
 
A typical fire development process for a metro train is shown in Figure 6.7. The worst 
fire scenarios will be to follow the path from a to k or aa to k shown in Figure 6.7.  
The fire starts with ignition source, which might be in the interior or exterior of the 
train car. If the fire is unattended or not suppressed, and there is sufficient amount 
ventilation and fuel, fire would grow in intensity. For interior car fire, the first item 
ignited by the ignition source would be the seat back or the face panel and the driver 
console assembly depending on the fire scenario in concern. For an exterior fire, the 
first item ignited is likely to be the wiring. For exterior fire scenario, the fire needs to 
propagate through the 45 minutes fire resistance rated floor before it could burn in the 
car interior. To allow for the worst, it is assumed that propagation through floor is 
possible.  
  
For all the scenarios, fires grow in the interior car could be postulated. Fires grow can 
be either by increased burning rate, by flame spread over the first ignited item, or by 
ignition of nearby surface. Gas temperature in the interior car increases and reaches 
about 600°C. With sufficient amount of ventilation and fuel, the fire could progress to 
full car involvement in which all exposed combustible surfaces ignite simultaneously, 
with a very rapid increase in HRR. This very rapid and sudden transition from a 
growing fire to a fully developed fire is called flashover (Karlsson and Quintiere 
2000). 
 




When the burning car is fully involved in the fire, the heat is sufficient to spread the 
fire to adjacent cars since the there is no door installed between the train cars. The fire 
development process repeats in the succeeding cars. Not all cars might be fully 
involved at the same time. When the second and/or third cars are fully developed, the 
first burning car might be in its decay phase.      
 
Observations of actual metro train fires have shown that the flame spread between 
cars occurs above the floor line. The fire resistance rated floor would usually prevent 
the fire from spreading to the below floor equipment or burning the floor itself 
(Hettinger and Barnett 1991). This is assumed to be the case in this project. 






1) The fire is unattended throughout the burning duration. 
2) The fire is contained to the above floor in the second and succeeding cars due to the presence 
of the fire resistance floor. 
Figure 6.7: Typical metro train fire development flow diagram 
 
 




7 Trial simulations 
 
This Chapter describes the trial simulations carried out. It also presents and discusses 
the trial simulation results. The trial simulations serve two purposes:  
a) Carry out grid sensitivity study to decide on the grid size to be used for the 
final simulations.  
b) Identify any unforeseen issue or problem that may be encountered during the 
simulations.   
 
The trial simulations were carried out before the Cone Calorimeter tests were 
conducted. Therefore the material properties were obtained from various references 
and not from the actual materials. Each simulation would require a couple of days 
(One to 12 days depending on grid size, fire scenario and computer speed) to 
complete. The computers used for the simulations were either Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4, 
2.8 GHz, 1 GB RAM or Intel(R) Pentium 4(R), 3.2 GHz, 2 GB RAM computers. In 
order to ensure the material properties inputted for the simulation were appropriate, a 
number of references were referred to for each material. This is outlined in detail in 
the later Sections.     
 
Only one car, the MC car, was simulated. Therefore only fire scenarios at the rear car 
were simulated. This was to reduce the number of grid cells thus the computation time. 
Both methods of defining the rate of pyrolysis for fuel surface were used i.e. 
HRRPUA and heat of vaporisation vH∆ . For simulation where HRRPUA was 
prescribed, the FDS data file has been written such that the rate of heat release from 
the fuel surface followed the Cone Calorimeter HRRPUA curve (of the fuel) once its 
surface reached the ignition temperature. If heat of vaporisation was prescribed, the 
burning rate of the fuel would depend on the net heat feedback to the surface from the 
fire. 




7.1 FDS inputs   
7.1.1 Geometry  
 
The geometry of the tunnel and the train car were taken directly from the drawings. 
Due to complexity in modelling some details e.g. curved geometry, a number of 
assumptions have been made so that to simplify the model. They were: 
a) The tunnel geometry and size was based on cut and cover tunnel. There are 
little difference in the critical velocity and ventilation rate requirement for cut 
and cover and bored tunnel as the area for the two tunnel types are 
approximately the same (also see Section 7.1.2) therefore cut and cover tunnel 
geometry was used.    
b) It would be difficult to model the geometry of the train head (of MC car), 
which is curved in shape. Therefore the train head was modelled as a 
rectangular shape based on equal volume method. 
c) The services in the tunnel were not modelled. It was assumed that the services 
had little contribution to the fire growth and had negligible effect on the 
ventilation airflow. 
d) The glass screen beside the seat was considered too small a detail to be 
included in the simulation. It was assumed that it had little effect on the fire 
growth and spread and therefore was not included in the simulation.  
e) Due to limited information on the gangway construction, it was assumed that 
the gangway’s wall and ceiling had the same thickness, density and thermal 
properties as the wall and ceiling constructions respectively.  
f) The undercarriage (below floor) housed different equipment of different size 
and geometry. As it was not the intent to model fire growth and flame spread 
in the undercarriage it was not important to have these details captured in the 
model therefore they were being modelled as concrete block to simplify the 
model. Note that the floor was also included as part of this concrete block in 
the model since observations from actual metro train fires have shown that the 
floor was usually not involved in the fire (except for exterior fire scenario 
which was dealt with separately (see Section 7.1.3).   
 




The size of the computational domain was 26.6 m long by 5.5 m wide by 4.4 m high. 
Three grid sizes, 300 mm, 200 mm and 150 mm, were used to investigate the 
sensitivity of results. There was attempt to reduce the grid size further but it proved 
too much for the computer to cope with. Therefore it was decided that only these three 
grid sizes be used for the simulations. In order to capture the important features such 
as details around the window which are much smaller than the defined grid size, the 
TRNY and TRNZ namelist groups in FDS were used to stretch the grids in y and z-
directions so that the details would be included in the model. The simulation time 
specified for each simulation was 1800_s.  
 




Forced (tunnel) ventilation 
Forced (tunnel) ventilation was simulated. In order to obtain the ventilation rate, the 
critical velocity crV needed to be calculated. From Associated Engineers (1980), 

































Where tH  is the tunnel height in m, Q&  is heat release rate in MW, AA  is the annular 
area (i.e. tunnel cross-sectional area minus train cross-sectional area) in m2, crFr  is the 
critical value of the Froude Number (for a flow ventilating a fire = 4.5), gT  is the gas 
temperature in K and gradeK  is grade correction factor (dimensionless) given by: 
8.0)(0374.01 GradeKgrade +=  Equation 7.3 
Where Grade is the gradient in °. 




The iteration solution of Equations 7.1 and 7.2 determines the critical velocity. This 
criterion determines the minimum steady-state velocity of the ventilating air moving 
toward the fire that would require to prevent back-layering. Note that the criterion 
determines the required air velocity during the fire and not the air velocity in the 
absence of the fire which can be substantially different. The ventilation rate can then 
be calculated since the tunnel and train cross-sectional areas are known. 
  
The tunnel ambient temperature ∞T , density ∞ρ  and specific heat pc  were assumed to 
be 305 K (32°C), 1.2 kg/m3 and 1.0 kJ/kgK respectively. The tunnel section was 
assumed to be on flat ground, therefore no grade correction factor was required i.e. 
gradeK = 1. The tunnel and train cross-sectional dimensions were taken directly from 
the drawings. Table 7.1 below shows the calculated critical velocity and ventilation 
rate based on cut and cover tunnel and bored tunnel at different HRRs.  
 
Cut and cover tunnel Bored tunnel HRR 
Critical velocity  Ventilation rate Critical velocity Ventilation rate 
MW m/s m3/s m/s m3/s 
5 1.9 27 2.0 29 
10 2.2 31 2.3 33 
15 2.4 34 2.5 36 
20 2.5 36 2.6 37 
25 2.6 37 2.7 39 
30 2.6 38 2.7 39 
35 2.7 39 2.8 40 
Table 7.1: Critical velocity and ventilation rate for cut and cover tunnel and bored 
tunnel 
 
Critical velocity and ventilation rate for cut and cover tunnel and bored tunnel do not 
vary significantly because the areas for the two tunnel types are approximately the 
same. Therefore it was decided to model only the cut and cover tunnel as mentioned 
earlier. Deciding the ventilation rate for the simulation was a more difficult task. From 
Table 7.1, it can be seen that the ventilation rate varies with HRR, the parameter that 
is to be predicted from the simulation. In order to proceed with the simulation, an 
assumption needed to be made. In the end, it was decided to use the ventilation rate 
based on 10 MW fire as that was the fire HRR used for the design of emergency 
tunnel ventilation system in CCL (see Section 2.2.1).  
 




The ventilation rate was prescribed in FDS by defining one end of the tunnel (the train 
head end as shown in Figure 7.1 below) to supply 31 m/s3 of airflow into the 
computational domain while the other end (the gangway end as shown in Figure 7.2 
below) being defined as open end. To simplify the simulation, 31 m/s3 was being 
supplied into the domain at the beginning of the simulation.     
 
Train doors 
The detrainment doors and/or passenger doors were opened and/or closed depending 
on scenarios simulated. For scenarios whereby both the detrainment doors were 
opened and all the passenger doors were closed, both ends of the MC-car were ‘left 
opened’ as shown in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2. The velocity across the detrainment 
door opening was found to be about 1.71 m/s. 
 
For scenarios whereby both the detrainment doors were closed and the passenger 
doors were opened, the 1st and 4th passenger doors of the MC-car facing the walkway 
were ‘left opened’ as shown in Figure 7.3. Note that because only one end (train head 
end) of the MC-car has detrainment door, a dummy door constructed of concrete was 
modelled at the other end (gangway) for this scenario. Concrete dummy door was 
chosen because concrete is non-combustible. The velocity across the passenger door 
opening was found to be about 0.34 m/s. 
 
Finally for closed doors scenarios, all the doors in the MC-car were in ‘closed 
position’.  Concrete dummy door was also modelled at the gangway end of the train 
car for reason mentioned above. Note that a 100 mm thick floor gap has been 
provided at the concrete dummy door to simulate leakage within the MC-car 
compartment for closed doors scenario. 
 





Figure 7.1 Snapshot from Smokeview showing the train head end 
 
Figure 7.2: Snapshot from Smokeview showing the gangway end 
 
Figure 7.3: Snapshot from Smokeview showing 1st and 4th passenger doors opened 
 
Window failure  
Window failure was simulated. The failure may be due to the safety glass itself or the 
seal which holds the glass. Window failure was simulated by assuming that window 
will fail when the ‘detectors’ located at the window (in the model) reach a specified 
temperature. The temperature was based on research by Shields et al. (1998) who 
investigated the behaviour of large double glazed units exposed to full-scale office 
fire. At a compartment gas temperature of 675°C, they reported that the double-
glazing window began to fracture and fall off. This temperature was taken as the 
criterion for window failure in this project. The author recognised that temperature is 
only one of the many factors that cause window failure when they are heated. But to 
account for all factors that cause window failure is beyond the scope of this project. 
This would require a window failure sub-model to be incorporated in FDS. Therefore 









In the model each window was divided into two equal sections: upper and lower. One 
‘detector’ was located at the centre of the window to open up the upper section and 
one ‘detector’ was located at the bottom of the window to open up the lower section. 
The locations of the ‘detector’ are illustrated in Figure 7.4 below. 
 
 
Figure 7.4:  Snapshot from Smokeview showing locations of the ‘detector’ 
 
7.1.3 Ignition sources 
 
Interior fire scenario 
From the literature reviewed, for interior car fire scenario, an ignition source fire size 
that is required to result in significant fire growth and spread is between 150 kW to 
200 kW. An ignition source fire size of 200 kW was used for the simulation. This fire 
size was equivalent to the peak HRR of a burning trash bag or a burning luggage 
(Peacock et al. 2002). It is also the average HRR of two carry-bags touching and 
burning simultaneously (see Section 6.2). It is recognized that the credible ignition 
source such as burning newspaper or flammable liquid may not necessary produce a 
fire of such intensity. However, a 200 kW ignition source fire size was selected to 
eliminate the need to conduct exploratory tests for the simulation. The size of the 
ignition source was assumed to be 0.2 m by 0.2 m and remain constant throughout the 
simulation to account for the contribution of items being brought onto the train as 
discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.  
 
‘Detector’ at 
centre of window 
‘Detector’ at 
bottom of window 




Two ignition source locations were considered in the simulation: one on top of the 
seat in the centre of the car and the other on the floor at one corner of the car. The first 
ignition source location was to simulate common fire scenario ‘1’ - Fire due to 
burning newspaper or flammable liquid placed on the seat in the centre of train car 
(Arson), while the second ignition source location was to simulate common fire 
scenario ‘2’ - Fire in the corner next to the face panel and driver console assembly 
(Arson or electrical fault). Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 show snapshots from Smokeview 
for the locations of the ignition sources.      
   
Figure 7.5: Snapshot from Smokeview 
showing train car interior – Ignition source 
on top of the seat 
Figure 7.6: Snapshot from Smokeview 
showing train car interior – Ignition source 
on the floor 
 
Exterior fire scenario 
For exterior fire scenario, it was assumed that the exterior fire (undercarriage fire) has 
propagated above the fire resistance floor and burned in the car interior. The ignition 
source fire size, being more difficult to define, was estimated using the traditional 
method. Traditional method was used since it is the only known method that can be 
used to estimate the sub-floor components contribution to the fire. In calculating the 
ignition source fire size using traditional method, it was assumed that the below floor 
and half the floor were involved when the fire propagated above floor; and the initial 
fire intQ&  was 0.7 MW (In line with design scenario – 1989 (see Section 2.2.1)). 
A combustion efficiency factor χ  of 0.7 was included in the calculation (In line with 
design scenario – CCL, Singapore (see Section 2.2.1)). The formula used to calculate 





One side abutted on 
the seat back 
One side abutted on the face panel and 
the other on the driver console assembly 

















The below floor and floor fire load for MC-car are 7892MJ and 3632MJ respectively. 
















Some may argue that the ignition source fire size is unreasonably large and such a 
ignition source fire size will result in materials which are normally hard to ignite and 
burn to be involved in the fire. Some may even criticise whether the ignition source 
size is credible. But note that the assumption made for the estimation was that the 
exterior fire (undercarriage fire) has propagated above the fire resistance floor and 
burned in the car interior. If it does occur, such a fire size may not be unreasonable. 
Having such a large ignition source fire size would also allow the fire performance of 
the metro train under consideration to be tested; and is inline with the objective of 
establishing the peak HRR for the metro train.   
 
The ignition source location was assumed to be on the floor directly above the battery 
boxes; battery charger; and the LV and IV box, with a fire area of approximately 3 m 
by 2 m or 6 m2, the area occupied by the equipment. The ignition source was assumed 
to be constant throughout the simulation since this was the duration the exterior fire 
would last based on the traditional method (the other reason for assuming it to be 
constant was to account for the contribution of items being brought onto the train as 
discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2). Figure 7.7 shows the snapshot from Smokeview 
on the location of the ignition source.  
 





Figure 7.7: Snapshot from Smokeview showing train car interior – Ignition source on 
the floor directly above the battery boxes; battery charger; and the LV and IV box. 
 
 
7.1.4 Materials’ thickness, density and thermal properties 
 
Table 7.2 summarises the thickness, density and thermal properties of materials used 
in the FDS simulation. It is important to highlight that most of these properties were 
based on values found in various references (at room temperature) and not from the 
actual materials.  This was due to difficulty in obtaining information from the train 
supplier and their material suppliers. The main assumption made for the density and 
thermal properties was that they are temperature independent, which is not true in 
practice.   
 
Among the materials listed, only FRP polyester and styrene butadiene were simulated 
as combustible surface materials. These two surface materials were assumed to be 
thermally thick therefore their thermal inertia ckρ  was specified. This was done by 
specifying the thermal conductivity k , the density ρ  and the specific heat c  
individually in FDS. Even though FDS allows change in thermal conductivity and 
specific heat with temperature to be prescribed, there was however no information on 
these properties at other temperatures except at room temperature. The author 
acknowledged that because of constant properties assumption, the time to ignition for 








For the wall, ceiling and door panels, they were assumed not to be involved in the fire 
since they are made of aluminium. There was reservation when making this 
assumption because the exposed side of the panel was painted with powder paint. But 
considering that it is only a thin coat of powder paint with low fire load content (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4), it might not contribute much to a fire even if ignited. 
Furthermore there was no information on the ignition properties e.g. ignition 
temperature and heat release properties e.g. heat of vaporisation for powder paint. 
Therefore wall, ceiling and door panels were assumed to be non-combustible in the 
trial simulations. Nevertheless the issue on whether the powder paint will contribute 
to the growth and spread of a fire will be addressed in the Chapter 8 whereby Cone 
Calorimeter test results are presented and discussed.  
 
In order to ensure the values used were appropriate, a number of references were 
referred to for each material and its properties where possible. Whenever, there was a 
range of values for a property, the average value was used. Actual thickness and 
density were measured and used if sample of the materials were available. As for 
properties of composite components (such as laminated safety glass; wall, ceiling and 
door construction), they were either calculated or assumed based on information 
gathered for the individual materials that made up the composite component. These 
were the basis for the values used in the simulation. The summary of the values 
gathered and the calculations can be found in Appendix D of this report.  











 c  
(kJ/kgK) 






assembly, face (wall) 
and ceiling panels at 
car end mask 
 FRP polyester 0.004 0.3 1795 1.51 
Floor covering 
 































Concrete 0.7 1.0 2100 0.88 
a See Section 7.1.1 
b See Section 7.1.2 
Table 7.2: Thickness, density and thermal properties of materials used in the trial 
simulations 




7.1.5 Combustion reaction parameters 
 
The simulation was based on LES approach and therefore mixture fraction 
combustion model was used. In mixture fraction combustion model only one fuel can 
be specified for the combustion reaction. This is another limitation of the fire model 
because in reality there may be more than one fuel burning in the fire. In the 
simulation, two fuels (i.e. the FRP polyester and styrene butadiene) were specified for 
the simulation of fire growth and spread. But since only reaction parameters of one 
fuel could be inputted, it was decided to base on FRP polyester since it was the main 
burning material in the train car. The reaction parameters used for the simulation are 
shown in Table 7.3.  
 
S/no Parameter Value Remark 
1 Chemical formula 63.125.677.5 OHC   
2 Energy per unit mass 2O  (kJ/kgO2) 11900  
3 Fraction of CO  from fuel (kg/kg) 0.0705  
4 Fraction of soot from fuel (kg/kg) 0.062  
5 Radiative fraction 0.35  
6 Molecular Weight of fuel  101.6 Calculated
7 Stoichiometry coefficient for 2CO  5.77 Calculated
8 Stoichiometry coefficient for OH 2  3.125 Calculated
9 Stoichiometry coefficient for 2O  6.5175 Calculated
Table 7.3: Reaction parameters for FRP polyester 
 
The first five parameters above were selected based on criteria outlined in previous 
Section. The last four parameters (i.e. molecular weight of fuel, stoichiometry 
coefficient for 2CO , OH 2 and 2O ) were calculated based on the chemical formula for 
polyester given above.  The summary of the values gathered for the first five 
parameters is given in Appendix D. The calculations for the last four parameters are 
shown in Appendix E.  




7.1.6 Parameters for the modelling approach based on HRRPUA 
 
For the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, the ignition temperatures and the 
Cone Calorimeter HRRPUA curves of the fuels (burning materials) were specified. 
The two burning materials were FRP polyester and styrene butadiene. The ignition 
temperatures used in the simulation were 346°C and 360°C respectively. For FRP 
polyester, a range of values for ignition temperature have been found (refer 
Appendix D), the lowest was used in the simulation.   
 
Cone Calorimeter HRRPUA curves for the two materials were obtained from NIST’s 
fire safety study of passenger trains (Peacock and Braun 1999). For FRP polyester, it 
was assumed that it had the same HRRPUA curve as the FRP wall panel tested in 
Peacock and Braun (1999). One of the floor coverings tested in Peacock and Braun 
(1999) had the same material as the floor covering used in the current study 
i.e. styrene butadiene, therefore it was used. The HRRPUA for the two materials are 
reproduced in Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9 below for easy reference. Note that the 
HRRPUA curves were based on Cone Calorimeter tests at 50kW/m2. All materials in 
the NIST study were only tested at this exposure heat flux level. Therefore it was not 
possible to prescribe the HRRPUA curves at the proposed exposure heat flux levels 
(depending on location of materials) as discussed in Chapter 4.     
 
 
Figure 7.8: FRP wall panel (reproduced from Peacock and Braun (1999)) 
 
 





Figure 7.9: Floor covering, styrene butadiene (reproduced from Peacock and Braun 
(1999)) 
 
Note that only the curve from time to ignition to the end of the test was used. The 
incipient phase was not included in the simulation.   
 
7.1.7 Parameters for the modelling approach based on heat of 
vaporisation 
 
Important parameters such as ignition temperature, heat of vaporisation, effective heat 
of combustion, maximum burning rate were required in the simulation. The ignition 
temperatures were the same as the modelling approach based on HRRPUA and other 
parameters are given in Table 7.4. For FRP polyester, a range of values for heat of 
vaporisation has been found (refer Appendix D), the lowest was prescribed to be 
conservative. The effective heat of combustion values for both materials were based 
on information in Renie and Prevot (2003) submitted by the train supplier. The 
maximum burning rate was approximated from the mass loss rate curve of FRP wall 
panel and styrene butadiene floor covering given in Peacock and Braun (1999). Note 
that in the trial simulations, the critical mass flux was not prescribed as this 
information could not be found for the two fuels.  
 
S/no Parameter FRP polyester Styrene butadiene
1 Heat of vaporisation vH∆  (kJ/kg) 1400 2700 
2 Effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆  
(kJ/kg) 
12870 17950 
3 Maximum burning rate "maxm&  (kg/m
2s) 0.042 0.02 
Table 7.4: Heat of vaporisation, effective heat of combustion and maximum burning 
rate for FRP polyester and styrene butadiene  




7.2 Results and discussions for the trial simulations 
 
Table 7.5 shows the summary of the trial simulations conducted. Note that for fire 
scenarios 1C, 2C and 3C i.e. scenarios with all doors closed, simulations were only 











Rear car fire, fire on the seat (Arson), both 





2A Rear car fire, fire in the corner (Arson or 
electrical fault), both detrainment doors opened, 




3A Rear car fire, undercarriage fire (Electrical 
fault), both detrainment doors opened, all 




1B Rear car fire, fire on the seat (Arson), both 
detrainment doors closed, 1st and 4th passenger 




2B Rear car fire, fire in the corner (Arson or 
electrical fault), both detrainment doors closed, 






3B Rear car fire, undercarriage fire (Electrical 
fault), both detrainment doors closed, 1st and 4th 
passenger doors facing the walkway opened 150 
19 1C Rear car fire, fire on the seat (Arson), all doors 
closed 
300 
20 2C Rear car fire, fire in the corner (Arson or 
electrical fault), all doors closed 
300 
21 3C Rear car fire, undercarriage fire (Electrical 
fault), all doors closed 
300 
Note:  1) Forced ventilation and window failure were simulated for all scenarios. 
2) The modelling approaches based on HRRPUA and heat of vaporisation were    
 simulated for all scenarios 









7.2.1 Modelling approach based on HRRPUA 
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Figure 7.10: Modelling approach based 
on HRRPUA – Fire scenario 1A 
Figure 7.11: Modelling approach based 
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Figure 7.12: Modelling approach based 
on HRRPUA – Fire scenario 3A 
Figure 7.13: Modelling approach based 
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Figure 7.14: Modelling approach based 
on HRRPUA – Fire scenario 2B 
Figure 7.15: Modelling approach based 































Figure 7.16: Modelling approach based 
on HRRPUA – Fire scenario 1C 
Figure 7.17: Modelling approach based 
on HRRPUA – Fire scenario 2C 





















Figure 7.18: Modelling approach based on HRRPUA – Fire scenario 3C 
 
Figure 7.19 provides the summary of predicted peak HRR values for the modelling 
approach based on HRRPUA. 
 
Figure 7.19: Summary of predicted peak HRR values for the modelling approach 
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For fire scenarios 1A, 1B and 1C i.e. fire on the seat, the fire only managed to spread 
around the ignition source to the nearby seat area (see Figure 7.20). It did not spread 
to the wall liner and ceiling as these exposed surfaces were simulated as non-
combustible. The maximum temperature in the car compartment was around 280°C 
implying that flashover did not take place. Because the compartment temperature was 
much lower than the window failure criterion, windows did not fail. With the 
exception of fire scenario 1C, the predicted HRRs were found to be quite sensitive to 
the prescribed grid sizes with grid size of 300 mm giving a more conservative 
prediction (see Figure 7.10, Figure 7.13 and Figure 7.19). Even so, the peak HRR 
values for all the seat fire scenarios at different grid sizes were all less than 1000 kW 
(see Figure 7.19). Ventilation conditions i.e. forced ventilation and closing of doors, 
did not appear to have much influence on the fire growth and flame spread for the seat 
fire scenarios. However for fire scenario 1C i.e. all doors closed scenario, abnormal 
oscillation of HRR was noted near the end of simulation (see Figure 7.16). This 
probably indicates the effect of numerical instability. No simulation was conducted 
using other grid resolution partly because of this reason. 
 
 
Figure 7.20: Snapshot from Smokeview for fire scenario 1A, grid 300 mm, 500 s into 
the simulation. 
 





The fire in fire scenarios 2A and 2B i.e. fire in the corner, growth and spread 
throughout the train car compartment and resulted in almost all the windows failing 
(see Figure 7.21). The fire was able to grow in intensity and spreads downstream of 
the train car as majority of the exposed surfaces at the end mask (in the vicinity of the 
ignition source) were combustible. The maximum temperature in the car compartment 
was about 980°C. Because of high ventilation airflow velocity through the 
detrainment door, the fire in fire scenario 2A propagated throughout the train car 
faster compared with fire scenario 2B. For fire scenario 2B, because of low ventilation 
airflow velocity through the 1st side door, the fire burned more intensely at the end 
mask (in vicinity of ignition source) before spreading downstream. The difference in 
the growth stage can be seen from Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.14. Even though these 
two scenarios had different ventilation conditions, there were not significant 
differences in the predicted time to peak and peak HRR. One possible reason may be 
because FDS is not able to adjust the HRRPUA curve according to the heat feedback 
from the fire for the modelling approach based on HRRPUA.  
 
For fire scenarios 2A and 2B, the simulations with different grid sizes gave a similar 
trend in fire growth and decay (see Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.14). For both scenarios, 
grid size of 300 mm provided a more conservative prediction of the peak HRR (see 
Figure 7.19).  
 
For fire scenario 2C, the fire did not grow to flashover and cause window failure. 
Maximum temperature in the car compartment was around 430°C. HRR decreased 
when the oxygen level depleted within the compartment. Oscillation of HRR was 
noted from 450 s until the end of the simulation (see Figure 7.17). This again indicates 
the effect of numerical instability.  





Figure 7.21: Snapshot from Smokeview for fire scenario 2A, grid 300 mm, 1800 s 
into the simulation. 
 
Because the detrainment doors were opened for fire scenario 3A, the forced 
ventilation airflow flowed directly through the train car. High forced ventilation 
airflow velocity through the detrainment doors limits the fire to spread only to the 
downstream of the ignition source. This scenario had much lower HRR (see Figure 
7.12) compared to fire scenarios 2A and 2B even though it has higher ignition source. 
This highlights the importance of ignition source (fire) location on the fire severity. 
For fire scenario 3B, the detrainment doors were closed and 1st and 4th side doors were 
opened. Because this scenario had lower forced ventilation airflow velocity through 
the doors, after the fire had spread downstream the train car, it progressed towards the 
end mask of the train car and resulted in second peak HRR. The second peak HRR 
was found to be sensitive to the grid resolutions with finer grid sizes predicting earlier 
occurrence of the second peak (see Figure 7.15)  
 




For fire scenario 3C, oscillation of HRR started right from the beginning until the end 
of the simulation. The average HRR was about 15000 kW (see Figure 7.18) and the 
maximum compartment temperature was as high as 1000°C for the first 50 s (which 
exceeded the criterion for window failure i.e. ≥  675°C). But unexpectedly the 
window did not fail and flame was observed to burn outside the train car (through the 
100 mm floor gap) as shown in Figure 7.22 throughout the simulation. The odd result 
and strange phenomenon somewhat suggested that FDS might not be suitable for 
under-ventilated scenario simulation especially those with large ignition source size. 
The oscillation of HRR again indicates the effect of numerical instability. 
 
 










7.2.2 Modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation 
Figure 7.23 to Figure 7.31 show the HRR curves for the modelling approach based on 
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Figure 7.23: Modelling approach based 
on vaporisation – Fire scenario 1A 
Figure 7.24: Modelling approach based 
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Figure 7.25: Modelling approach based 
on vaporisation – Fire scenario 3A 
Figure 7.26: Modelling approach based 
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Figure 7.27: Modelling approach based 
on vaporisation – Fire scenario 2B 
Figure 7.28: Modelling approach based 






























Figure 7.29: Modelling approach based 
on vaporisation – Fire scenario 1C 
Figure 7.30: Modelling approach based 
on vaporisation – Fire scenario 2C 





















Figure 7.31: Modelling approach based on vaporisation – Fire scenario 3C 
 
Figure 7.32 provides the summary of predicted peak HRR values for the modelling 
approach based on vaporisation. 
 
Note: For fire scenario 3B, simulation for grid size 200 mm stopped automatically at about 200 s. 
Therefore the peak HRR for this fire scenario is not included in the Figure. 
 
Figure 7.32: Summary of predicted peak HRR values for the modelling approach 
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Coincidently, the results for both modelling approaches were quite similar even 
though the input data were different i.e. one prescribed HRRPUA and the other 
prescribed heat of vaporisation, and were from different references.  
 
For the modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation, the fire in fire scenarios 1A, 
1B and 1C i.e. fire on the seat also did not grow to flashover and cause window failure. 
The predicted HRRs were also sensitive to grid resolutions but unlike the modelling 
approach based on HRRPUA, finer grid resolutions tend to predict earlier time to 
peak and higher peak HRR (see Figure 7.23, Figure 7.26 and Figure 7.32). However 
this is not really a concern because simulations based on different grid resolutions 
produced consistent results in term of fire growth and spread; and for these fire 
scenarios the fires did not grow to flashover. The worry will be for simulations using 
different grid sizes to produce different predictions of fire severity as it will make 
selection of grid resolution for the final simulations a more difficult task. For fire 
scenario 1C, abnormal oscillation of HRR was also observed near the end of 
simulation (see Figure 7.29).  
 
For fire scenario 2A and 2B, because of difference in ventilation conditions, 
dissimilarity in the growth stage was also observed (See Figure 7.24 and Figure 7.27). 
For fire scenario 2A, because of high ventilation airflow velocity through the 
detrainment doors, the fire propagated downstream the train car earlier; and the time 
to peak was faster and the fire grew more intense compared with fire scenario 2B. 
These results made more sense compared with those from the modelling approach 
based of HRRPUA for the same fire scenarios. For these two fire scenarios, 
simulations using different grid resolutions gave similar trend of fire growth and 
decay. A grid size of 300 mm was noted to provide a more conservative prediction of 
the peak HRR (see Figure 7.32). The fire in fire scenario 2B for the modelling 
approach based on heat of vaporisation also did not grow to flashover and cause 
window failure (see Figure 7.30) but unlike the modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA, there was no oscillation of HRR in the simulation. 
 




For fire scenario 3A, fire spread was also limited to downstream of the ignition source 
because of high forced ventilation airflow velocity through the train detrainment doors. 
The predicted peak HRRs were also much lower compared with fire scenario 2A and 
2B. Grid size of 300 mm again gave a more conservative prediction of the peak HRR 
(see Figure 7.32). For fire scenario 3B, two peak HRRs were also predicted. The 
second peak HRR occurred when the fire progressed toward the end mask of the train 
car. The finer grid again gave earlier prediction of the second peak. For this scenario, 
it was not possible to complete the simulation based on 200 mm grid size as 
simulation consistently stopped automatically at about 200 s. McGrattan (2005a) 
advised that the sketching of grids is often the cause of instabilities. This probably 
explains what has happened.  
 
For fire scenario 3C (see Figure 7.31), similar result and phenomenon were observed 
as in the modelling approach based on HRRPUA.  
 
7.2.3 Grid resolution for the final simulations 
 
A grid size of 300 mm is selected for the final simulations because of the following 
reasons:  
a) Simulations based on different grid resolutions were able to give consistent 
prediction of fire severity.  
b) For majority of the simulations, a grid size 300 mm gave a more conservative 
prediction of the peak HRR.  
c) For fire scenario 3C, simulation was not able to complete using 200 mm grid 
size. 
d) Simulations based on 150 mm grid size could take up to 12 days to complete 
depending on fire scenario and computer speed. Not to mention that currently, 
only one car was simulated. 
 




7.3   Conclusions from the trial simulations 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the trial simulations: 
a) For fire scenarios 1A and 1B i.e. fire on the seat, the fire did not grow to 
flashover. The fire only managed to spread to the nearby seat area. It did not 
spread to the wall liner and ceiling as these exposed surfaces were simulated 
as non-combustible.  
b) For fire scenarios 2A and 2B i.e. the fire in the corner, the fire was able to 
grow in intensity and spreads downstream of the train car because majority of 
the exposed surfaces in the vicinity of ignition source was combustible.  
c) For fire scenario 3A i.e. undercarriage fire with detrainment doors opened, the 
fire only spread to the surfaces downstream of the ignition source because of 
high forced ventilation airflow velocity through the detrainment door. For fire 
scenario 3B i.e. undercarriage fire with 1st and 4th passenger doors opened, two 
peak HRRs were predicted. The second peak HRR occurred when fire 
progressed to the end mask of the train car. The predicted peak HRRs for these 
two scenarios were lower than fire scenarios 2A and 2B even though the 
ignition source size was substantially larger. This highlights the importance of 
ignition source location on the fire severity. 
d) All the simulations were able to complete except one: fire scenario 3B, grid 
200 mm, the modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation. Stretching of 
grid might be the cause of instability for this particular simulation.  
e) Simulations for fire scenarios with all doors closed i.e. fire scenarios 1C, 2C 
and 3C were unsteady, especially the one with large ignition source size i.e. 
fire scenario 3C. The results suggested that FDS might not be suitable for 
simulation of under-ventilated scenario.  
f) A grid size 300 mm is selected for the final simulations because of reasons 












8 Cone Calorimeter tests and material properties  
 
This Chapter describes the Cone Calorimeter tests. It also describes the procedures to 
derive the Cone Calorimeter heat release rates and the material properties of samples. 
The observations during the tests and the results will also be presented.   
 
8.1 Cone Calorimeter 
 
Cone Calorimeter was designed in 1982 at National Bureau of Standards (NBS), now 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), primarily by Babrauskas, 
Parker and Swanson. At present, it is the most commonly used tool for bench-scale 
heat release rate measurement (Janssens 2002). Besides the heat release rate, it is also 
possible to measure a number of other parameters, including: 
a) Effective heat of combustion 
b) Mass loss rate 
c) Ignitability 
d) Smoke and soot production  
e) Production of toxic gases 
 
During a Cone Calorimeter test, a specimen is exposed to a constant level of exposure 
heat flux from a conical heater. The exposure heat flux levels used can be up to 
100 kW/m2. Volatile gases, which are released from the specimen during the test, are 
ignited by an electric spark ignitor. Combustion gases are collected by an exhaust 
hood and duct system for further analysis via the gas analyser. This gas analysis may 
include measurements of the 2CO , CO , 2O  and other toxic gas concentrations. 
 




The heat release rate is calculated according to the oxygen consumption method 
described later in Section 8.2. During the Cone Calorimeter test, the specimen is 
placed on a load cell, which records the mass loss of the specimen during combustion. 
It is possible to determine the optical smoke obscuration by measuring the attenuation 
of a laser beam by smoke in the exhaust duct. It is also possible to record the 
gravimetric soot yield i.e. grams of soot evolved, per grams of specimen burned if the 
Calorimeter is equipped with a soot mass sampler.  
 
The test specimen must be flat in order to achieve a constant exposure heat flux over 
the entire surface. For test specimen that bends, an optional retainer frame and wire 
grid can be used to hold the test specimen flat and firmly in place. The retainer frame 
and wire grid are also used for specimens that might intumesce. The frame is designed 
to reduce unrepresentative edge-burning of composite specimens and to retain 
specimens prone to delaminating.  
 
Standard mounting of the heater and specimen is in horizontal orientation however it 
is also possible to mount them in vertical orientation for special–purpose testing. In 
the horizontal orientation, the distance between the bottom surface of the conical 
heater and the top of the specimen is adjusted to be 0.025± 0.002 m by means of the 
sliding cone height adjustment to ensure that the test specimen is exposed to the 
designated exposure conditions. 
 
The specimen is wrapped in a single sheet of aluminium foil, covering the sides and 
bottom to limit flow of molten material in case the specimen melted during the test. In 
order to present a standardized heat flow boundary condition to the rear face of the 
specimen, all specimens are backed with low loss insulating ceramic fibrous material.  
The specimen should be 0.1 m by 0.1 m and the thickness of 0.006 to 0.05 m.  
 
  




The major components of the Cone Calorimeter are shown in Figure 8.1.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Cone Calorimeter 
 
The test procedure is described in either NFPA 271 (NFPA-271 2004 edition), ISO 
5660 (ISO-5660-1:2002; ISO-5660-2:2002; ISO-5660-3:2003), or ASTM E 1354 
(ASTM-E-1354 2004). Detailed descriptions of the apparatus are covered in 
Babrauskas (2002) whereby reader is recommended to refer to for additional 
information. It gives reader a clear idea of what the components are, what they do, 
and why they were designed to be the way they are.  
 
8.2 Oxygen consumption method 
 
A useful similarity between common organic materials is that the heat release per unit 
mass of oxygen consumed is nearly constant. Huggett (1980) investigated a wide 
variety of organic solids and obtained an average value for this constant of 13.1 MJ/kg 
of oxygen consumed. This value can be used for most practical applications and is 
accurate with very few exceptions to within ±5%. The heat release rate from an 
experiment can therefore be calculated by measuring the mass rate of oxygen 
consumed (Janssens 2002; Janssens and Parker 1992). 
 




The basic requirement for using the oxygen consumption method is that all 
combustion gases are collected and removed through exhaust hood and duct system. 
At a distance downstream, where the mixing is adequate, the mass flow rate of gases, 
the gas temperature and the gases concentration, i.e. the mole fraction, are measured.  
The treatment and equations to be used varied mainly due to the extent to which gas 
analysis is made. As a minimum, the oxygen 2O  concentration must be measured. 
The accuracy of the results can be improved if the concentrations of carbon dioxide 
2CO  and carbon monoxide CO  (and water vapour OH 2 ) are also measured. In this 
project, the concentrations of 2O , 2CO  andCO  were measured.  The equations used 
to calculate the heat release rate with these three gases measured are described in 
Janssens (1991). It consists of four main steps as discuss below: 
a) To calculate the mass flow rate of the gases em&  
b) To obtain the mole fraction of water vapour in the incoming air a OHX 2  
c) To calculate the oxygen depletion fraction φ  
d) To calculate the heat release rate q&  in kW 
 
8.2.1 Mass flow rate  
 
The technique used to calculate the mass flow rate in the experiment was to measure 
the pressure drop across and temperature at the orifice plate. From Janssens (1991), 




PCm ∆=&  
Equation 8.1 
 
Where exm& is the mass flow rate in the exhaust duct in kg/s, calibC  is the calibration 
constant, P∆ is the pressure drop across the orifice plate in Pa and exT  is the gas 
temperature at the orifice plate in K.  
  




The calibration constant calibC  was determined by carrying out a calibration (using 
methane). This was done prior to the day’s testing to check for the proper operation of 
the instrument and to compensate for minor changes in mass flow determination. The 
pressure drop across the orifice plate and the temperature were measured during the 
experiment.  As the pressure drop was measured in volt (1 volt equals to 1 torr), it was 
converted into Pa by multiplying the measured voltage by a factor of 133.  
 
8.2.2 Mole fraction of water vapour 
 





















Where RH is the relative humidity in %, ∞T  is the ambient temperature in K and aP  
is the air pressure ( ≈ 101325 Pa). The relative humidity RH  and ambient 
temperature ∞T  are recorded prior to the day’s testing.   
 
8.2.3 Oxygen depletion factor 
 

































Where AaOX 2  and 
Aa
COX 2  are the measured mole fraction of 2O , 2CO  in the incoming 
air respectively; and AeOX 2 ,
Ae
COX 2  and 
Ae
COX  are the measured mole fraction of 2O , 2CO  
and CO  in the exhaust gases respectively. 
 




8.2.4 Heat release rate 
 


































Where E  is the amount of energy released by complete combustion per unit mass of 
oxygen consumed, COE  is the heat release per mass unit of oxygen consumed for the 
combustion of CO , 2OM  is the molecular weight of oxygen, aM  is the molecular 
weight of the incoming air and α  is the volumetric expansion factor. 
 
8.2.5 Constant values for calculation  
 
Janssens (1991) recommends the following numerical values to be used in the 
equations: 
a) COE   = 17600 kJ/kg of 2O  
b) 2OM  = 32 kg/kmol 
c) aM  = 29 kg/kmol 
 
Exact values for E and α  should be used, if available, to improve the accuracy 
(Janssens 2002).  However, if actual values are not known, generic values of 
E = 13100 kJ/kg and α = 1.105 are recommended (Janssens 1991). In this project, 
these recommended values were adopted to calculate the heat release rate. 
 




8.3 Material properties 
 
Besides the HRR curves of Cone Calorimeter tested at various exposure heat fluxes, 
the following material properties are required for FDS simulation:  
a) The ignition temperature igT  
b) The thermal inertia ckρ  if the surface material is thermally-thick. The product 
of δρc  if the surface material is thermally-thin. 
c) The heat of vaporisation vH∆  




In order to derive the material properties from the Cone Calorimeter test data, ignition 
data measured at a minimum of three exposure heat fluxes are required. Ideally there 
should be replicates tested at each exposure heat flux. The procedures to derive these 
properties are discussed below. 
 
8.3.1 Ignition temperature 
 
The procedure for determining the surface temperature for ignition igT  from the Cone 
Calorimeter measurements is taken from Grenier (1996); Janssens (1993); Janssens 
and Grenier (1997). It was chosen among a few available methods as it provided a 
means to correlate material’s ignition data based on the best fit of the data to either a 
semi-infinite solid (thermally thick) or thermally thin surface. The procedure is 
outlined below: 
a) The average time to ignition igt  for each exposure heat flux is calculated.   
b) Correlate the average time to ignition by plotting ( )nigt/1 against the exposure 
heat fluxes. Determine the value of n between 0.547 and 1 that results in the 
highest correlation coefficient 2R . If the optimum n is closer to 0.547, the 
material behaves as a thermally-thick surface. If n is closer to 1, the material 
behaves as thermally-thin surface. 
 




c) Determine the x-intercept from the best-fit line through the data. The x-
intercept is taken as the critical heat flux for ignition "crq& .  The critical heat 
flux for ignition is an estimate of minimum heat flux for ignition "minq& , the heat 
flux below which ignition under practical conditions cannot occur. 
d) The ignition temperature igT can then be calculated by solving (by iteration) 
the following equation: 
  
            )()( 44" ∞∞ −+−= TTTThq igigccr εσε &  Equation 8.5 
 
Where ch is the convection heat transfer coefficient in kW/m
2K, ε  is the surface 
emissivity at ignition, σ  is the Stefan-Boltzmann’s constant (5.67x10-11 kW/m2K4) 
and ∞T is the ambient temperature. 
 
8.3.2 Mechanical and thermal properties 
 
If the material is identified as thermally-thick i.e. n is closer to 0.547. The thermal 
inertia ckρ is to be determined for the simulation. The procedure for determining the 
thermal inertia ckρ  is also taken from Grenier (1996); Janssens (1993); Janssens and 
Grenier (1997) and is outlined below.  
a) The total heat transfer coefficient toth is first being solved.  














b) Correlate the ignition times again but this time use n = 0.547 and include data 
point "crq& on the x-axis. 
c) Determine the slope of a straight line drawn through the data point "crq& on the x-
axis and data point for the highest heat flux. This is a simplification to make 
the calculation easier (Wade 2003a). 
d) The apparent thermal inertia ckρ in kW2s/m4K2 can then be computed using: 























If the material is identified as thermally-thin i.e. n is closer to 1. The product of δρc  
will be determined for input into the simulation. The procedure for determining the 
product of δρc  is taken from Mikkola and Wichman (1989) and is outlined below. 
a) Correlate the ignition times again but this time use n = 1. 
b) Determine the slope of a linear line fit through the data. 
c) The product of δρc in kJ/m2K can then be computed using: 











8.3.3 Heat of vaporisation 
 
The heat of vaporisation vH∆ for the material is determined following the procedure of 
Quintiere (1993) and is outlined below.  
a) Peak heat release rate "peakq& from Cone Calorimeter tests are plotted against the 
exposure heat flux levels.  
b) Determine the slope of a linear fit through the data. This slope is equal to 
effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆  divided by heat of vaporisation vH∆ . 
c) The effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆  is also obtained from the Cone 
Calorimeter test. An average value of effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆  is 
used. 
d) The heat of vaporisation can be computed using: 















8.3.4 Critical mass flux 
  
Critical mass flux "crm&  is a property that quantifies a critical condition for ignition 
(Janssens et al. 2003).  FDS requires both this parameter and the ignition temperature 
igT to be specified (for the modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation) in order 
for the code to choose pre-exponential factor A  and activation energy AE  so that the 
fuel burns at the critical mass flux rate when its surface temperature reaches the 
ignition temperature (McGrattan and Forney 2004). A method of measuring the 
critical mass flux was proposed by Rasbash et al. (1986) but the apparatus they used 
was specifically built. The author is not aware of any simple procedure or method that 
can be used to derive the critical mass loss rate from the Cone Calorimeter test data. 
This is because the critical mass flux is not commonly used to describe the piloted 
ignition behaviour of a material for practical reasons (Janssens et al. 2003). In order to 
obtain a reasonable value that can be conservatively prescribed in the simulation, the 
following procedure is proposed: 
a) Calculate the mass loss rate of material (tested in the Cone Calorimeter test) at 
the lowest exposure heat flux where sustained burning occurred.   
b) The mass loss rate at the time to ignition (sustained flaming) is taken as the 
‘critical mass flux’. This is a conservative approximation as it is expected that 
the ‘true’ critical mass flux to be lower than the value used. The average value 
from replicate specimens will be used in the simulation. 
 
8.3.5 Maximum burning rate 
 
Maximum burning rate is prescribed in FDS so that to prevent excess pyrolysis of the 
fuel. It limits the burning rate of the fuel to its measured maximum. To prescribe this 
value will require information on the burning rate of material in a real fire, which is 
not available. Peacock and Braun (1999) discussed the fire exposure conditions for 
FRA-cited test methods and in typical fires when they were deciding the exposure 
conditions to be used for Cone Calorimeter testing of rail car materials. The various 
exposure heat flux levels quoted in Peacock and Braun (1999) are summarised in 
Table 8.1 below. 






Table 8.1: Fire exposure conditions for FRA-Cited test methods and in typical fires 
(adopted from Peacock and Braun (1999)) 
 
The highest exposure heat flux used in this project for material testing is 65 kW/m2. 
This exposure heat flux level is higher than the exposure conditions used in FRA-cited 
test methods. It is also higher than the exposure conditions during a typical 
developing fire; and measured during the real-scale train fire experiments. Therefore 
it is reasonable to prescribe the maximum burning rate for simulation based on the 
maximum mass loss rate measured at the exposure heat flux of 65 kW/m2. An average 
value from replicate specimens will be used in the simulations. 
 
 
Test method/ Fire type  Maximum radiant energy to 
sample (kW/m2) 
FRA-cited test methods < 5 to 40 
Developing fire < 50 
Post-flashover fire ≥50 to 75 
Real-scale train fire 
experiments 
0.5 to 62 






This Section describes the Cone Calorimeter tests and reports on the observations 
made during the tests. It also highlights derivations from NFPA 271 (NFPA-271 2004 
edition) which was the Standard referred to for the tests.   
 
8.4.1 Train materials 
 
The train car materials provided by LTA for the Cone Calorimeter tests are shown in 
Table 8.2. 
 
S/no Component Material 
1 Seat FRP polyester 
2 Floor covering Styrene butadiene 
3 Wall panel Aluminium panel with a thin coat of 
powder paint on its exposed surface 
4 Bellows (Inner) WPE Vamac compound ref 22-003  
5 Bellows (Outer) WPE Vamac compound ref 22-004  
6 Air-con duct Glass wool with the outer surface covered 
with aluminium paper sheet 
Table 8.2: Train car materials for Cone Calorimeter tests 
 
Note that the seat, floor covering, bellows (Inner) and bellows (Outer) are treated with 
flame retardant additive as discussed in Chapter 5. Bellows (Inner) and bellows (Outer) 
are distinguished by their colour, which is grey and black respectively. 
 
8.4.2 Derivations from NFPA 271 
Specimen size 
The Standard requires the test specimen size for the Cone Calorimeter test to be 0.1 m 
by 0.1 m. However, due to the available sample sizes, two of the material test 
specimen sizes (seat and bellows (Inner)) were smaller than the specified size. The 
size of the test specimens are summarised in Table 8.3 below.  
  





The test specimen thickness should be between 0.006 m to 0.05 m. If the specimen 
thickness is less than 0.006 m, it should be mounted on the substrate material over 
which it will actually be used so that to avoid thickness effect (Babrauskas 1992). All 
the samples’ thickness was less than 0.006 m except for the air-con duct. But since the 
substrate material was not available, the test specimens were all backed with calcium 
silicate block(s) instead. 
 
Number of replicate specimens tested at each exposure heat flux level.  
Ideally, there should be three replicate specimens tested at each exposure conditions. 
However, due to the available sample size, this requirement could not be met for four 
samples: wall panel, bellows (Inner), bellows (Outer) and air-con duct. The number of 
tests conducted for each material at each exposure conditions are summarised in Table 
8.3 below. 
 
S/no Component Sample size δ  a  
(m) 
ρ  a 
(kg/m3) 




1 Seat  
 
0.1 m x 0.05 m 0.004 1795 25, 35, 50 
and 65 





0.1 m x 0.1 m 0.003 1478 25, 35, 50 
and 65 
3 for each 
"
eq&  
3 Wall panel 0.1 m x 0.1 m 0.0014 3011 35, 50 and 
65 





0.1 m x 0.068 m 0.003 1827 35, 50 and 
65 





0.1 m x 0.1 m 0.003 1721 35, 50 and 
65 





0.1 m x 0.1 m 0.025 85.2 35, 50 and 
65 
2 for each 
"
eq&  
a Measured from the sample  
Table 8.3: Test specimen size and thickness; and number of tests conducted 
 




8.4.3 Test specimen mounting  
 
The Cone Calorimeter tests for all the samples were conducted in horizontal 
orientation. Before the test, the test specimens were wrapped in aluminium foil on all 
sides except for the exposed surface. The test specimens were then backed with 
ceramic fibrous block(s) and placed on the specimen holder. The retainer frame was 
used for all test specimens and wire grid was used for the specimens that might 
expand. The mounting details for each of material test specimen are shown from 
Figure 8.2 to Figure 8.7.   
 
Figure 8.2: Seat test specimen mounting – Specimen holder with retainer frame 
  
Figure 8.3: Floor covering test specimen mounting – Specimen holder with retainer 
frame and wire grid 
 





Figure 8.4: Wall panel test specimen mounting – Specimen holder with retainer frame  
  
Figure 8.5: Bellows (Inner) test specimen mounting – Specimen holder with retainer 
frame and wire grid 
  
Figure 8.6: Bellows (Outer) test specimen mounting – Specimen holder with retainer 
frame and wire grid 
 




Figure 8.7: Air-con duct test specimen mounting – Specimen holder with retainer frame 
and wire grid 
 
8.4.4 Cone Calorimeter calibration and test procedure 
 
The Cone Calorimeter tests were carried out at the small-scale fire laboratory at the 
University of Canterbury.  
 
 




Prior to the day’s testing, the methane calibration was performed and the calibration 
constant calibC determined. The ambient temperature and humidity were also recorded. 











The distance between the bottom surface of the conical heater and the top of the 
specimen was adjusted to approximately 0.025 m to ensure that the test specimens 
were exposed to the designated exposure conditions. 
 
A datalogger was used to acquire the data in one-second intervals and save it into a 
spreadsheet file. The data collected include: 
a) Mole fractions of 2O , 2CO  andCO  
b) Pressure drop across the orifice plate 
c) Temperature at the orifice plate 
d) Mass loss of test specimen 
 
Smoke and soot production and toxic gases were not measured because the essential 
kit was not available. 
 
The procedure for the Cone Calorimeter test is briefly described below: 
1) Prepare the test specimen according to the pre-defined mounting details. The 
test specimen, the holder, the frame, the wire grid, etc, were initially at room 
temperature. 
2) The conical heat temperature was adjusted to generate the required exposure 
heat flux. 
3) The data acquisition program was started. The shield in front of the conical 
heat was closed, the spark ignitor moved into place and the test specimen held 
in the holder was put onto the load cell directly under the conical heater. 
4) After the test specimen was properly mounted, the shield was opened. At the 
same time the stop-watch was started. 
5) The time when sustained flaming occurs was recorded. The specimen was 
allowed to burn freely after the ignition until flameout. The flameout time was 
recorded 
6) Data was collected for another two minutes after any flaming cease. 
7) Steps 1 to 6 were repeated for the next specimen. 
8) Note that the test was terminated when the specimen did not ignite within 
15 minutes after the test was started. 




8.4.5 Observations during the Cone Calorimeter tests 
 
Seat  
The material of the seat is made of FRP polyester. The test specimen size was 0.1 m 
by 0.05 m and 0.004 m thick. Three replicate specimens were tested at each exposure 
conditions. The exposure heat flux levels from the conical heater to the specimen 
were 25, 35, 50 and 65 kW/m2.  
 
Observations 
When the specimen thermally decomposed, tearing or ripping sound was heard and 
black volatile gases were released. The sound was likely to be caused by the bursting 
of small tiny bubbles formed on the surface when pyrolysis occurred.  After the 
specimen ignited, flaming tended to concentrate near the edges. The flame was 
observed to flicker and give an impression that it was trying to ‘dig’ below the surface 
layer from the edges. Flame extinguishment was observed to resemble those of pool 
fires.  
 
At low exposure heat fluxes ( ≤ 35 kW/m2), ‘flashing’ occurred before sustained 
flaming. While this phenomenon only occurred once or twice for tests at 35 kW/m2, it 
occurred more than 10 over times before sustained flaming happened for tests at 
25 kW/m2. For tests at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level, flashing first occurred at 
approximately 5 minutes and was more frequent between 6 to 8 minutes. All the three 
specimens at 25 kW/m2 ignited after over 8 minutes into the tests.  
 
During post-test observation, it was discovered that the three edges covered under the 
retainer frame had hardened. However delamination occurred and layers of fibre 
could be seen at the exposed edge. The latter observation suggested that 
unrepresentative burning has taken place at the ‘unprotected’ edge. For those tests at 
low heat flux (25 kW/m2), black patches were formed on the surface which can be 
seen from Figure 8.9. This was likely due to incomplete combustion. 
 





Seat specimen before test Burned specimen at low 
heat flux (25 kW/m2) 
Burned specimen at high 
heat flux (65 kW/m2) 
Figure 8.9: Seat specimen before and after test 
 
Floor covering  
The material of the flooring covering is made of styrene butadiene, a type of synthetic 
rubber. The test specimen size was 0.1 m by 0.1 m and 0.003 m thick. The number of 




When the specimen thermally decomposed, tearing or ripping sound was heard and 
grey volatile gases were released. The flaming was noted to be more intense during 
the period immediately after ignition and during the late stage of the test. Localised 
burning at the edge was observed before flameout. 
 
Transitory flaming occurred for specimens tested at low exposure heat fluxes 
(≤35 kW/m2). For test specimens at 35 kW/m2, transitory flaming only occurred once 
but for test specimens at 25 kW/m2, transitory flaming occurred twice or more times 
for the test specimens before sustained flaming happened. The floor covering was 
found to be more difficult to ignite compared with the seat based on the time to 
ignition.  
 
At low heat flux (25 kW/m2), the surface charred with large obvious crack lines which 
can be seen from Figure 8.10. At high heat flux (65 kW/m2), the leftover was grey 
powder form ash on its surface and a layer of char below.   
 





Floor covering specimen 
before test 
Burned specimen at low 
heat flux (25 kW/m2) 
Burned specimen at high 
heat flux (65 kW/m2) 
Figure 8.10: Floor covering specimen before and after test 
 
Wall panel  
The wall panel is made of aluminium panel with a thin coat of powder paint on its 
exposed surface. The test specimen size was 0.1 m by 0.1 m and 0.0014 m thick. Two 
replicate specimens were tested at each exposure conditions. The exposure heat flux 
levels from the conical heater to the specimen were 35, 50 and 65 kW/m2. 
 
Observations 
Black volatile gases were released from the test specimens at early stage of the tests.  
However, only specimens at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux were ignited. This 
suggested that at lower exposure heat fluxes there were insufficient volatile gases 
released from the specimens to result in ignition. Even though the specimens at 
65 kW/m2 were ignited, the burning times were short: one lasted for about 18 s while 
the other lasted for about 30 s. This can be explained by the fact the only the powder 
paint on the wall panel was combustible.  
 
  
Wall panel specimen before 
test 
Non- ignited specimen 
(35 and 50kW/m2) 
Ignited specimen (at 
65kW/m2) 
Figure 8.11: Wall panel specimen before and after test 
 
The powder paint evolved into dust after the tests. For the ignited specimens, dirty 
greyish spots formed on its surface which can be seen from Figure 8.11.  




Bellows (Inner)   
The bellows (Inner) was made of WPE Vamac compound, a type of elastomer 
material. The test specimen size is 0.1 m by 0.68 m and 0.003 m thick. . The number 
of replicate specimens and the tested exposure conditions were the same as the wall 
panel specimen.   
 
Observations 
Like the previous two materials i.e. seat and floor covering, tearing or ripping sound 
was heard when the specimen decomposed. For this material, it swelled shortly after 
ignition but the wire grid managed to hold the specimen firmly in place. Even though 
no transitory flaming was observed during the tests, it did not warrant that transitory 
flaming would not happened when the specimen was tested at lower exposure fluxes 
(since the lowest exposure heat flux level tested for this material was 35 kW/m2). 
Nevertheless, this material appeared to ignite faster compared to the floor covering.  
 
The end products were to some extent similar to the floor covering specimens at low 
and high heat fluxes. At low heat flux (25 kW/m2), the surface also charred with large 
obvious crack lines formed on its surface which can be seen in Figure 8.12. At high 
heat flux (65 kW/m2), white and powdery residue formed on its surface with a layer of 
char below it.  
 
 
Bellows (Inner) specimen 
before test 
Burned specimen at low heat 
flux (35 kW/m2) 
Burned specimen at high 
heat flux (65 kW/m2) 
Figure 8.12: Bellows (Inner) specimen before and after test 
 




Bellows (Outer)   
The bellows (Outer) is also made of WPE Vamac compound. The test specimen size 
was 0.1 m by 0.1 m and 0.003 m thick. The number of replicate specimens and the 




The specimens gave out tearing or ripping sound when it decomposed. Shortly after 
ignition, the specimens swelled and expanded. The force from the expansion was so 
great that the wire grid bent into parabolic shape as shown in Figure 8.13. In three of 
the tests, the retainer frame popped up and hit the spark ignitor.  This introduced 
errors in the recorded mass loss. Besides errors in the recorded mass loss, the heat 
release from the tests were likely to be inaccurate because the specimens surface were 
not exposed to uniform and intended heat fluxes when the above incidents took place. 
Charred and flaky surface was noted on the specimens during the post-test 




Bellows (Outer) specimen 
before test 
The wire grid bent into 
parabolic shape. 
Charred and flaky surface 
Figure 8.13: Bellows (Outer) specimen before and after test 
 
Wire grid bent when the specimen 
swelled 




Air-con duct  
The air-con duct is made of glass wool with the outer surface covered with aluminium 
paper sheet by means of adhesive. The exposed surface during the tests was the 
aluminium paper sheet since this would be the exposed surface during its end 
installation. The test specimen size was 0.1 m by 0.1 m and 0.025 m thick.  The 
number of replicate specimens and the tested exposure conditions were the same as 
the wall panel and bellows (Inner and Outer) specimens. 
 
Observations 
Grey gases were released from the specimens during the tests. However, no ignition 
occurred at 50 and 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux levels. No further test was conducted 
at other exposure heat flux levels. The aluminium paper sheet peeled off from the 
surface after the tests at both exposure heat flux levels. A thin layer of char resemble 
that of burned paper appeared on the glass wool surface. The glass wool originally 





Air- con duct specimen 
before test 
Aluminium paper sheet 
peeled off from the 
surface. 
Thin layer of char formed 
on the glass wool surface  
Figure 8.14: Air-con duct specimen before and after test 
 
Glass wool turned whitish 
grey 
Thin layer of char 




8.5 Results and discussions for the Cone Calorimeter tests and the 
derived material properties 
 
8.5.1 Heat release rate data 
 
The calculated data from the Cone Calorimeter tests include: 
a) Heat release rate q&  (kW) 
b) HRRPUA curve (kW/m2) 
c) Mass loss rate curve (kg/sm2) 
d) Peak heat release rate "peakq&  (kW/m
2) 
e) Average "q& values for the first 60, 120 and 180 s after ignition i.e. "60q& , 
"
120q&  
and "180q&  (kW/m
2) 
f) Total heat released by the specimen "q  (MJ/m2) 
g) Average effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆ for the entire test duration 
(MJ/kg) 
 
The heat release rate q&  was calculated using the oxygen consumption method 
outlined in Section 8.2. When calculating the heat release rate, the data for the gases 
was adjusted to account for the delay time they took to reach the gas analyser. The 
heat release rate per unit area at each time interval was determined by dividing the 
heat release rate by the specimen area in m2.  
 
The mass loss rate at each time interval was computed using five-point numerical 
differentiation method described in NFPA 271. However due the high noise 
disturbance, the computed mass loss rate curves were smoothed using 20 points 
moving average. 
 
The peak "q& and average "q& values for the first 60, 120 and 180 s after ignition i.e. "q60& , 
"q120& and 
"q180& , were computed from the HRRPUA data. 
 
As for the total heat released by the specimen, it was computed beginning with the 
first reading after the last negative rate of heat release reading that occurred at the 
beginning of the test, and continuing until the final reading recorded for the test. The 
average effective heat of combustion was calculated by dividing the computed total 
heat released by the total mass loss. 




The above data for all the specimens tested in the Cone Calorimeter for current study 
was compiled in Appendix G of this report. This Section only reports on selective data 
and only the average values (of all the replicates tested at each exposure heat flux 
level) are reported, unless otherwise stated. The results for the air-con duct specimen 
are not presented since no ignition occurred at the tested exposure heat flux levels.  
 
Seat 
The time to ignition igt , peak HRR
"
peakq& , average 
"q&  value for first 180 s after ignition 
"
180q& and effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆ at the tested exposure heat flux levels are 
summarised in Table 8.4. The HRRPUA and mass loss rate curves at tested exposure 
heat flux levels are shown in Figure 8.15 and Figure 8.16 respectively.  
 
igt   
(s) 
"



















3 25 502 11 130 12 97 5 13.0 0.7 
3 35 106 5 151 10 103 4 14.1 0.3 
3 50 50 0 170 17 121 2 13.3 0.6 
3 65 34 1 184 10 140 3 14.3 0.7 
Ave = Average value of all the replicates tested at the listed exposure heat flux level 
STDEV = Standard deviation of average value 



















Average 25kWm^-2 Average 35kWm^-2
Average 50kWm^-2 Average 65kWm^-2
 
Figure 8.15: Seat sample – HRRPUA curves at tested exposure heat fluxes 























Average 25kWm^-2 Average 35kWm^-2
Average 50kWm^-2 Average 65kWm^-2
 
Figure 8.16: Seat sample - Mass loss rate curves at tested exposure heat fluxes 
 
From Table 8.4, it can be seen that while there was significant increase in average 
time to ignition for tests at low exposure heat flux levels especially at 25 kW/m2, the 
decrease in the average peak HRR was not substantial. In some cases, the peak HRR 
for specimen tested at e.g. 25 kW/m2 was even higher than peak HRR for specimen 
tested at the next higher exposure heat flux level. This is notable by looking at the 
standard deviation of the average peak HRR in Table 8.4. These observations not only 
suggested that the material was difficult to ignite (especially at low heat flux levels); it 
also suggested that the material was difficult to burn. For this material, the average 
effective heat of combustion was found to be relatively constant with increasing 
exposure heat flux levels. 
 
There were two peaks in heat release rate as shown in Figure 8.15. The first peak was 
likely due to burning of the surface layer. However, due to the presence of the 
fibreglass reinforced layer which acted as an insulation layer and physical barrier that 
prevented volatile gases from below the surface layer to travel out to the burning face, 
this resulted in decrease in the first peak HRR. The second peak might be due the 
delamination of the fibreglass reinforced layer which resulted in increase of the HRR 
again. The other possibility for the second peak HRR might be due to degradation of 
the unexposed back surface after the thermal wave reached the back surface.  
 




From Figure 8.15 and Figure 8.16, it can be seen that even though the second peak 
HRR was not much lower than the first peak HRR, there was considerable difference 
in the mass loss rate when the two peak HRRs occurred. The difference in mass loss 
rate was most obvious for specimen tested at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level 
whereby both first and second peak HRR values were approximately the same. From 
Figure 8.16 and Table 8.4, it can be seen that for specimen tested at 25 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux level, sustained ignition did not occur until approximately 500 s 
into the tests, despite high mass loss rate. The likely explanation to all these results 
were that the material was treated with flame retardant additive. At low heat fluxes 
(25 and 35 kW/m2), the additive worked effectively well to retard flaming. This might 
explain why flashings occurred before sustained ignition. When the specimens ignited, 
the additive might have decreased the effective heat of combustion during the initial 
stage of the test thus resulting in low HRR even though there was high mass loss rate. 
At the later part of the test, the effect of the additive vanished and the effective heat of 
combustion increased. Therefore lower mass loss rate was needed to result in same 
peak HRR. The other explanation for the high mass loss rate/ low HRR and low mass 
loss rate/ high HRR phenomena could be that the distribution of flame retardant 
additive was not homogenous with higher concentration near the surface. This 
explanation perhaps is more likely the case. 
 
The average peak HRR for the FRP polyester seat was in the range of 130 to 
184 kW/m2 for exposure heat flux from 25 kW/m2 to 65 kW/m2.  This was 
approximately 3.35 to 4.75 times lower compared with the peak HRR (618 kW/m2) of 
the FRP material used in the trial simulations. Note that the HRRPUA curve for the 
FRP material was obtained from NIST’s fire safety study of passenger trains (Peacock 
and Braun 1999); and was the material for wall panel tested at exposure heat flux of 
50 kW/m2. When comparing the other test data between the two FRP materials from 
the current study and the NIST study, at exposure heat flux level of 50 kW/m2, it was 
noted that the thickness δ of the specimen in both studies was the same. The mass 
loss per unit area "m , time to ignition igt , second peak HRR and effective heat of 
combustion effcH ,∆  were relatively comparable as shown in Table 8.5, despite the 
large difference in the peak HRR.   
 














effcH ,∆  
(kJ/kg) 
Current study 0.004 50 3.860 132 13.3 
NIST study 0.004 54a 4.137a 125b 13.5a 
a Value was average of three tests listed in the report 
b Approximated from the HRRPUA curve 
NIST study - (Peacock and Braun 1999) 
Table 8.5: Comparison of Cone Calorimeter test data between the current study and 
the NIST study (at exposure heat flux 50kW/m2) 
 
In order to make relative comparison, the test data of the seat in the current study was 
compared with the test data from other rail car studies as shown in Table 8.6. 
 
Data source "









Current study 25 – 65 34 - 502 130 – 184 40.1 - 60.3 
NIST studya 50 7 - 12 260 – 420 4.5 – 61.7 
Amtrak studya 25 0 – 16b 27 – 600 3.2 – 12 
MARC studya 35 - 55 NA 164 – 192 NA 
FIRESTARRa 25 - 35 1 – 88 98 – 525 4.3 - 92.1 
a  Seat cushion assembly 
b Reported as ignition delay time 
NA = Not available 
NIST study - (Peacock and Braun 1999) Amtrak study - (Peacock and Braun 1984) 
MARC study - (Gandhi et al. 1996)  FIRESTARR - (Briggs et al. 2001a) 
Table 8.6: Comparison of Cone Calorimeter test data of the seat between the current 
study and other rail car studies 
  
The seat in the current study was moulded seat made of FRP polyester while the seat 
in other rail car studies was cushion seat made of combinations of foam, inter-liner 
and fabric. This was the main difference in the seat type. Data from Table 8.6 
somewhat suggested that the seat in the current study was not easy to ignite and had 
relatively low peak HRR. However, in term of total heat released, it was on the high 
side. The might be because the amount heat released was moderately constant 
throughout the tests as can be seen from Figure 8.15.    
 





The time to ignition igt , peak HRR
"
peakq& , average 
"q&  value for first 180 s after ignition 
"
180q& and effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆ at the tested exposure heat flux levels are 
summarised in Table 8.7. The HRRPUA and mass loss rate curves at tested exposure 
heat flux levels are shown in Figure 8.17 and Figure 8.18 respectively.  
 
igt   
(s) 
"



















3 25 603 42 45 4 31 2 11.9 2.1 
3 35 232 8 82 8 44 2 16.5 0.3 
3 50 118 3 80 9 61 4 14.5 1.6 
3 65 76 2 101 3 77 2 15.4 1.1 
Ave = Average value of all the replicates tested at the listed exposure heat flux level 
STDEV = Standard deviation of average value   
Table 8.7: Summary of Cone Calorimeter ignition and heat release data for the floor 
covering samples 
 

















Average 25kWm^-2 Average 35kWm^-2
Average 50kWm^-2 Average 65kWm^-2
 
Figure 8.17: Floor covering sample – HRRPUA curves at tested exposure heat fluxes 























Average 25kWm^-2 Average 35kWm^-2
Average 50kWm^-2 Average 65kWm^-2
 
Figure 8.18: Flooring covering sample - Mass loss rate curves at tested exposure heat 
fluxes  
 
Results from the Table 8.7 revealed that the floor covering was even more difficult to 
ignite and burn compared to the seat. There were two peak HRRs for tests at 35, 50 
and 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux levels as shown in Figure 8.17. The first peak 
appeared shortly after ignition followed by gradual decrease in HRR with time. The 
decrease in HRR was likely due to the formation of insulating char layer near the 
specimen surface. The occurrence of the second peak was possibly due to heat up of 
the unexposed surface causing it to decompose and contribute to the HRR. At 
25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level, there was only one peak HRR. The likely 
explanation was that there was insufficient energy for the thermal layer to reach the 
unexposed surface. The conversion of lower layer into char might also be the reason 
why there was only one peak HRR.  Because there was only one peak HRR for tests 
at 25 kW/m2, the effective heat of combustion was also relatively low compared to 
tests at higher exposure heat flux levels as indicated in Table 8.7.  
 




The floor covering was also treated with flame retardant additive. This might explain 
why there were transitory flaming at 25 and 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level; and 
why there were high mass loss rate / low HRR and low mass loss rate / high HRR 
phenomena as in tests for the seat. The second peak HRR for tests at 35 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux level was substantially higher than the first peak as shown in 
Figure 8.17. The first peak demonstrated good flame retardant property of the additive 
and the second peak suggested that there was uneven distribution of the flame 
retardant additive with higher concentration near the surface.   
 
The styrene butadiene floor covering HRRPUA curve for the trial simulations was 
also obtained from the NIST study (Peacock and Braun 1999). Even though the 
material in the current study and the NIST study was the same, the peak HRR of the 
floor covering (281 kW/m2) in the NIST study, at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level, 
was almost 3.4 times higher compared with the peak HRR (80 kW/m2) in the current 
study.  
 
Table 8.8 shows the test data of the floor covering in the current study and from other 









2) "q  
(MJ/m2) 
Current study 25 – 65 76 – 603 45 – 101 19 – 44.3 
NIST study 50 10 – 35 245 – 340 17.6 - 89.0 
Amtrak study 25 95 – 117a 350 – 380 13 - 21 
a  Reported as ignition delay time 
NIST study - (Peacock and Braun 1999) Amtrak study - (Peacock and Braun 1984) 
Table 8.8: Comparison of Cone Calorimeter test data of the floor covering between 
the current study and other rail car studies 
 
A comparison with other rail car studies shows that the floor covering in the current 
study was highly resistant to ignition. The peak HRR was also substantially low 
compared with other rail car studies.   The amount of heat released was however in 
the middle ranges.  





The time to ignition igt , peak HRR
"
peakq& , average 
"q&  value for first 180 s after ignition 
"
180q& and effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆ at 65 kW/m
2 exposure heat flux levels 
are summarised in Table 8.9. The HRRPUA and mass loss rate curves at 65 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux levels are shown in Figure 8.19 and Figure 8.20 respectively.  
 
igt   
(s) 
"






















2 65 54 1 86 4 19 9 11.7 1.8 
a  No data was collected for both tests because of software problem 
b    No data was collected for one of the tests because of software problem 
Ave = Average value of all the replicates tested at the listed exposure heat flux level 
STDEV = Standard deviation of average value   






















Figure 8.19: Wall panel sample - HRRPUA curve at 65kW/m2 exposure heat flux 

























Figure 8.20: Wall panel sample - Mass loss rate curve at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
 
 
For the wall panel, there was no ignition for tests at 35 and 50 kW/m2. This suggested 
that the wall panel was unlikely to contribute to the growth and spread during the 
developing stage of the fire. This claim could be supported based on results reported 
in Duggan (1997). Duggan reported the Cone Calorimeter test HRRPUA curve of a 
painted steel ceiling panel at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level. The HRRPUA curve 














The ceiling panel when tested to BS 476-Part 7 (BS-476-Part-7 1997) achieved ‘Nil 
spread of flame’. Judging from the tested exposure heat flux level, the time to ignition 
and the burning period of the painted steel ceiling panel as shown in Figure 8.21, one 
would expect the wall panel in the current study to have better fire performance 
compared with the painted steel ceiling panel as ignition only occurred at 65 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux level for the wall panel. The time to ignition was also slower and 
the burning period was shorter for the wall panel compared with the painted steel 
ceiling panel even though it was tested at a higher exposure heat flux level.   
 
The average "q&  for the first 180 s i.e. "180q&  as shown in Table 8.9 was exceptionally 
low. This was because of short burning period of the specimen due to the fact that 
only the powder paint on the wall panel was combustible.  
 
There were two peak HRRs as shown in Figure 8.19. The first peak might be due to 
the ignition of the top coat and the second peak due to the ignition of the primer. 
However note that there were insufficient tests conducted to fully support this 
explanation because for the two tests at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level, only one 
test had two peak HRRs. The HRR curve shown in Figure 8.19 was the average of the 
two tests. 
 
Table 8.10 shows the test data of the wall panel in the current study and from other 











Current study 25 – 65a 54 86 1.1 – 2 
NIST study 50 18 - 23 120 – 270 21.5 - 66.8 
Amtrak study 25 48b 410 3.1 
MARC study 35 - 55 NA 134 - 222 NA 
a Ignition occurred only at 65kW/m2 exposure heat flux level 
b  Reported as ignition delay time 
NA = Not available 
NIST study - (Peacock and Braun 1999) Amtrak study - (Peacock and Braun 1984) 
MARC study - (Gandhi et al. 1996)   
Table 8.10: Comparison of Cone Calorimeter test data of the wall panel between the 
current study and other rail car studies 
 




Data in Table 8.10 demonstrated good fire performance of the wall panel in the 
current study compared with the wall panel tested in other rail car studies. This mainly 
attributed to the difference in materials used to construct the panels. In other rail car 
studies, the wall panels were made of polymers whereby in the current study, the wall 
panel was made of aluminium, a non-combustible material, with a thin coat of powder 
paint.      
 
Bellows (Inner) 
The time to ignition igt , peak HRR
"
peakq& , average 
"q&  value for first 180 s after ignition 
"
180q& and effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆ at the tested exposure heat flux levels are 
summarised in Table 8.11. The HRRPUA and mass loss rate curves at tested exposure 
heat flux level are shown in Figure 8.22 and Figure 8.23 respectively.  
 
igt   
(s) 
"



















2a 35 179 n/a 111 n/a 82 n/a Nil n/a 
2 50 81 4 147 1 104 2 15.1 0.6 
2 65 58 9 170 8 109 5 13.2 1.1 
a No data was collected for one of the tests. For the other tests, data acquisition stopped mid-way 
through the test. The effective heat of combustion could not be calculated and therefore was shown as 
Nil above.  
Ave = Average value of all the replicates tested at the listed exposure heat flux level 
STDEV = Standard deviation of average value 
n/a = Not applicable since only value for one test was reported 
Table 8.11: Summary of Cone Calorimeter ignition and heat release data for the 
bellows (Inner) samples 





















35kWm^-2 Average 50kWm^-2 Average 65kWm^-2
 
Figure 8.22: Bellows (Inner) sample - HRRPUA curves at tested exposure heat fluxes 
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The bellows (Inner) exhibited the same burning behaviour as the floor covering. The 
material was also treated with flame retardant additive but compared with the flooring 
covering, it ignited slightly faster and had higher peak HRR. Unlike the floor covering, 
the second peak HRR was substantially lower compared with the first peak HRR at all 
tested exposure heat flux levels as can be seen from Figure 8.22. There was no test 
data to make relative comparison with, however it was noted that the fire performance 
of this material was better compared with the seat material in the current study. 
Data acquisition stopped mid-way 
through the test 
Data acquisition stopped mid-way 
through the test 





The time to ignition igt , peak HRR
"
peakq& , average 
"q&  value for first 180 s after ignition 
"
180q& and effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆ at the tested exposure heat flux levels are 
summarised in Table 8.12. The HRRPUA and mass loss rate curves at tested exposure 
heat flux levels are shown in Figure 8.24 and Figure 8.25 respectively.  Note that for 
one of the tests at each exposure heat flux levels, the retainer frame popped up and hit 
the ignitor. The results for those tests were not reported here because of potential 
errors.  However, the time to ignition was reported since it was not affected. 
 
igt   
(s) 
"



















2 35 118 4 84 n/a 60 n/a 12.8 n/a 
2 50 76 3 116 n/a 77 n/a 13.8 n/a 
2 65 47 2 194 n/a 114 n/a 16.5 n/a 
Ave = Average value of all the replicates tested at the listed exposure heat flux level 
STDEV = Standard deviation of average value 
n/a = Not applicable since only value for one test was reported  
Table 8.12: Summary of Cone Calorimeter ignition and heat release data for the 
bellows (Outer) samples 
  



















Figure 8.24: Bellows (Outer) sample - HRRPUA curves at tested exposure heat fluxes 

























Figure 8.25: Bellows (Outer) sample - Mass loss rate curves at tested exposure heat 
fluxes  
 
Both the bellows (Outer) and bellows (Inner) have the same trade name but with 
different identification code.  It was assumed that both were made of the same 
material. However, from Table 8.12, it seemed that the bellows (Outer) was easier to 
ignite compared with the bellows (Inner). The difference in time to ignition was found 
to be larger at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level. The peak HRR for the bellows 
(Outer), however, was lower (with exception to tests at 65 kW/m2) compared with the 
bellows (Inner) even though the specimens were exposed to higher exposure heat flux 
levels when they expanded after ignition.  
 
There was no concrete explanation for the above.  It could be due to specimen area 
effect since the bellows (Inner) specimen size was smaller compared with the bellows 
(Outer) specimen. It could be due to experimental errors or it could also be due to 
difference in composite ingredients that made up the two components. 
 
Disregarding the above differences, the burning behaviour of the bellows (Outer) and 
bellows (Outer) were similar. The fire performance for the bellows (Outer) was also 
found to be better compared with the seat material in the current study. The peak HRR 
was below 200 kW/m2 even with the potential errors introduced when the specimen 
swelled during the tests. 
 




8.5.2 Material properties 
 
  
This Section presents the results of material properties (for the exposed surface 
materials in the train car) derived from the Cone Calorimeter test data. Note that only 
the material properties for the seat and floor covering samples were derived. It was 
not possible to derive the material properties for wall panel due to insufficient data 
from the Cone Calorimeter tests. A simple assumption, however, was made to 
approximate the ignition temperature igT  for the wall panel but the result was solely 
for discussion purpose only.   
 
Ignition temperature 
The ignition time correlation for the seat and floor covering are shown in Figure 8.26 
and Figure 8.27 below. 
Seat sample
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Figure 8.26: Ignition time correlation for 
the seat sample 
Figure 8.27: Ignition time correlation for 
floor covering sample 
 
Both graphs illustrate almost perfect linear relation. The value of n that resulted in the 
highest correlation coefficient 2R  was 1. This indicates thermally thin behaviour.  
 
The x-intercept is taken as the critical heat flux "crq& . It was determined to be 
21.4 kW/m2 for the seat and 18.7 kW/m2 for the floor covering.    
 




In order to determine the ignition temperature, it was necessary to solve (by iteration) 
Equation 8.5. Equation 8.5 is reproduced here as Equation 8.10 
 
)()( 44" ∞∞ −+−= TTTThq igigccr εσε &  Equation 8.10 
 
The value of ambient temperature ∞T  was assumed to be 273 K (20°C). The 
convective heat transfer coefficient ch was taken as 0.0135 kW/m
2K, the value 
adopted by Grexa et al. (1996) in their study. Surface emissivity ε  was taken as 0.88, 
the average value for a wide range of plastics and value suggested by 
Babrauskas (2003) for treating of the Cone Calorimeter data. Surface emissivity ε  of 
0.88 was also the value used by Grexa et al. (1996) in their study.    
 
By solving Equation 8.10, the ignition temperature igT for the seat and floor covering 
were determined to be 448 and 419°C respectively.  
 
These values were reasonably higher than the values used in the trial simulations 
which were 346 and 360°C for the seat (FRP polyester) and floor covering (styrene 
butadiene) respectively.  
 
It was noted from the results above that the floor covering was determined to have 
lower critical heat flux "crq&  and ignition temperature igT  compared with the seat. The 
results seemed to contradict with the experimental observations and HRR test data 
which indicated that the floor covering was more difficult to ignite. But to investigate 
this further was beyond the scope of this project, therefore it was decided to take the 
results as they were. It was also noted during the calculation process that the 
computed ignition temperature was sensitive to the inputted critical heat flux "crq&  and 
heat transfer coefficient ch . Different values of heat transfer coefficient ch  were 
proposed by different researchers depending of the tested heat flux levels (Babrauskas 
2003). However to carry out sensitivity analysis will only complicate this project 
therefore it was decided to abandon this attempt. 
 




In order to approximate the ignition temperature igT for the wall panel, a crude 
assumption was made. The critical heat flux "crq&  for the wall panel was conservatively 
assumed to be 50 kW/m2. Taking the ambient temperature ∞T  to be 273 K (20°C), 
convective heat transfer coefficient ch to be 0.0135 kW/m
2K and surface emissivityε  
to be 0.88. Solving by iteration of Equation 8.10, the ignition temperature igT for the 
wall panel was determined to be 648°C. This result again suggested that the wall 
panel would not be involved during the developing stage of the fire. The compartment 
temperature needs to be higher than 648°C to result in ignition and this will only 
occur during the post-flashover fire stage.  
 
Mechanical and thermal properties 
Both the seat and floor covering were found to behave as thermally thin surface, 
therefore the product of δρc  were determined for the simulation. This contrary to the 
assumption made in the trial simulations that the materials were thermally thick. From 
Figures 8.26 and 8.27, the slopes of a linear line fit through the data for the seat and 
floor covering were found to be 0.0007 and 0.0003 respectively. Substituting these 
values and the computed ignition temperatures into Equation 8.8, the products of δρc  
for the seat and floor covering were determined to be 3.341 and 8.363 kJ/Km2 
respectively.  
Heat of vaporisation 
The heat release rate correlations for the seat and floor covering are shown in Figure 
8.28 and Figure 8.29 below. 
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Figure 8.28: Heat release rate correlation 
for the seat sample  
Figure 8.29: Heat release rate correlation 
for the floor covering sample 
 




The average values of effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆  for the seat and floor 
covering were determined to be 13670 and 14570 kJ/kg respectively. From Figure 
8.28 and Figure 8.29, the slopes of a linear line fit through the data for the seat and 
floor covering were found to be 1.3282 and 1.1832 respectively. Substituting the 
average value of effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆ and the slope into Equation 8.9, 
the heat of vaporisation values for the seat and floor were determined to be 10300 and 
12320 kJ/kg respectively. 
 
It was noted that the effective heat of combustion of the seat (FRP polyester) in the 
above calculation was higher than the value of 12870 kJ/kg used in the trial 
simulations. However for the floor covering (styrene butadiene), the effective heat of 
combustion in the calculation was lower than that prescribed in the trial simulations 
which was 17950 kJ/kg. The values used in the trial simulations were based on the 
values given in (Renie and Prevot 2003) submitted by the train supplier.   
 
The slope or ‘combustibility ratio’ was found to be extremely low compared with the 
combustible solids quoted in Drysdale (1998). The ‘combustibility ratio’ for 
combustible solids as quoted in Drysdale (1998) was in the range of 3 (for red oak) to 
30 (for rigid polystyrene foam). Drysdale (1998) reported that flame retardant could 
influence the ‘combustibility ratio’ by altering the heat for combustion and/ or heat of 
vaporisation. This probably explained why the ‘combustibility ratio’ for both the seat 
and floor covering were low as they were both treated with flame retardant.  Having 
low ‘combustibility ratio’ somewhat suggests that the materials are ‘less combustible’. 
 
Because of low ‘combustibility ratio’, the computed heat of vaporisation values for 
both the seat and floor covering were found to be unusually high. The computed heat 
of vaporisation values were even higher than the heat of vaporisation values of flame 
retardant materials quoted in Babrauskas (2003); Drysdale (1998) and 
Grexa et al. (1996).  The values were also substantially higher than those used in the 
trial simulations which were 1390 and 2700 kJ/kg for the seat (FRP polyester) and 
floor covering (styrene butadiene) respectively.   




Critical mass flux and maximum burning rate 
The critical mass flux and the maximum burning rate were determined directly from 
the mass loss rate data. The critical mass flux values for the seat and floor were 
determined to be 0.0044 and 0.0024 kg/sm2 respectively while the maximum burning 
rate values were determined to be 0.0161 and 0.0079 kg/sm2 respectively.  
 
The critical mass flux was not prescribed in the trial simulations therefore it was not 
possible to make comparison. The maximum burning rate values were found to be 
relatively low compared with the values used in the trial simulations. The maximum 
burning rate values used in the trial simulations for the seat (FRP polyester) and floor 
covering (styrene butadiene) were 0.021 and 0.01 kg/sm2 respectively. These values 
were approximated from the HRRPUA curves of similar materials tested in Peacock 
and Braun (1999). 
 
Charring of samples 
Because the samples charred as observed during the experiments, it posed the 
question whether it would be more appropriate to model the samples as thermoplastic 
or char former fuels. To model the samples as char former fuels will require the char 
density, char conductivity and char specific heat to be specified for the modelling 
approach based on heat of vaporisation (McGrattan 2004). These properties are on top 
of those that have been derived previously.  
 
The char density could be approximated since the mass of the specimens at the end of 
the Cone Calorimeter tests was measured. Chen et al. (1995) described a methodology 
that could be used to obtain the char conductivity although in their study they found 
that the thermal capacity i.e. cρ  of char has negligible effects on the pyrolysis process 
and therefore need not be quantified. However the methodology requires a thermal 
pyrolysis model to be created (and an assumption that the materials are thermally-
thick) and a trial and error process to obtain value that best fits the predicted with the 
experimental mass loss rate histories for Cone Calorimeter tests at two different 
exposure flux levels (Delichatsios et al. 2003). How well the predicted and the 
experimental mass loss rate histories correlate is subjective and this will affect the 
char conductivity value obtained and therefore might not be suitable for engineering 
design. 




There is no other simpler procedure to derive the char conductivity and char specific 
heat from the Cone Calorimeter test data. There is also no such information available 
for the samples modelled. In view of these constraints, it was decided to model the 
samples as thermoplastic fuels. It would be more conservative because the decline in 
first peak HRR would not be predicted. However, the author acknowledged that this is 
a practical problem that may affect the simulation results.  
 
Summary of material properties derived  
The material properties derived from the Cone Calorimeter test data and material 
properties used in the trial simulations are summarised in Table 8.13 for easy 
reference.  
 
igT  δρc  Ave
effcH ,∆  
vH∆  "crm&  
"
maxm&  Component  
(°C) (kJ/m2K) (kJ/kg) (kJ/kg) (kg/sm2) (kg/sm2) 
Derived from 
test data 













360 n/a 17950 2700 Not 
prescribed 
0.01 
Wall panel Approximated 648 - - - - - 
n/a = Not applicable as the material was assumed to be thermally thick. The thermal conductivity, 
density and specific heat i.e. ckρ  were prescribed individually and were based on properties at room 
temperature.  
Table 8.13: Summary of material properties derived from Cone Calorimeter test data 
 
The material properties values used in the trial simulations were found to be over 
conservative. The train car materials are expected to be more difficult to ignite based 
on their derived ignition temperature. The materials are also likely to be less 
combustible because of low ‘combustibility ratio’. The fire consequence is also 
expected to be less severe because of lower burning rate.  
 




8.6  Conclusions from the Cone Calorimeter tests and the derived 
material properties 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the Cone Calorimeter tests and the 
derived material properties. 
a) Cone calorimeter tests were carried out for six train car materials. Among the 
six materials, the seat had the highest ignitability and flammability. Even so, it 
was more difficult to ignite and to burn compared with materials tested in 
other rail car studies.  The flame retardant additive in the polymer materials 
proved to be effective in retarding ignition (especially at low heat flux levels) 
and reducing the heat release rate.  
b) There was insufficient Cone Calorimeter test data to derive the material 
properties for the wall panel as the test specimens did not ignite at 35 and 
50 kW/m2. Through analysis, the wall panel is not expected to contribute to 
the fire growth and flame spread during the developing stage of the fire.  
c) The samples charred as observed during the experiments. However as there 
was no information on the char properties, it was decided to model the 
samples as thermoplastic fuels. 
d) The material properties values used in the trial simulations were found to be 
over conservative. The train car materials are expected to be more difficult to 
ignite and less combustible. The fire consequence is expected to be less severe 



















9 FDS predictions of Cone Calorimeter test results 
 
This Chapter describes the simulations carried out to compare the FDS predictions with 
the Cone Calorimeter test results i.e. the time to ignition and heat release rate. The 
purpose of the simulations is to check whether the material properties derived (and used 
as input into the fire model) are able to provide reasonable prediction of the experimental 
test results before they are used for simulation of train fires. It is particularly important to 
carry out this step because no full-scale test will be conducted to validate the train fire 
modelling results. 
 
Since only the material properties for seat (FRP polyester) and floor covering (styrene 
butadiene) were derived, only these two materials were modelled.  
 
9.1 FDS inputs  
 
9.1.1 Geometry, vent, mechanical and thermal properties 
 
The FDS model for the Cone Calorimeter was provided by McGrattan (2005b). The 
perspective views of the Cone Calorimeter model for the seat (FRP polyester) specimen 
and floor covering (styrene butadiene) specimen are shown in Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2 
respectively. The size of the computational domain was 0.2 m long by 0.2 m wide by 0.25 
m high. All the sides were specified to be open vent i.e. open to ambient.  
  
 
Figure 9.1: Snapshot from Smokeview – 
Cone Calorimeter model for seat (FRP 
polyester) specimen 
Figure 9.2: Snapshot from Smokeview – 
Cone Calorimeter model for floor covering 



















The dimensions of the specimens were specified according to their actual dimensions 
in the Cone Calorimeter tests. These two specimens have been found to behave as 
thermally-thin surface. The derived δρc values for FRP polyester and styrene 
butadiene specimens were 3.341 and 8.363 kJ/m2K respectively. These values were 
prescribed directly into FDS.    
 
Both specimens were backed with 0.1 m by 0.1 m by 0.02 m thick calcium silicate 
block in the model. The prescribed thermal conductivity k , density ρ  and specific 
heat c of the calcium silicate block were 0.12 W/mK, 720 kg/m3 and 1.25 kJ/kgK 
respectively. These values were obtained from Wade (2003b).  
 
The size and shape of the conical heater in the model were replicate of the conical 
heater in the Cone Calorimeter. The temperature of the outer surface of the conical 
heater was specified to be at 20°C while the temperature of the inner surface was 
specified according to the required incident heat flux level on the specimen. By 
prescribing a ‘heat flux gauge’ at a distance of 0.025 m below the bottom surface of 
conical heater and by trial and error, the calibrated temperature values as shown in 












Table 9.1: Calibrated temperatures for Cone Calorimeter model 
 




A numerical grid size of 25 by 25 by 32 cells was chosen after conducting grid 
sensitivity analysis. One of the main reasons for choosing this grid size was because 

















was similar for the selected grid size and characteristic fire diameter *D  for the train 
model as shown in Table 9.2. In the calculation, the HRR value of 1 kW for the Cone 
Calorimeter model was the maximum HRR in the Cone Calorimeter tests for the two 
specimens while the HRR value of 10000 kW for the train model (see Table 9.2) was 
the speculative HRR of the metro train under consideration. 
 
Model Q&  (kW) *D  (m) xδ  (mm) *D / xδ  
Cone Calorimeter 1 0.061 8 0.008 
Train 10000 2.4 300 0.008 
Table 9.2: HRR, characteristic fire diameter and grid size 
 
This criterion was used by Hietaniemi et al. (2004) in their work to select the grid 
sizes for FDS models having different scales. It allows the selected grid size to relate 
to the HRR.  
 
Note that in the Cone Calorimeter model, the grid has been stretched in the z-direction 
so that finer grid cells were allocated at lower portion of the domain where 
combustion took place. The simulation time specified for each simulation was 1200_s. 
The computers used for the simulations were Intel(R) Pentium 4(R), 3.2 GHz, 1 GB 
RAM computers. The times taken to complete the simulations were between 9 to 12 
hours.  
 
A sample FDS data file for the simulations can be found in Appendix H of this report. 




9.1.2 Parameters for the modelling approach based on HRRPUA 
 
For the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, the ignition temperature and the 
Cone Calorimeter HRRPUA curve of a specimen were specified in each simulation. 
The prescribed ignition temperatures for FRP polyester and styrene butadiene 
specimens were 448°C and 419°C respectively. 
 
The HRRPUA curve to be prescribed should be from the time to ignition (the point 
where sustained flaming occurred) until the end of the test. The average HRRPUA 
curve of the three replicate specimens at each exposure condition was utilised.  
 
Because the average HRRPUA curve was used, there was some uncertainty in the 
time to ignition especially for the specimens tested at low exposure heat flux level. 
This was because the visually determined ignition times showed significant scatter.  
 
Grexa et al. (1996) proposed the use of a criterion based on the HRR to determine the 
time to ignition. In their study, the specimen was considered ignited when the Cone 
Calorimeter HRR reached 30 kW/m2. They highlighted that the use of such criterion 
can greatly eliminate subjectivity because of ambiguity in the recording of ignition 
times. Their proposed method was therefore adopted.   
 
After evaluation of the ignition data for the two materials in the current study, 
30 kW/m2 was also chosen as the suitable limit because the time to reach this HRR 
has been found to agree reasonably well with the visually determined ignition times.    
 




9.1.3 Parameters for the modelling approach based on heat of 
vaporisation 
 
The ignition temperatures prescribed were the same as the modelling approach based 
on HRRPUA and the other parameters for the simulations are given in Table 7.4.   
 
S/no Parameter FRP polyester Styrene 
butadiene 
1 Heat of vaporisation vH∆  (kJ/kg) 10300 12320 
2 Effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆  
(kJ/kg) 
13670 14570 
3 Maximum burning rate "maxm&  (kg/m
2s) 0.0161 0.0079 
4 Critical mass flux "crm&  (kg/m
2s) 0.0044 0.0024 
Table 9.3: Heat of vaporisation, effective heat of combustion, maximum burning rate 
and critical heat flux for FRP polyester and styrene butadiene specimens 
 
 




9.2 Results and discussions for FDS prediction of Cone 
Calorimeter test results  
 
9.2.1 Modelling approach based on HRRPUA 
 
FRP polyester 
Figure 9.3 to Figure 9.6 show the FDS predictions and the experimental HRR curves at 
different exposure conditions. 








































Figure 9.3: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - FRP polyester - FDS prediction 
at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
Figure 9.4: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - FRP polyester - FDS prediction 
at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux  








































Figure 9.5: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - FRP polyester - FDS prediction 
at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
Figure 9.6: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - FRP polyester - FDS prediction 
at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
 
For the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, the ‘shape’ of the heat release curves 
was programmed into FDS, therefore FDS was able to gave identical ‘shape’ as the 
experimental HRR curve as shown in the Figures. The predicted time to ignition was 
relatively accurate at high exposure heat flux levels. However, the accuracy decreases 
with decreasing exposure heat flux levels. At 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level, the 
predicted time to ignition was unreasonably low. The parameters that governed the time 
to ignition were exposure heat flux level, δρc and ignition temperature. This suggested 
the derived values were not suitable for prediction of time to ignition at low heat flux 
levels.  





To improve the prediction, the δρc and /or ignition temperature values may need to 
be calibrated since they are the parameters that influence the time to ignition. Of the 
two parameters, only the δρc  value is temperature dependent. The ignition 
temperature of a thermoplastic is found to be reasonably constant and independent of 
heat flux (Janssens et al. 2003; Thomson and Drysdale 1987; Thomson et al. 1988). 
Assuming the derived ignition temperature was accurate, therefore only the δρc value 
needed to be adjusted.   
 
By trial and error, the ‘optimum’ δρc values as shown in Table 9.4 were obtained. 
From Table 9.4, it can be seen that at low exposure heat flux levels, much higher 
δρc values were to be prescribed in order to accurately predict the time to ignition. 
FDS predictions using the calibrated δρc values are shown from Figure 9.7 to Figure 












Table 9.4: Modelling approach based on HRRPUA - Calibrated δρc  values for FRP 
polyester  
 








































Figure 9.7: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - FRP polyester - FDS prediction 
at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux (Calibrated) 
Figure 9.8: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - FRP polyester - FDS prediction 
at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux (Calibrated) 












































Figure 9.9: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - FRP polyester - FDS prediction 
at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux (Calibrated) 
Figure 9.10: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - FRP polyester -  FDS prediction 
at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux (Calibrated) 
 
The author had attempted to derive a set of temperature variant properties for δρc in 
hope that the time to ignition could be accurately predicted at various exposure heat 
flux levels. This was carried out by assuming ∞T  in Equation 8.8 to be the surface 
temperature of the materials surT . Equation 8.8 is rewritten in the following form:   








The slope and the ignition temperature igT in Equation 10.2 were kept constant while 
surT was increased incrementally. This way, a set of temperature variant properties was 
derived for input into FDS for simulations. However, using the temperature variant 
properties for simulations did not give better results. The ignition times at low 
exposure heat flux levels were underestimated while the ignition times at high 
exposure heat flux levels were overestimated.   
 
The calibrated δρc  values were plotted against the exposure heat flux levels as 
shown in Figure 9.11. The Figure shows that there was a steep decrease in δρc values 
when the exposure heat flux levels increased from 25 to 35 kW/m2.  This might be the 
region where the fire retardant started to lose its effectiveness to retard ignition. The 
flame retardant was able to effectively retard ignition at low exposure heat flux level, 
therefore substantially greater amount of energy was required before ignition could 
take place, but at high heat flux intensities, lesser amount of energy was required. This 
might be the reason why a suitable set of temperature variant properties for the fire 
retardant material could not be derived.  
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Figure 9.11: Calibrated δρc  values for FRP polyester at exposure different heat flux 
levels 
 
A suitable set of temperature variant properties for δρc could not be derived and no 
single constant δρc  value could be prescribed for the modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA to reasonably predict the time to ignition at different exposure heat flux 
levels. If the value derived from Cone Calorimeter is inputted into the train model, 
FDS will over-predict the HRR because the time to ignition will be underestimated 
especially at low heat flux levels.  
 
To improve the prediction, a sub-model may be required. The sub-model must be able 
to select different prescribed property values for numerical simulation depending on 
the heat feedback from the fire.   
 
The current version of FDS does not have such a sub-model. To proceed with the final 
simulations, it was decided to prescribe the δρc  values according to the locations of 
the components in the metro train. For wall-like surfaces, seat and driver console 
assembly which will be represented by HRRPUA curve tested at 35 kW/m2, the 
calibrated δρc  value at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level i.e. 5.39 kJ/m2K, will be 
prescribed. For ceiling which will be represented by HRRPUA curve tested at 
50 kW/m2, the calibrated δρc  value at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level 
i.e. 3.95 kJ/m2K, will be prescribed. It is fully appreciated that the chosen δρc  values 
will not be able to adequately represent the conditions within the metro train but it 
may improve on the prediction and therefore are used for now until better modelling 
techniques becomes available.   
 




Styrene butadiene (Sty but) 
Figure 9.12 to Figure 9.15 show the FDS predictions and the experimental HRR curves 
at different exposure conditions for the styrene butadiene specimen before the δρc  
values were being calibrated. The trend in predicted time to ignition at different 
exposure heat flux levels was observed to be identical with the predictions for FRP 
polyester specimen.  








































Figure 9.12: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - Sty but - FDS prediction at 
25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
Figure 9.13: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - Sty but - FDS prediction at 
35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 








































Figure 9.14: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - Sty but - FDS prediction at 
50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
Figure 9.15: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - Sty but - FDS prediction at 
65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
 
Table 9.5 shows the calibrated δρc values. Figure 9.16 to Figure 9.19 show perfect 
agreement of FDS predictions with the experimental HRR curves when these 











Table 9.5: Modelling approach based on HRRPUA - Calibrated δρc  values for 
styrene butadiene 
 












































Figure 9.16: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - Sty but - FDS prediction at 
25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux (Calibrated) 
Figure 9.17: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - Sty but - FDS prediction at 
35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux (Calibrated) 








































Figure 9.18: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - Sty but - FDS prediction at 
50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux (Calibrated) 
Figure 9.19: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA - Sty but - FDS prediction at 
65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux (Calibrated) 
 
As in the case for the FRP polyester specimen, a suitable set of temperature variant 
properties for δρc could not be derived and no single constant δρc  value could be 
prescribed for the styrene butadiene specimen for the modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA to reasonably predict the time to ignition at different exposure heat flux 
levels. Therefore for the final simulations, the δρc  value will also be prescribed 
according to the location of the component made of styrene butadiene i.e. the floor 
covering. 
  
As the floor covering will be represented by HRRPUA curve tested at 25 kW/m2 in 
the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, therefore the calibrated δρc  value at 
25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level i.e. 22.17 kJ/m2K, will be prescribed.  
 




9.2.2 Modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation 
 
FRP polyester 
Figure 9.20 to Figure 9.23 show the FDS predictions and the experimental HRR curves 
at different exposure conditions. 
 








































Figure 9.20: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - FRP polyester - FDS 
prediction at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux  
Figure 9.21: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - FRP polyester - FDS 
prediction at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 








































Figure 9.22: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - FRP polyester - FDS 
prediction at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
Figure 9.23: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - FRP polyester - FDS 
prediction at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
 
As in the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, there were relatively good 
predictions in the time to ignition of specimens at high exposure heat flux levels. But 
at low exposure heat flux levels, the predictions were poor. Figure 9.20 to Figure 9.23 
also show that the HRRs were grossly under predicted at all exposure conditions. 
Because the specimen was modelled as a thermoplastic and not a char former fuel, no 
charring properties were specified. Therefore FDS was not able to predict the decline 
of 1st peak HRR and increase of the 2nd peak HRR. A constant peak HRR was 
predicted as shown in above Figures.  
 




The results were discouraging. It suggested that the derived properties were not 
suitable for use in the fire model to allow accurate prediction of ignition and fire 
growth. To improve the prediction, calibrations were again carried out.  
 
In order to limit the number of simulations, it was decided to adjust only two main 
parameters: 
a) the δρc  value since it affect the time to ignition 
b) the heat of vaporisation vH∆  since it affect the HRR 
 
Since constant peak HRR would be predicted, the prediction was considered 
acceptable if FDS predicted the average HRR of the two peaks and the lowest point 
between the two peaks. 
 
Besides problems with the time to ignition and HRR, it was also discovered that the 
heat released for the specimens would be over predicted if the simulation was allowed 
to run sufficiently long e.g. 2400 s, as the HRR would remain constant (after reaching 
its peak) throughout the simulation.  
 
For FDS to estimate correct amount of heat released from the specimen, it has been 
found that density ρ  and thicknessδ of the specimen must also be prescribed in the 
model. Either one of these value must be adjusted so that the correct amount of heat is 
released. This is because in FDS the amount of heat released from a specimen is 
calculated by multiplying the density, thickness, surface area and effective heat of 
combustion i.e. effesur HA ,∆ρδ . 
 
From the Cone Calorimeter test data, the average amount of mass loss was found to 
be 54%. The prescribed thickness of the specimen was therefore adjusted so that the 
mass in the model was only 54% of its actual mass. As for the density, the measured 
value i.e. 1795 kg/m3, was prescribed.  
 




Table 9.6 shows the calibrated values. Figure 9.24 to Figure 9.27 show FDS predictions 
using the calibrated values.  
 
 
Table 9.6: Modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation - Calibrated values for 
FRP polyester 
 








































Figure 9.24: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - FRP polyester - FDS 
prediction at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
(Calibrated) 
Figure 9.25: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - FRP polyester - FDS 
prediction at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
(Calibrated) 








































Figure 9.26: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - FRP polyester - FDS 
prediction at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
(Calibrated) 
Figure 9.27: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - FRP polyester - FDS 
prediction at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
(Calibrated) 
 
From Table 9.6, it can be seen that when the specimen was exposed to different 
exposure heat flux levels, different sets of δρc  and heat of vaporisation values would 
need to be prescribed in order to reasonably predict the time to ignition and HRR. 












vH∆   
(kJ/kg) 
25 0.00216 13.3 2850 
35 0.00216 5.4 3700 
50 0.00216 3.95 4700 
65 0.00216 3.6 5250 




The derived heat of vaporisation value from Cone Calorimeter test data was 
10300 kJ/kg. The calibrated values at different exposure heat flux levels were much 
lower than this value. This suggested that the procedure proposed by Quintiere (1993) 
could not derive appropriate heat of vaporisation values for fire retardant materials 
which could be used for fire modelling. Even though the calibrated heat of 
vaporisation values were lower than the derived value, it was noted that they were still 
higher than that used in the trial simulations. 
 
After analysing the results, the calibrated values at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level 
was chosen to be the most suitable single set of values which could be used the 
represent the burning behaviour of the specimen over the spectrum of exposure 
conditions. Even though at lower heat flux level, the HRR may be slightly under-
predicted, it will predict earlier ignition. At higher heat flux level, the HRR may be 
over-predicted but the time to ignition will be delayed. It allowed a compromise 
between the HRR and ignition time which both have influence on the fire severity. As 
maximum burning rate has been prescribed in the simulation, the maximum HRR will 
be limited to the experimental maximum. This will prevent the HRR to be grossly 
over-estimated. Therefore it was decided to use calibrated values at 35 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux level i.e. δρc  value of 5.39 kJ/m
2K and vH∆ of 3700 kJ/kg, for 
the final simulations. In addition, the density and the adjusted thicknessδ  will be 
prescribed to predict a correct amount of heat released from the material. 
 
Styrene butadiene 
Figure 9.28 to Figure 9.31 show the FDS predictions and the experimental HRR curves 
at different exposure conditions. 








































Figure 9.28: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - Sty but - FDS 
prediction at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux  
Figure 9.29: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - Sty but - FDS 
prediction at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 












































Figure 9.30: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - Sty but - FDS 
prediction at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
Figure 9.31: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - Sty but - FDS 
prediction at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
 
These Figures show similar results as the FRP polyester specimen. Therefore 
calibrations were also carried out. 
 
For the styrene butadiene specimen, the mass loss rate at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
level was comparatively lower than the other three exposure heat flux levels. The 
average mass loss rate (of the three replicate specimens) at 25 kW/m2 was 42%. At 
the other three exposure heat flux levels, the average mass loss rate was 54%. This 
information was used to adjust the thickness of the specimen so that correct amount of 
heat was released at different heat flux levels. As for the density, the measured value 
i.e. 1478 kg/m3, was prescribed.  
 
Table 9.7 shows the calibrated values. Figure 9.32 to Figure 9.35 show FDS predictions 
using the calibrated values.  
 
 














vH∆   
(kJ/kg) 
25 0.00126 18.6 4750 
35 0.00162 13.9 6250 
50 0.00162 11.0 8600 
65 0.00162 9.6 9400 












































Figure 9.32: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - Sty but - FDS 
prediction at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
(Calibrated) 
Figure 9.33: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - Sty but - FDS 
prediction at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
(Calibrated) 








































Figure 9.34: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - Sty but - FDS 
prediction at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
(Calibrated) 
Figure 9.35: Modelling approach based on 
heat of vaporisation - Sty but - FDS 
prediction at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
(Calibrated) 
 
As in the case for FRP polyester specimen, different sets of δρc  and heat of 
vaporisation values must be prescribed at different heat flux levels in order to 
reasonably predict the time to ignition and HRR. The calibrated heat of vaporisation 
values were also lower than the derived value, but they were still higher than that used 
in the trial simulations.  
 
For the final simulations, the calibrated values at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level 
i.e. δρc  value of 13.9 kJ/m
2K and vH∆ of 6250 kJ/kg, will be used since only one set 
of values can be prescribed. The density and the adjusted thickness δ  will also be 











9.3 Conclusions from FDS predictions of Cone Calorimeter test 
results  
 
The following conclusions can be drawn after compared FDS predictions with the Cone 
Calorimeter test results: 
a) For the modelling approach based of HRRPUA, FDS was not able predict the 
time to ignition at low heat flux levels using the derived properties. It was not 
possible to derive a suitable set of temperature variant properties for δρc  
because the fire retardant was able to effectively retard ignition at low exposure 
heat flux levels.  
b) For the modelling approach based of heat of vaporisation, FDS not only could not 
predict the time to ignition at low heat flux levels, it also under-predicted the 
HRR at all exposure heat flux levels.  
c) It can be concluded that the procedures used cannot derive appropriate material 
properties for fire retardant materials which can be used in fire model to 
accurately predict ignition and fire growth.  
d) For the modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation, it is necessary to 
prescribe the density and thickness of the specimen so that FDS is able to 
compute the heat released. In the current study, the thickness of the specimen was 
adjusted so that the heat released by the specimen in the model tallied with the 
experimental data.  
e) For the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, there was no single constant 
δρc  value which could be prescribed to accurately predict the time to ignition at 
different exposure heat flux levels. For practical reasons, it was decided to 
prescribe the calibrated δρc  values according to the locations of the components 
in the metro train for the final simulations. 
f) For the modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation, there was no single set 
of δρc  and heat of vaporisation values which could be prescribed to accurately 
predict the time to ignition and HRR at different exposure heat flux levels. For 
practical reasons, it was decided to prescribe the calibrated values at 35 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux level for the final simulations. In addition, the density and the 
adjusted δ  would also be prescribed to predict correct amount of heat released 
from the material.  
 




10 HRR calculations based on the current methods 
 
This Chapter presents the HRR calculations based on the current methods. The 
estimations are used to make comparison with the simulation results. Estimations 
from three methods will be presented, namely the traditional method, Duggan (1997) 
method (or summation method) and the post-flashover model method. In addition, the 
hazard load based on method described in NFPA 130 (2003 edition) Annex D will 
also be estimated to examine whether self-propagating fire is possible for the CCL 
metro train. 
 
10.1 Traditional method 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there were two revisions to the traditional method after it 
was first used to estimate HRR of metro train in 1975. The latest revision i.e. design 
scenario – 1989, was made to incorporate the impact of the recommendations 
contained in NFPA 130. The HRR estimation based on this revision will be presented 
since the CCL metro train is designed to comply with the test methods and 
performance criteria specified in NFPA 130 or its equivalent.  
 
In addition to design scenario - 1989, the modified traditional method proposed and 
used by the design consultant to calculate the HRR of the CCL metro train will also 
be presented. The modified traditional method has the same methodology as design 
scenario – 1989 but there are a few modifications to the assumptions. The differences 
will be highlighted in the later Section. 
 
The fire loads for the MC-car and T-car are summarised in Table 10.1 below. They 
were computed from the fire load schedule submitted by the train supplier (Renie and 









Location Fire load (MJ) 
MC-car 
Above floor 20743 
Floor 3632 
Below floor 7892 
T-car 
Above floor 17884 
Floor 3789 
Below floor 8683 
Table 10.1: Fire loads of MC-car and T-car 
 
In the traditional method, the fire is assumed to start with flame ignition at the under 
carriage (below floor) of the metro train car. Once established in the below floor area 
of the car, the fire propagates through the floor (despite the use of fire resistant floor) 
and into the above floor area of the car. The combustibles in the car interior are 
assumed to ignite and result in flashover. The magnitude of the fire during flashover 
will result in fire spread to the adjoining car in the direction of tunnel airflow. When 
the fire spreads to the adjoining car, the fire is contained to the above floor due to the 
presence of the fire resistant floor. Fire in the adjoining car is assumed to continue to 
develop until flashover. The fire spread regime is assumed to continue and repeat until 
the entire train is being consumed. All the combustibles above and below the car floor 
and less than one-half of the floor materials are assumed to be burnt in the incident car 
while only the above floor combustibles are assumed to be involved in the second and 
succeeding cars.   
 
Since the CCL metro train is made up of three cars in MC-T-MC configuration, the 
worst case will be for the fire to start at the MC-car (and spread downstream in the 
direction of airflow to the other two cars) since this will result in all three cars to be 
involved in the fire. 
 
10.1.1 HRR based on design scenario – 1989 
 
 
In design scenario -1989, an initial fire size intQ& of 0.7 MW is assumed and lasted for 
30 minutes. The burning period for each car is assumed to be 60 minutes (excluding 
the ignition phase) while the flashover and fire-transmission rates are assumed to be 
30 minutes. Up to two cars would be fully-involved at any given instant. The HRR for 




the first involved car 1Q& was calculated using Equation 2.4 and determined to be 8.1 
MW. The HRRs of the T-car and the MC-car (at the other end of the train) were 
calculated using Equation 2.5 and determined to be 4.6 MW and 5.4 MW respectively. 
Table 10.2 below shows the tabulation of HRRs at different phases of the fire 
development.  
 









0 – 30 1 0.7 0.7 1st car under initial burning phase. 




8.8 1st car flashover. 2nd car (T-car) 
under initial burning phase. 






13.4 1st car continues to burn. 2nd car 
flashover. 3rd car (MC-car) under 
initial burning phase. 






10.0 1st car completely burnt out. 2nd 
car continues to burn. 3rd car 
flashover.  




5.4 2nd car completely burnt out.  3rd 
car continues to burn.  
150+ 3 0 0 All cars burnt out and fire 
extinguished 
Table 10.2: Fire development - Design scenario - 1983 
 
From Table 10.2, the peak HRR was estimated to be 13.4 MW and the burning period 
was 150 minutes. 
 
10.1.2 HRR based on modified traditional method for CCL 
 
Initial fire size intQ&  of 0.7 MW for 30 minutes is also assumed when calculating the 
HRR for CCL metro train. Only up to two cars would be fully-involved at any given 
instant as in design scenario -1989. However there are a few modifications in the 
design assumptions. They are: 
a) To account for the fire resistance rating of the floor, the period from the initial 
ignition to fire propagation through floor is taken to be 60 minutes. 
b) The burning period for the below floor, floor and above floor combustibles are 
assumed to be 60 minutes. 
c) Combustion efficiency factor of 0.7 is included in the calculation. 
d) Fire is transmitted to the adjacent car in 10 minutes after flashover. 




Design Equations 2.6 to 2.9 were used to calculate the HRR for first involved car and 
succeeding cars. The HRR of the below floor combustibles for the first involved car; 
the HRR for the first involved car; the HRR of the floor and above floor combustibles 
for the first involved car; and the HRRs for T-car and MC-car (at the other end of the 
train) were determined to be 1.2, 5.6, 4.0, 3.1 and 3.7MW respectively. Table 10.3 
below shows the tabulation of HRRs at different phases of the fire development. 
 









0   – 30
  
1 0.7 0.7 1st car under initial burning phase 
30 – 60 1 1.2 1.2 Burning of 1st car below floor 
combustibles  
60 – 70 
  
1 5.6 5.6 Fire propagates above floor and 










Entire 1st car continues to burn. 2nd 
car (T-car) under initial burning 
phase. 




4.7 1st car below floor combustibles 
burnt out, 1st car above floor 
continues to burn, 2nd car still 







7.1 1st car above floor continues to 
burn, 2nd car above floor flashover 






7.8 1st and 2nd cars above floor 
continue to burn. 3rd car under 
initial burning phase 






3.8 1st car completely burnt out. 2nd 
car above floor continues to burn. 
3rd car still under initial ignition
  




6.8 2nd car above floor continues to 
burn. 3rd car above floor flash over 




6.8 2nd and 3rd car above floor  
continues to burn 




3.7 2nd car completely burnt. 3rd car 
above floor continues to burn 
200+  3 0 0 All cars burnt out and fire 
extinguished 
Table 10.3: Fire development – Modified traditional method for CCL 
 




From Table 10.3, the peak HRR was estimated to be 7.8 MW based on the calculation 
method used in Circle Line. Note that the value calculated in this Section was lower 
than that calculated by the design consultant (10 MW) because the fire loads which 
the consultant based on was from the contract specification while the fire loads used 
here was based on the train supplier submission which was much lower.  
 
The HRRs at different fire development stages for Design scenario - 1989 and 



















Design scenario 1989 Modified traditional method
 




The calculation method for CCL resulted in lower peak HRR and longer burning 
period compared with design scenario – 1989 because of the modifications in design 
assumptions for the calculation. By including lapse time to account for the fire 
resistance rating of the floor and combustion efficiency factor reduced the peak HRR 
for the CCL metro train.   
 
1989 peak – 13.4 MW 
CCL peak – 7.8 MW 




10.2 Duggan (1997) method 
 
In Duggan (1997) method, the heat release rate per unit area HRRPUA curves of 
exposed surface materials (determined from Cone Calorimeter tests) are multiplied by 
their exposed area in the metro train car. The ‘HRR curves’ of all the exposed surface 
materials are then summed up. A notional 1.5 MW continuous ignition source is 
added to represent a severe luggage stack fire. A smoothing procedure is used to 
merge peaks which are resolved but close together. In addition, a notional 3 MW is 
added to account for other miscellaneous surfaces and items within the car when the 
data is used for emergency tunnel ventilation system design. The exposure heat flux 
levels (at which the exposed surface materials are tested) depend on their orientation 
in the metro train car. For a material which has a ‘ceiling-like’ (horizontal prone) 
orientation, it is tested at 50 kW/m2. For a material which has a ‘wall like’ (vertical) 
orientation, it is 35 kW/m2 and for a material which has a ‘floor-like’ (horizontal 
supine) orientation, it is either tested at 20 or 25 kW/m2.   
 
The HRRPUA curves at exposure heat flux levels of 25, 35 and 50 kW/m2 were used 
for the calculation presented herein. In Duggan (1997) method, the calculation is done 
for only one car therefore the exposed area of surface materials in the MC-car was 
used as shown in Table 10.4. Note that wall, ceiling and door panels (made of 
aluminium panel and painted with powder paint) were not included in the calculation 
as the wall panel tested in the current study did not ignite at 35 and 50 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux levels. 
 









Floor covering  Styrene 
butadiene 
25 53.6 Horizontal 
supine  





Vertical  Seat back, under seat boxes, 
equipped cubicle assemblies, 
PEC module fittings, detrainment 
doors, wall (face) panels at car 






prone   
Ceiling panels at car end mask FRP 
polyester 
50 2.3 
Table 10.4: Exposed area of surface materials 
 
Figure 10.2 shows the ‘luggage’ ignition source. Figure 10.3 to Figure 10.6 show the 
HRR curves at listed exposure heat flux levels adjusted for area and Figure 10.7 
shows the summation of HRRs. The smoothing procedure was not performed as there 

































Figure 10.2: HRR curve of ignition 
source  
Figure 10.3: HRR curve of surface made 
of styrene butadiene at 25kW/m2 
































Figure 10.4: HRR curve of surfaces made 
of FRP polyester at 25kW/m2 
Figure 10.5: HRR curve of surfaces made 
of FRP polyester at 35kW/m2 



































Figure 10.6: HRR curve of surfaces made 
of FRP polyester at 50kW/m2 
Figure 10.7: Summation of HRRs for one 
car 
 
From Figure 10.3 to Figure 10.6, it can be seen that the vertical surfaces were the 
main contributor to the HRR. The peak HRR was found to be 7600 kW or 7.6MW as 
can be seen from Figure 10.7. Adding a notional 3 MW to account for other 
miscellaneous surfaces and items within the car gave a peak HRR of 10.6 MW. 
 
One of the main criticisms of the Duggan (1997) method is that the calculation is done 
for only one car (Dowling and White 2004). Therefore another calculation was carried 
out by scaling the HRR curves for area of the surfaces found in two cars i.e. the MC- 
car and T car.  Two cars were chosen because based on traditional method design 
scenario – 1989 and modified traditional method for CCL, only up to two cars would 
be fully-involved at any given instant. Three cars or a complete train were not 
considered for the calculation because different propensities for ignition, flame spread 
and heat release would make the estimation highly conservative. The summation of 
HRRs for two cars is show in Figure 10.8. 














Figure 10.8: Summation of HRRs for two cars  
 
The peak HRR was found to be 11900 kW or 11.9 MW. Adding a notional 3 MW 
gave a peak HRR of 14.9 MW.  This value was found to be reasonably close to the 
estimated peak HRR of 13.4 MW using the traditional method design scenario -1989.  




10.3 Post-flashover model method 
 
Hettinger and Barnett (1991) used post-flashover computer model, COMPF2 to 
predict the HRR of metro train car interior (above floor). The assumption for the 
model is that fire is ventilation controlled during the post-flashover regime and 
therefore burning rate is simply function of the oxygen available for combustion.  
 
In their study, they assumed that the material would exhibit the material properties of 
polycarbonate after flashover. A combustion efficiency factor χ  was included and 
‘net’ heat of combustion was based on weighted average for the combustible materials 
in the metro train car.  
 
In their study, a HRR of 12.9 MW was derived based on a ‘net’ heat of combustion of 
13650 kJ/kg, a combustion efficiency factor χ  of 0.8 and the design scenario that 
assumed passenger doors and windows were opened. When the COMPF2 result was 
modified to incorporate the effect of the floor and below floor combustibles, peak 
HRR of 18 MW was obtained for the metro train car.  
 
Besides having safety glass windows, the train in their study also had stainless steel 
shell which prevented the fire from being transmitted directly from car to car. 
Therefore the possibility of multiple car involvement for a fire was discounted in their 
study. 
 
Then Kennedy et al. (1998) reported the COMPF2 study for the same train (and with 
same amount of distribution of combustibles in the train) but assumed the car had 
polycarbonate windows. Multi-car fire with succeeding cars being involved every 30 
minutes was assumed. The peak HRR for the duration of the fire was estimated to be 
23.1 MW, with two cars being fully involved at any one time.   
 




No simulation was conducted using the COMPF2 in the current study to predict the 
HRR. As the opening area was approximately the same and the ‘net’ heat of 
combustion was slightly higher in the current study compared with the COMPF2 
study (see Table 10.5), it was decided to approximate the HRR using the proportional 
method according to the above floor (car interior) heat load of the metro train cars. 
The average above floor fire load of MC-car and T-car was used.   
 
Data source Opening area 
per metro train 
car (m2) 
‘Net’ heat of 
combustion per metro 
train car (kJ/kg) 
Above floor fire load 
of metro train car 
(MJ) 
Current study 31.08 14800 (MC-car) 
14100 (T-car) 
19310 (average of 
MC and T cars) 
COMPF2 study 32.67 13650 24400 
Table 10.5: Opening area and ‘net’ heat of combustion in the current study and the 
COMPF2 study 
 
Using the above proposed method, the HRR for the CCL metro train was 
approximated to be 18.3 MW for the multi-car fire scenario. 
 
10.4 NFPA 130 Annex D – Hazard Load 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, NFPA 130 (2003 edition) Annex D contains method to 
determine the hazard load in MJ/m3 of train car volume. A suggested performance 
criterion of 3 MJ/m3 is included as the maximum allowable loading to ensure self-
propagating fire would not occur with an initiating fire consisting of the equivalent of 
0.45 kg of newsprint or 0.23 kg of lighter fluid. To estimate the hazard load, the 180-
second average heat release "180q values are multiplied by the exposed area for each 
material and totalled. In the example calculation, the components are either exposed 
to 10 kW/m2 (seat and floor) or 15 kW/m2 (wall) or 35 kW/m2 (ceiling) exposure heat 
flux level selected according to their orientation and location.  
 
Even though there was reasonable amount of test data from the experiments, there 
were still two limitations for the estimation as discussed below: 
a) The OSU apparatus (ASTM-E-906 2004) is specified for use in the example 
calculation given in NFPA 130 and not the Cone Calorimeter. The OSU 
apparatus results, however, when compared against other measurements, have 




been found to substantially underestimate the HRR (Babrauskas 1986). This 
was one of the reasons which led to the development of Cone Calorimeter 
(Peacock and Braun 1999). Therefore use of Cone Calorimeter results will be 
more conservative for the estimation of hazard load.   
b) No test was conducted at 10 and 15 kW/m2 exposure heat flux levels therefore 
no data at these heat flux levels was available. But based on the experimental 
results it is appropriate to assume that none of the exposed surface materials 
will ignite at these flux levels. The derived critical heat flux levels for FRP 
polyester and styrene butadiene were reasonably higher than the above 
exposure heat flux levels i.e. 10 and 15  kW/m2. The critical heat flux level for 
the aluminium panel (with exposed surface painted with powder paint) was 
expected to be even much higher as no ignition occurred at 35 and 50 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux level.  Therefore it is reasonable to assume the average 
180-second heat release "180q values for these materials to be insignificant when 
tested at 10 and 15 kW/m2 exposure heat flux levels. 
 
Considering the above, only the ceiling material tested at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat 
flux in the Cone Calorimeter was required for the estimation of hazard load. This 
implied that only data on the ceiling panel at the end mask (made of FRP polyester) 
was needed for the estimation.  
 
The exposed area of the ceiling panel was 2.3 m2 as shown in Table 10.4. The 180-
second average heat release value at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux level was 
18.5 MJ/m2. The dimensions of the MC-car were 23.45 m by 2.9 m by 2.1 m high 
which gave a train volume of 143 m3. Based on the information, the hazard load for 
the train car was determined to be 0.3 MJ/m3 ≤ 3 MJ/m3. This was 10 times lower 
than the specified criterion.  This result suggested that self-propagating fire was 
unlikely to occur with an ignition source consisting of the equivalent of 0.45 kg of 
newsprint or 0.23 kg of lighter fluid. For fire to self-propagate, the 180-second 




2) which was a relatively high value considering that the derived 
critical heat flux levels of the materials were much higher than the specified exposure 
flux levels. 




10.5 Summary  
 
Table 10.6 summarises the peak HRRs estimated based on the various current 
methods.  
Method  Revision Peak HRR 
(MW) 
Remark 
Traditional method Design scenario – 1989 13.4  
 Modified method 7.8  
Duggan method One car 10.6  
 Two cars 14.9  
Post-flashover 
model method 
Multi-car fire  18.3 By approximation 
Table 10.6: Summary of peak HRR values estimated based the various current 
methods 
   
 
The peak HRRs were in the range of 7.8 MW to 18.3 MW, depending on the method 
used to estimate it. The modified traditional method resulted in lowest HRR value 
whereas the post-flashover model method gave the highest HRR value. In all the 
current methods used to estimate the HRR, the main assumption was that the fire 
would grow, spread and attain flashover during a metro train fire. Because of this 
assumption, the HRR of the metro train might be overestimated in view that the 
materials tested in the current study not only complied with the stringent small-scale 
tests performance criteria but were also difficult to ignite and burn in the Cone 
Calorimeter compared with the test results from other rail car studies. 
 
The hazard load for the metro train car was much lower than the allowable loading 
suggesting that self-propagating fire was unlikely to occur with an ignition source 
















11 Final Simulations 
 
This Chapter describes the final simulations. It also presents and discusses the final 
simulation results. It is important to highlight that the original plan for the project is to 
derive thermo-physical properties for the train car exposed surface materials from the 
Cone Calorimeter test data and to use them as input into the FDS model for the final 
simulations. However, there were two unforeseen problems arose that did not allow 
the project to proceed as planned: 
a) There was insufficient Cone Calorimeter test data to derive the material 
properties for the wall panel. Therefore it was not possible to simulate this 
component /material as combustibles in the simulation. However, through 
analysis, the wall panel is not expected to contribute to the fire growth and 
flame spread during the developing stage of the fire. Even if the fire grows to 
flashover, the modelling results are unlikely to be significantly affected 
because of low fire load content of the materials. 
b) The small-scale predictions based on the derived thermo-physical properties 
for the other two exposed surface materials i.e. FRP polyester and styrene 
butadiene, have been poor. Therefore to improve the prediction, a combination 
of derived and calibrated properties will be used for the final simulations as 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
 




11.1 Final simulations conducted 
  
The trial simulations showed that the fire scenarios with the fire on the seat and the 
fire scenarios with all doors closed were not able to grow in intensity and cause 
window failure. This was the case even though the material properties used in the trial 
simulations were more conservative than the derived properties (or the calibrated 
properties). This led to the conclusion that these fire scenarios would be less severe 
compared with the other fire scenarios and therefore were not considered further in 
the final simulations. The other reason for not considering the fire scenarios with all 
doors closed was because the trial simulations have indicated that the simulations 
were unstable which implied that FDS was not suitable for simulating under-
ventilated fire scenarios. The final simulations focused on five fire scenarios which 




Description of fire scenario 
1 2A Rear car fire, fire in the corner (Arson or electrical fault), both 
detrainment doors opened, all passenger doors closed 
2 3A Rear car fire, undercarriage fire (Electrical fault), both 
detrainment doors opened, all passenger doors closed 
3 2B Rear car fire, fire in the corner (Arson or electrical fault), both 
detrainment doors closed, 1st and 4th passenger doors facing 
the walkway opened 
4 3B Rear car fire, undercarriage fire (Electrical fault), both 
detrainment doors closed, 1st and 4th passenger doors facing 
the walkway opened 
5 3D Middle car, undercarriage fire (Electrical fault), both 
detrainment doors closed, 1st and 4th passenger doors facing 
the walkway opened 
Note:  1) Forced ventilation and window failure were simulated for all scenarios. 
2) The modelling approaches based on HRRPUA and heat of vaporisation were    
 simulated for all scenarios 
Table 11.1: Summary of the final simulations conducted 
 




11.2 FDS inputs 
 
Since most of the details of FDS inputs for the train model were described in Chapter 




In the final simulations, the complete train was modelled. Figure 11.1 and Figure 11.2 
show the snapshot from Smokeview for the 3-car train. The size of the computational 
domain was 70 m long by 5.5 m wide by 4.4 m high. A grid size of 300 mm was 
selected for the simulations after conducting the grid sensitivity analysis. For the final 
simulations, the simulation time was increased to 3600 s. The computers used for the 
simulations were Intel(R) Pentium 4(R), 3.2 GHz, 1 GB RAM computers. The times 
taken to complete the simulations were between 20 to 80 hours each.  
Figure 11.1: Snapshot from Smokeview showing exterior view of the 3-car train 
within a tunnel 
 
 
Figure 11.2: Snapshot from Smokeview showing interior view of the 3-car train 




11.2.2  Vents, ignition sources, mechanical and thermal properties and 
combustion reaction parameters 
 
The vents i.e. forced ventilation, train doors and criterion for window failure, and 
ignition sources were as described in the trial simulations. However, at 1800 s into the 
simulation, the ignition sources were ‘removed’ to simulate burn out of the ignition 
source.  
 
Besides the two burning materials i.e. FRP polyester and styrene butadiene, the 
thickness, the density and the thermal properties of the tunnel and other components 
in the train were similar to the trial simulations. The mechanical and thermal 
properties of FRP polyester and styrene butadiene are outlined in later Sections. 
 
For the final simulations, the combustion reaction parameters were also based on FRP 
polyester since it was the main burning material in the train.       
 
11.2.3 Parameters for the modelling approach based on HRRPUA 
 
For the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, the ignition temperatures and the 
Cone Calorimeter HRRPUA curves of the burning materials i.e. FRP polyester and 
styrene butadiene, were specified. The ignition temperatures for FRP polyester and 
styrene butadiene were based on the derived values and were 448°C and 419°C 
respectively.  
 
The HRRPUA curves to be prescribed in FDS depend on the locations of the 
materials/ components in the train and are according to the exposure heat flux levels 
listed in Table 4.2. The Table also shows the calibrated δρc values which are 
prescribed according to the locations of the components in the train as discussed in 
Chapter 9. The FDS data file has been written such that the rate of heat release from a 
component followed one of the HRRPUA curves shown in Figure 11.3 to Figure 11.5  
once its surface reached the ignition temperature. The curve to follow will depends on 
the materials and locations of the components as discussed.  









δρc  (kJ/m2K) 
Floor covering Styrene 
butadiene 
25 22.2 
Seats, under seat boxes, equipped 
cubicle assemblies, PEC module 
fittings, detrainment door, driving 
console assembly and face panels 
FRP polyester 35 5.4 
Ceiling panels at car end mask FRP polyester 50 3.95 
Table 11.2:  Modelling approach based on HRRPUA – Calibrated δρc values 
 
HRRPUA curve for styrene butadiene at 



















HRRPUA curve for FRP polyester at 



















Figure 11.3: HRRPUA curve for styrene 
butadiene at 25 kW/m2 exposure heat flux
Figure 11.4: HRRPUA curve for FRP 
polyester at 35 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
HRRPUA curve for FRP polyester at 




















Figure 11.5: HRRPUA curve for FRP 
polyester at 50 kW/m2 exposure heat flux 
 
 




11.2.4 Parameters for the modelling approach based on heat of 
vaporisation  
 
For completeness, the parameters prescribed for the two burning materials for the 
modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation are given in Table 7.4. The 
properties were either derived, calibrated or measured values as shown in the remark 
column. 
 





1 Ignition temperature igT  (°C) 448 419 Derived 
2 Heat of vaporisation vH∆  (kJ/kg)  3700 6250 Calibrated 
3 Effective heat of combustion effcH ,∆  
(kJ/kg) 
13670 14570 Derived 
4 Maximum burning rate "maxm&  (kg/m
2s) 0.0161 0.0079 Derived 
5 Critical mass flux "crm&  (kg/m
2s) 0.0044 0.0024 Derived 
6 δρc  (kJ/m2K) 5.4 13.9 Calibrated 
7 Density ρ  (kg/m3) 1795 1478 Measured 
8 Thickness δ  (m) 0.00216 0.00162 Calibrated 
Table 11.3: Modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation - Parameters for FRP 
polyester and styrene butadiene  




11.3 Results and discussions for the final simulations   
 
11.3.1 Modelling approach based on HRRPUA 
 
Figure 7.10 to Figure 11.10 show the HRR curves while Table 11.4 shows the 































Figure 11.6: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA – Fire scenario 2A 
Figure 11.7: Modelling approach based 






























Figure 11.8: Modelling approach based on 
HRRPUA – Fire scenario 2B 
Figure 11.9: Modelling approach based 

















Figure 11.10: Modelling approach based 
on HRRPUA – Fire scenario 3D 
 







Peak HRR value for the 
modelling approach 
based on HRRPUA (kW) 
1 2A 1550 
2 3A 11800 
3 2B 2670 
4 3B 1890 
5 3D 3500 
Table 11.4: Final simulations - Summary of predicted peak HRR values for the 
modelling approach based on HRRPUA. 
 
The fire in fire scenarios 2A and 2B i.e. fire in the corner, did not spread to the 
adjacent car.  For fire scenario 2A, the fire was at its peak when the fire spread to the 
2-seater seat area (near the ignition source) at about 620 s (see Figure 7.20). For fire 
scenario 2B, the fire was at its peak when the fire spread to the 7-seater seat area (near 
the ignition source) at about 820 s (see Figure 11.12). In both fire scenarios, the HRR 
started to decrease after reached the peak (see Figure 7.10 and Figure 11.8). The 
maximum compartment temperatures for fire scenarios 2A and 2B were 471°C and 
590°C respectively. Both temperatures were below the flashover criteria implying that 
flashover did not take place. No window failure occurred since the compartment 
temperature was lower than the window failure criterion. These temperatures also 
would not be high enough to cause ignition of wall or ceiling since they were lower 
than the ‘approximated’ ignition temperature for wall panel (see Chapter 8, Section 
8.5.2). Because the fire in fire scenario 2B was able to spread further downstream, it 
had slightly higher peak HRR compared with fire scenario 2A.  
 
The results suggested that low forced ventilation airflow velocity through the 
passenger door has facilitated the fire growth in the vicinity of the ignition source. 
Although high forced ventilation airflow velocity was able to ‘fan’ the fire, it was not 
able to grow in intensity because the materials in the train car were difficult to ignite. 
High airflow seemed to reduce the flame temperature instead.  
 









Figure 11.12: Snapshot from Smokeview for fire scenario 2B, 820 s into the 
simulation 
 




However with significantly large ignition source size, high forced ventilation airflow 
velocity through the detrainment door would cause the fire to propagate downstream 
the ignition source and spread to the adjacent cars. This was the case for fire scenario 
3A i.e. undercarriage fire.   
 
For this scenario, it took about 600 s before the gas temperature in the vicinity of the 
ignition source was sufficiently high to cause the fire to spread to the adjacent cars. 
This strengthened the point made earlier that high forced ventilation airflow velocity 
would reduce the flame temperature and therefore it took longer time to reach a 
critical stage where fire spread was possible because the materials in the current study 
were difficult to ignite. The fire spread to adjacent cars coincided with the rapid 
increase in HRR as shown in Figure 11.7.  
 
The fire spread to the second and third cars was very rapid. The assumption that the 
fire would spread to the next car only after the first car flashover was not valid for this 
particular scenario because of the high forced ventilation airflow velocity. The other 
reason was because there was no door installed between the train cars to prevent 
flame from propagating to the adjacent car due to the high airflow. Peak HRR was 
attained when the surfaces downstream the ignition source and the second and third 
cars were involved in the fire. Surfaces upstream of the ignition source were not 
involved in the fire because of the direction of the airflow. Maximum compartment 
temperature in the train was about 970°C causing almost all the windows in the 
second and third cars to fail (see Figure 11.13).    
  





Figure 11.13: Snapshot from Smokeview for fire scenario 3A, 3600 s into the 
simulation 
 
Considering the effect of direct high forced ventilation airflow velocity on the fire 
development, to assume the ignition source size to be constant at its peak for 1800 s 
was conservative. The undercarriage fire (the ignition source) might not be able to 
grow in the first place. Even if the emergency tunnel ventilation system was assumed 
to activate after the undercarriage fire has grown and propagated through the floor, the 
ignition source size would not remain at its peak due to the high direct airflow effect. 
Therefore the result from the simulation might be conservative.  
 
Another simulation was conducted. However, as there was no better information on 
the likely ignition source size and burning duration, it was assumed that the ignition 
source size would be the same as the original simulation but this ignition source 
would only last for 600 s. This timing was used since this was the time taken for the 
compartment temperature to build up and where fire spread to adjacent cars started to 
occur. This again was a conservative assumption as the ignition source was unlikely 
to remain at its peak due to the high airflow effect as discussed earlier. The HRR 
curves for the original simulation and the simulation with ignition source ‘removed’ at 
600 s are shown in Figure 11.14. From Figure 11.14, it can be seen that when the 




ignition source was removed at 600 s, the fire growth was much slower. The peak 
HRR of 7430 kW was also substantially lower compared with the original simulation. 
The results from the two simulations highlighted the importance of prescribing a 
realistic ignition source size and its burning duration for simulations as it would have 
a major impact on the simulation results.    
 
 
Figure 11.14: Modelling approach based on HRRPUA – Fire scenario 3A (Ignition 
source ‘removed’ at 600 s) 
 
For fire scenarios 3B and 3D, only downstream of the ignition source was involved in 
the fire. The fire did not grow in intensity and spread further downstream to the 
adjacent car despite having a large ignition source size. The reason why the fire was 
not able to grow might be because of the burning area of the ignition source. Because 
a large burning surface (6 m2) was defined, the flame heat flux was not as intense 
compared with the fire in the corner.  In addition, the location of the ignition source 
and the location of the combustibles were also not as favourable as the fire in the 
corner to promote fire growth. Their HRR values were relatively constant (see Figure 
11.9 and Figure 11.10) and showed signs of decay before the ignition source was 
‘removed’ at 1800 s. The maximum compartment temperatures for fire scenarios 3B 
and 3D were 489 and 578°C respectively implying that flashover did not take place. 
There was no window failure since the compartment temperature was lower than the 
window failure criterion. These temperatures would also not be high enough to cause 
ignition of wall or ceiling since they were lower than the ‘approximated’ ignition 
temperature for wall panel (see Chapter 8, Section 8.5.2). 
 
The simulation results for fire scenarios 3B and 3D indicated the importance of 
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through the train that might support fire spread. Even though fire scenarios 2A and 3A 
have showed that high airflow would to some extent slow down the fire growth, 
closing the detrainment doors however could eliminate a potentially more severe fire 
from happening. 
 
11.3.2 Modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation 
 
Figure 11.15 to Figure 11.19 show the HRR curves while Table 11.5 shows the 

































Figure 11.15: Modelling approach based 
on heat of vaporisation – Fire scenario 2A 
Figure 11.16: Modelling approach based 






























Figure 11.17: Modelling approach based 
on heat of vaporisation – Fire scenario 2B 
Figure 11.18: Modelling approach based 

















Figure 11.19: Modelling approach based 
on heat of vaporisation – Fire scenario 3D 
 









Peak HRR value for the 
modelling approach 
based on heat of 
vaporisation (kW) 
1 2A 530 
2 3A 8200 
3 2B 4540 
4 3B 1840 
5 3D 1840 
Table 11.5: Final simulations - Summary of predicted peak HRR values for the 
modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation. 
 
The predicted fire severities for different fire scenarios were the same as the 
modelling approach based of HRRPUA. Low forced ventilation airflow velocity in 
fire scenario 2B aided the fire growth and therefore this fire scenario was more 
developed than fire scenario 2A. The predicted HRR for fire scenario 2B was higher 
than the modelling approach based on HRRPUA. Despite the difference in predicted 
HRR for the two modelling approaches, the furthest point the fire spread was the same 
i.e. to the 7-seater seat area (near the ignition source).    
 
The fire in fire scenario 3A also spread downstream to the adjacent cars due to the 
influence of high forced ventilation airflow velocity. However, this only occurred at 
about 900 s into the simulation. The predicted HRR was also much lower than the 
modelling approach based on HRRPUA. As discussed in previous Section, the result 
for this scenario might be conservative because the ignition source size would not 
remain constant at its peak for 1800 s under the influence of high airflow. Another 
simulation was conducted by assuming the ignition source was removed at 900 s since 
this was the time where compartment temperature built up and fire spread to adjacent 
cars started to occur. The HRR curves for the original simulation and the simulation 
with ignition source ‘removed’ at 900 s are shown in Figure 11.20. The Figure shows 
that when the ignition source removed, the fire basically could not sustain itself. The 
results from the two simulations highlighted again the importance of prescribing a 
realistic ignition source size and its burning duration for simulations as it would have 
a major impact on the simulation results. As for the large difference in results between 
the two modelling approaches, it was likely because of the prescribed constant which 
governed the ignition and rate of pyrolysis.  






Figure 11.20: Modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation – Fire scenario 3A 
(Ignition source ‘removed’ at 900 s) 
 
For fire scenarios 3B and 3D, the fire did not spread to adjacent car. Only downstream 
of the ignition source was involved in the fire. Their HRRs were almost constant until 
the ignition source was ‘removed’ at 1800 s.  
 
11.3.3 HRR of the CCL metro train 
 
The simulations results have allowed a full appreciation of the factors that affect the 
fire development. From the simulations, the influences from the following factors on 
the modelling results were particularly obvious: 
a) Ventilation conditions (Fire scenario 2A vs. fire scenario 2B; fire scenario 3A 
vs. fire scenarios 3B and 3D) 
b) Location of the combustibles (Fire scenarios 2A and 2B vs. fire scenarios 3A, 
3B and 3D)  
c) Location and size of the ignition sources (Fire scenarios 2A and 2B vs. fire 
scenarios 3A, 3B and 3D) 
d) Burning duration of the ignition sources  
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Even though the two modelling approaches gave different HRR values, which were 
expected, they predicted the same fire consequences for different fire scenarios. Fire 
scenario 3A has the highest fire severity because the fire spread to adjacent cars. For 
this scenario, the modelling approach based on HRRPUA gave a more conservative 
prediction of HRR than the modelling approach based on heat of vaporisation because 
of the add-on effect as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
However, modelling results from fire scenario 3A might be conservative because the 
ignition source size was unlikely to remain constant at its peak for 1800 s under the direct 
influence of high airflow. This conclusion can be made as simulations for fire scenarios 
2A and 3A have indicated that high forced ventilation airflow velocity would slow down 
the fire growth because materials in the current study were difficult to ignite. For the 
modelling approach based on HRRPUA, re-simulation result showed that the fire growth 
would be slower and the fire would be less severe when the ignition source was 
‘removed’ earlier. For the modelling approach based on HRRPUA, the re-simulation 
result showed that the fire could not sustain itself.  
 
The predicted peak HRR values in the final simulations were lower than the predicted 
peak HRR values in the trial simulations even though in the final simulations the 
complete train was modelled. This is because the values used in the trial simulations were 
over conservative as discussed in Chapter 8.   
  
Based on the modelling results for the two modelling approaches, two peak HRR values 
are proposed for the metro train under consideration depending on the location of the train 
in the event of a fire. For a metro train fire at the station trackway i.e. the section of track 
next to the platform, a peak HRR value of 5 MW is proposed. Fire scenarios 2B, 3B and 
3D were under the influence of low forced ventilation airflow velocity. They can also be 
used to represent a metro train fire at the station trackway as discussed in Chapter 6. The 
modelling results for both the modelling approaches for these three scenarios have 
showed that the HRR would not exceed 5 MW. Therefore a peak HRR value of 5 MW 
can conservatively be used for the design of emergency tunnel ventilation system for a 
train fire at the station trackway. Less than half the metro train car would be involved in 
the fire based on the simulations.  
 




For a metro train fire in the tunnel, a peak HRR value of 10 MW is proposed. This HRR 
value coincides with the value proposed by the design consultant (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.2.1). The proposed value of 10 MW allows the design to cater for the worst scenario 
that could probably occur in a tunnel taking into account uncertainty in size and burning 
duration of ignition source under the influence of high forced ventilation airflow velocity. 
The value was the average of predicted peak HRR for fire scenario 3A based on the two 
modelling approaches. 
 
The peak HRR values estimated using the current methods were in the range of 7.8 MW 
to 18.3 MW, depending on the method used to estimate it. For the proposed peak HRR 
value of 5 MW for a metro train fire at the station trackway, the peak HRR values 
estimated using the current methods were higher since the main assumption used for the 
calculation in the current methods was that the fire would grow, spread and attain 
flashover during a metro train fire. The peak HRR value of 5 MW however was close to 
the peak HRR value computed using Frankfurt metro fire model (5.6 MW) for 
underground metro train car (U-Bahn) used in city of Frankfurt (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.2.5). It tallied with the 5 MW value used for LAL, Hong Kong (see Chapter 2, Table 2.4) 
and therefore is not at odds considering the materials in the current study not only 
complied with the stringent small-scale tests performance criteria but were also 
difficult to ignite and burn in the Cone Calorimeter compared with the test results from 
other rail car studies. 
 
As for the proposed peak value of 10 MW for metro train fire in the tunnel, it is at the 
lower limit of the estimated peak HRR values based on the current methods. It is also at 
the lower limit of peak HRR values adopted by various metro lines (see Chapter 2, Table 
2.4). This value has been selected to cater for the worst scenario that could probably occur 
in a tunnel taking into account uncertainty in size and burning duration of ignition source 
under the influence of high forced ventilation airflow velocity. Because the size and 
burning duration of the ignition source used for simulations was conservative, the 
proposed HRR could be further reduced if better information is available.   
 




11.3.4 Comments on the final simulations  
 
It is important to stress that several major assumptions e.g. criterion for window 
failure; ignition source size and burning duration; material properties, have been made 
along the course of this research project so that the final simulations could be 
conducted. However, the assumptions made were in most case conservative so that 
the predicted results would be ‘safe’. Efforts have also been made so that the 
simulations for various scenarios were realistic based on available information at hand. 
Comparing with the current methods of estimating HRR for a metro train, the 
proposed methods are still more superior as they are able to take into account factors 
that affect the fire development. 
 
Nevertheless, the author has to acknowledge the proposed methods are time 
consuming. Besides gathering better information for simulation, there is a need to 
develop procedures that can derive suitable thermo-physical properties from small-
scale tests for the fire retardant materials for use in fire modelling. There is also a 
need to improve the modelling techniques for fire growth and flame spread. The 
proposed methods can only become commercially viable when improvements in these 
areas are made. The current project can only be treated as a case study to evaluate the 
HRR of the metro train under consideration.  
 




11.4 Conclusions from the final simulations   
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the final simulations: 
a) For fire scenarios 2A and 2B i.e. fire in the corner, the fire did not grow to 
flashover. Low forced ventilation airflow velocity in fire scenario 2B aided the 
fire growth and therefore this fire scenario was more developed than fire 
scenario 2A. High forced ventilation airflow velocity in fire scenario 2A 
slowed down the fire growth due to high airflow effects. 
b) With significantly large ignition source size, a high forced ventilation airflow 
velocity would cause the fire to spread to adjacent cars as in the case for fire 
scenario 3A i.e. undercarriage fire with detrainment doors opened. However, 
this was provided that the ignition source remained constant at its peak for 
1800 s.  
c) The fire in fire scenario 3B and 3D i.e. undercarriage fire with 1st and 4th 
passenger doors opened, was not able to grow to flashover despite having a 
large ignition source size. This was because the fire was less intense and the 
location of the ignition source and the location of the combustibles were not as 
favourable as fire in the corner to promote fire growth.     
d) The modelling results indicated the importance of closing the detrainment 
door during train fire incident to prevent direct airflow through the train 
compartment that may support fire spread if there is a large ignition source. 
Closing the detrainment doors could eliminate a potentially more severe fire 
from happening.  
e) For a scenario that will progress to flashover under the influence of high 
forced ventilation airflow velocity, the assumption that the fire will spread to 
the next car only after the first car attained flashover is not valid if there is no 
door installed between the train cars. The fire spread to the second and 
succeeding cars will be very rapid. 
f) Two peak HRR values are proposed for the metro train under consideration 
based on the simulations. For a metro train fire at the station trackway, a peak 
HRR value of 5 MW is proposed and for a train fire in the tunnel, a peak HRR 
value of 10 MW is proposed. 
 
 




12 Conclusions  
 
The FDS CFD model was used to simulate fire growth and flame spread within a 
metro train in an underground trainway to predict the HRR and specifically the peak 
HRR for emergency tunnel ventilation system design. The main conclusions and 
findings from various aspects of this research are: 
a) Fire on top of the seat (arson), fire in the corner (arson and electrical fault) 
and undercarriage fire (electrical fault) were the common fire scenarios 
identified for FDS simulation. The common fire scenarios were expanded to 
consider ventilation conditions. A total of 13 credible fire scenarios were 
investigated in current study.   
b) From the Cone Calorimeter test data, the train materials evaluated in the 
current study were found to be difficult to ignite and burn compared with 
materials tested in other rail car studies. The fire retardant additive in the 
polymer materials proved to be effective in retarding ignition (especially at 
low heat flux levels) and reducing the heat release rate. 
c) FDS predictions of Cone Calorimeter test results indicated that the 
procedures used in the current study were not able to derive thermo-physical 
properties for fire retardant materials which could be used in fire model to 
accurately predict the ignition and fire growth. It was not possible to derive a 
suitable set of temperature variant properties for δρc  because the fire 
retardant was able to effectively retard ignition at low exposure heat flux 
level. Different property values need to be prescribed at different exposure 
heat flux levels to improve the fire model prediction. Such a modelling 
technique is beyond the capabilities of FDS model at its current stage. For the 
final simulations, a combination of derived and calibrated values was 
prescribed to improve on the modelling results. 




d) In the final simulations, the two modelling approaches predicted the same 
fire severity for different fire scenarios. For corner fire scenarios, a low 
forced ventilation airflow velocity aided the fire growth but a high forced 
ventilation airflow velocity slowed down the fire growth due to high airflow 
effects which reduced the flame temperature. However, for undercarriage fire 
scenarios whereas the ignition source size was significantly larger than the 
corner fire, a high forced ventilation velocity could cause the fire to spread to 
adjacent cars but the fire severity will depend on the burning duration of the 
ignition source.  
e) It is important to close the detrainment door during a train fire incident to 
prevent direct airflow through the train compartment that may support fire 
spread if there is a large ignition source.  
f) For a scenario that will progress to flashover under the influence of high 
ventilation airflow velocity, the assumption that the fire will spread to the 
next car only after the first car attained flashover is not valid if there is no 
door installed between the metro train cars. The fire spread to the second and 
succeeding cars will be very rapid. 
g) Two peak HRR values are proposed for the design of emergency tunnel 
ventilation system for the metro train under consideration based on the final 
simulations. For a train fire at the station trackway, a peak HRR value of 
5 MW is proposed and for a train fire in the tunnel, a peak HRR value of 
10 MW is proposed. 
h) The modelling results could be improved on if better information on the 
criterion for window failure; ignition source size and burning duration; and 
material properties are available. A modelling technique that allows for 
different prescribed property values to be selected for numerical simulations 
depending on the heat feedback from the fire could also improve on the 
modelling results.   
 




12.1 Recommendation and future research 
There is a need to develop procedures that can derive suitable thermo-physical 
properties for fire retardant materials for use in fire modelling from small-scale tests 
and also a need to improve the modelling techniques for fire growth and flame spread 
before the proposed methods in the current study become commercially viable. The 
proposed methods in the current project can only be treated as a case study to evaluate 
the HRR of the metro train under consideration.  
 
As this research work has been limited in scope and duration, future work should 
consider the following: 
a) To carry out a hazard analysis for metro train fires particularly for a scenario 
whereby fire occurs in the car interior and with the train stalled inside a tunnel. 
This scenario posed the most hazardous condition for the commuters 
especially if operation of emergency tunnel ventilation system is delayed.   




(Hietaniemi et al. 2004; Liang 2002; Madrzykowski et al. 2002; McGrattan 2004; McGrattan and Hamins 2003; Vettori et al. 
2002) (Associated-Engineers 1980; Barnett 1992; Bettis et al. 1994; Brennan and Lim 2003; Briggs et al. 2001a; Burdett et al. 
1989; Cappuccio 1992; Carvel et al. 2001a; Casale and Marlair 1994; Chow 2004; Dowling and Delichatsios 2000; Dowling and 
Delichatsios 2001; Dowling and White 2004; Drysdale 1998; Drysdale et al. 1992.; Duggan 1997; ERRI 1992a; ERRI 1992b; 
FIT-Workpackage2 2003; Haack 1994; Hettinger and Barnett 1991; Ingason et al. 1994; Karlsson and Quintiere 2000; Kennedy 
et al. 1998; Könnecke and Schneider 2004; Luo and Yau 2002; NFPA-130 2003 edition; Park 2004; Parker 1994; Rakaczky 1980; 
Richter 1994; Richter and Vauquelin 1994; Schirmer_Engineering_Corporation 1990; Sinai 2004; Smith 1976; Smith 1983; 
Steinert 1994; Tewarson 2002; Wilk 2002; Wu 2003) (Babrauskas 2002; Briggs et al. 2001a; Duggan 1997; Peacock and Braun 
1999)(Alstom 2001a; Alstom 2001b; Alstom 2001c; Alstom 2001d; Alstom 2004; Renie and Prevot 2003; RTI 2002; Tan 2005b). 
(Briggs et al. 2001a; Carvel et al. 1999a; Carvel et al. 1999b; Carvel et al. 2001b; Carvel et al. 2001d; Hettinger and Barnett 1991; 
Morgan and De Smedt 2002; Munro et al. 2002; Peacock et al. 2002; Tipping 2004) (Associated-Engineers 1980; McGrattan 
2005a; Peacock and Braun 1999; Peacock et al. 2002; Renie and Prevot 2003; Shields et al. 1998) (Babrauskas 1992; Babrauskas 
2003; Chen et al. 1995; Drysdale 1998; Duggan 1997; Grenier 1996; Grexa et al. 1996; Huggett 1980; Janssens 1991; Janssens 
1993; Janssens and Grenier 1997; Mikkola and Wichman 1989; Peacock and Braun 1999; Quintiere 1993; Rasbash et al. 1986) 




















Alstom. (2001a). "Electrical Eqt Layout Under Seat Boxes Synop. Appareils 
Elecriques S/S Siege." MicroStation CAD, D830INT-ARRG0051E, ed., 
Alstom Transport. 
 
Alstom. (2001b). "Final Configuration in MRT Tunnel for CSD/ SEM Tunnel 
Straight Alignment." MicroStation CAD, D830TUN-CSD1002A, ed., Alstom 
Transport. 
 
Alstom. (2001c). "Underframe Equipment Layout MC Car Equipt. S-Chassis Voit. 
MC." MicroStation CAD, D830BDY-ARRG0001C, ed., Alstom Transport. 
 
Alstom. (2001d). "Underframe Equipment Layout T Car Equipt. S-Chassis Voit. T." 
MicroStation CAD, D830BDY-ARRG0002C, ed., Alstom Transport. 
 
Alstom. (2004). "Alstom Transport Project Story - Singapore Northeast Line: The 
Largest, Fully Automatic Metro System in the World, 
http://www.transport.alstom.com, accessed 10 Feb 2004." Alstom Transport. 
 
Amtrak. (2004). "Emergency Ventilation System - Need for Fire Heat Release Rate, 
http://www.nfpa.org/PDF/RailSymp1.pdf, accessed 10 Aug 2004." 
 
Anon. (2004a). "Rapid Transit, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metro, accessed 25 June 
2004." 
 
Anon. (2004b). "http://www.chandralakshmi.com/prods.htm, accessed 05 Dec 05." 
 
Anon. (2004c). "Arson attack in the subway of Daegu, South Korea, 
http://www.takagi-ryo.ac/docs/id/183/lang/1, accessed 10 Dec 2004." 
 
Arup. (2004). "Fire in a railway carriage, 
http://www.arup.com/fire/services/modelling/modelling.htm, accessed 24 Aug 
2004." 
 
Associated-Engineers. (1980). "Subway Environment Design Handbook, Volume II, 
Subway Environment Simulation (SES) Computer Program, Version 3.0, Part 
1: User's Manual. Prepared for the Transportation Systems Center of the 
U.S.D.O.T." Associated Engineers, a Joint Venture of Parsons Brinckerhoff 
Quade and Douglas, Inc, De Leuw Cather and Company, and Kaiser 
Engineers. 
 
ASTM-D-3675. (1998). "Standard Test Method for Surface Flammability of Flexible 
Cellular Materials Using A Radiant Heat Energy Source." American Society 








ASTM-E-162. (1998). "Standard Test Method for Surface Flammability of Materials 
Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source." American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM), Philadelphia. 
 
ASTM-E-906. (2004). "Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release 
Rates for Materials and Products." American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM), Philadelphia. 
 
ASTM-E-1354. (2004). "Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release 
Rates for Materials and Products Using an Oxygen Consumption 
Calorimeter." American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), 
Philadelphia. 
 
ASTM-E-2061. (2000). "Guide for Fire Hazard Assessment of Rail Transportation 
Vehicles." American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), Philadelphia. 
 
Babrauskas, V. (1979). "COMPF2: A Program for Calculating Post-Flashover Fire 
Temperatures. Final Report." NBS TN 991, National Bureau of Standards 
(NBS). 
 
Babrauskas, V. (1986). "Comparative Rates of Heat Release from Five Different 
Types of Test Apparatuses." Journal of Fire Sciences, 4. 
 
Babrauskas, V. (1992). "The Cone Calorimeter." Heat Release in Fires, V. Babrauskas 
and S. J. Grayson, eds., Elsevier Applied Science, pp. 61 to 91. 
 
Babrauskas, V. (2002). "Heat Release Rates." SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection 
Engineering, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Quincy, MA, pp. 
3-1 to 3-37. 
 
Babrauskas, V. (2003). Ignition Handbook, Fire Science Publishers, Issaquah, WA. 
 
Babrauskas, V., and Peacock, R. D. (1992). "Heat Release Rate: The single most 
important variable in fire hazard." Fire Safety Journal(18), pp. 255-272. 
 
Barber, C., Gardiner, A., and Law, M. "Structural Fire Design of the Øresund 
Tunnel." Proceedings of the International Conference on Fires in Tunnels, 
Borås, Sweden, pp. 313 to 329. 
 
Barnett, J. R. (1992). "Development of Analytical Techniques for Risk Management 
Training. University Research Final Report. Prepared for FTA, USDOT." 
DOT-MA-11-0050-92-1, October 1992, Worcester Polytechnic Institute. 
 
Bettis, R. J., Jagger, S. F., and Moodie, K. "Reduced Scale Simulation of Fires in 
Partially Block Tunnels." Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Fires in Tunnels, Borås, Sweden, pp. 162 to182. 
 
Braun, E. (1975). "A Fire Hazard Evaluation of the Interior of WMATA Metrorail 
Cars, Final Report. Prepared for Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 





Braun, E. (1978). "Fire Hazard Evaluation of BART Vehicles. Prepared for Urban 
Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA), now Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA)." NBSIR 78-1421, National Bureau of Standards (NBS). 
 
Brennan, E., and Lim, L. W. "Ventilating the North East Line Tunnels." RTS 
Conference, Singapore 2003, Singapore. 
 
Briggs, P., Métral, S., Tallec, Y. L., Troïano, D., Messa, S., and Breulet, H. (2001a). 
"FIRESTARR - Final Report." FIRESTARR Consortium. 
 
Briggs, P., Tallec, Y. L., Sainrat, A., Métral, S., Messa, S., and Breulet, H. "The 
FIRESTARR Research Project on the Reaction-To-Fire Performance of 
Products in European Trains." Proceedings of the 9th International Interflam 
Conference 2001, Edinburgh, Scotland, pp. 925 to 936. 
 
BS-476-Part-7. (1997). "Fire tests on building materials and structures. Method of test 
to determine the classification of the surface spread of flame of products." 
British Standards Institution. 
 
BSI. (1988). "Toxicity of Combustion Products, Part 2. Guide to the Relevance of 
Small-scale tests for Measuring the Toxicity of Combustion Products of 
Materials and Composites." PD 6503: Part 2, British Standards Institution, 
London. 
 
Burdett, J. R. F., Ames, S. A., and Fardell, P. J. (1989). "Selection of Materials and 
Composites to Minimize Fire Hazard." King's Cross Underground Fire: Fire 
Dynamics and the Organisation of Safety, The Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers, London. 
 
Cappuccio, J. A. (1992). "Development of Analytical Techniques for Risk 
Management Training," Master's thesis, Worcester Polytechnic Institute. 
 
Carlsson, J. (2003). "Computational strategies in flame-spread modelling involving 
wooden surfaces - An evaluation study," Master Thesis, Lund University, 
Sweden. 
 
Carvel, R. O., Beard, A. N., and Jowitt, P. W. "The Effect of Forced Longitudinal 
Ventilation on a HGV fire in a Tunnel." Proceeding of the 1st International 
Conference on Tunnel Fires and Escape from Tunnels 1999, Lyon, France. 
 
Carvel, R. O., Beard, A. N., and Jowitt, P. W. "The Effect of Longitudinal Ventilation 
on a Pool Fire In Tunnel." Proceeding of 8th International Interflam 
Conference 1999, Edinburgh, Scotland, pp. 1267 to 1272. 
 
Carvel, R. O., Beard, A. N., and Jowitt, P. W. "How Much Do Tunnels Enhance the 
Heat Release Rate of Fires?" Proceedings of the 4th International Conference 






Carvel, R. O., Beard, A. N., and Jowitt, P. W. (2001b). "The Influence of 
Longitudinal Ventilation Systems on Fires in Tunnels." Tunnelling and 
Underground Space Technology, 16, pp. 3 to 21. 
 
Carvel, R. O., Beard, A. N., and Jowitt, P. W. "A Method for Making Realistic 
Estimates of the Heat Release Rate of a Fire in a Tunnel." Proceedings of the 
3rd International Conference on Tunnel Fires 2001, Gaithersburg, Maryland, 
USA. 
Carvel, R. O., Beard, A. N., Jowitt, P. W., and Drysdale, D. (2001d). "Variation of 
Heat Release Rate with Forced Longitudinal Ventilation for Vehicle Fires in 
Tunnels." Fire Safety Journal, 36, pp. 569 to 596. 
 
Casale, E., and Marlair, G. "Heptane Fire Tests with Forced Ventilation." Proceedings 
of International Conference of Fires in Tunnels 1994, Borås, Sweden, pp. 37 
to 50. 
 
Castro, J. D., Rhodes, N., and Leoutsakos, G. "CFD Prediction of Smoke Movement 
in a Double Track Bored Tunnel, a Cut and Cover Station and a Mined Station 
in the Athens Metro." Ninth International Symposium on the Aerodynamics 
and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels 1997, Aosta Valley, Italy. 
 
Chen, Y., Motevalli, V., and Delichatsios, M. A. (1995). "Material pyrolysis 
properties, Part II: methodology for derivation of pyrolysis properties for 
charring materials." Combustion Science and Technology, 104(4-6), pp. 401 to 
425. 
 
Chow, W. K. (2004). "Fire Safety of the Railway Systems." International Journal on 
Architectural Science, 5(2), pp. 35 to 42. 
 
Chua, K. H. (2003). "Guideline for Determining Heat Release Rate for Train Fire in 
Underground  / Enclosed Trainway (Unpublished)." Land Transport Authority, 
Singapore. 
 
Cox, G. (1995). "Basic Considerations." Combustion Fundamentals of Fire, Academic 
Press, London. 
 
Delichatsios, M., Bradley, P., and Bhargava, A. (2003). "Flammability properties for 
charring materials." Fire Safety Journal, 38, pp. 219 to 228. 
 
Dowling, V. P., and Delichatsios, M. A. "Material Flammability in Train Saloons." 
Proceedings: New Railways Systems, In Conjunction with Exporail (Asia) 
2000, Hong Kong. 
 
Dowling, V. P., and Delichatsios, M. A. (2001). "Call for More Realistic Rail Fire 
Assessments." Built Environment Innovation & Construction Technology, 17. 
 
Dowling, V. P., and White, N. "Fire Sizes in Railway Passenger Saloons." 
Proceedings of the 6th Asia-Oceania Symposium on Fire Science and 






Drake, S., and Meeks, K. R. "Confidence Gaining by Computer Simulation of 
Emergency Tunnel Ventilation Design." First International Conference, 
Tunnel and Underground Stations Fires 2000. 
 
Drysdale, D. (1998). An Introduction to Fire Dynamics, John Wiley & Sons Inc, 
London. 
 
Drysdale, D. D., Macmillan, A. J. R., and Shilitto, D. (1992.). "King's Cross Fire: 
Experimental verification of the 'trench effect'." Fire Safety Journal, 18(1), pp. 
75 to 82. 
 
Duggan, G. J. "Usage of ISO 5660 Data in UK Railway Standards and Fire Safety 
Cases." Fire Hazards, Testing, Materials and Products. A One Day 
Conference 1997, Rapra Technology Ltd, Shawbury, Shrewsbury, Shropshire, 
UK. 
 
ERRI. (1992a). "Coaches: Reasons for Undertaking Supplementary Studies on 
Improvement of the Protection of Coaches Against Fire." ERRI B 106/RP 22, 
European Rail Research Institute (ERRI), Utrecht. 
 
ERRI. (1992b). "Feasibility Study of Computer Modelling of Fires in Railway 
Vehicles With a View to Improving Passenger Safety." ERRI B 106/RP 25, 
European Rail Research Institute (ERRI), Utrecht. 
 
ERRI. (1994). "Improvement of the Protections Against Fire of Passenger Rolling 
Stock; Progress Report on Tests Carried Out Using a Cone Calorimeter and 
the Calculations with Hazard 1.1. Software Package." ERRI C 204/RP 1, 
European Rail Research Institute (ERRI), Utrecht. 
 
ERRI. (1995). "Improvement of the Fire Protection of Passenger Rolling Stock, 
Results of Additional Cone Calorimeter Tests on Seat Materials and Furniture 
Calorimeter Tests on Mock-up Seats." ERRI C 204.1/DT319, European Rail 
Research Institute (ERRI), Utrecht. 
 
EUREKA. (1995). "Fire protection in Traffic Tunnels - Findings from Large Scale 
tests within the EUREKA-project EU 499 Firetun (Final Technical Report)." 
 
FHWA. (2004). "The Memorial Tunnel Fire Ventilation Test Program, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/tunnel/tunres2.htm, accessed 15 Aug 2004." 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), United States Department of 
Transportation (USDOT). 
 
FIT-Workpackage2. (2003). "Design Fire Scenario's - 5a draft - Oct.2003 
(Unpublished)." European Thematic Network on Fire in Tunnels (FIT). 
 
Floyd, J. E., Baum, H. R., and McGrattan, K. B. "A mixture fraction combustion 
model for fire simulation using CFD." Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Engineered Fire Protection Design 2001, San Francisco, pp. 






FRA. (2002). "Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Transportation (49 CFR), Part 
238: Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. Subpart 238.103, Fire Safety and 
Appendix B (As of June 25, 2002)." National Archives and Records 
Administration, Washington DC. 
 
Galea, E. R., Blake, S. J., and Lawrence, P. J. "The airEXODUS Evacuation Model 
and its Application to Aircraft Safety." Proceeding of International Aircraft 
Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference 2001, Trump Taj Mahal Casino 
Hotel, Atlantic City, NJ. 
 
Gandhi, S., Long, R. T., and Quintiere, J. G. (1996). "Fire Tests of Passenger Rail Car 
Interior Materials, Final Report." NTSB12-96-SP-034, Prepared by 
Department of Fire Protection Engineering, University of Maryland for the 
NTSB. 
 
Göransson, U., and Lundqvist, A. (1990). "Fires in Buses and Trains, Fire Test 
Methods." SP Report 1990:45, SP Swedish National Testing and Research 
Institute., Sweden. 
 
Grenier, A. T. (1996). "Fire Characteristics of Cored Composite Materials for Marine 
Use," Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI). 
 
Grexa, O., Janssens, M., White, R., and Dietenberger, M. "Fundamental 
Thermophysical Properties of Materials Derived From the Cone Calorimeter 
Measurements." Proceedings of the 3rd International Scientific Conference on 
Wood & Fire Safety 1996, The High Tatras, Hotel Patria, Slovak Republic. 
 
Haack, A. "Introduction to the EUREKA-EU 499 Firetun project." Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Fires in Tunnels, Borås, Sweden, pp. 3 to 19. 
 
Hasemi, Y., Moriyama, S., Nam, D., Tanaka, S., Okazawa, N., and Ding, W. "Fire 
Safety Background for Japanese Underground Railway Systems and Field 
Experiments on the Smoke Movement in Subway Stations." Proceedings of 
the 10th International Interflam Conference 2004, Edinburgh, Scotland, pp. 
1563 to 1574. 
 
Hettinger, J. C., and Barnett, J. R. (1991). "Evolution of the Fire Development 
Scenario for Subway Vehicle Fires: Historical Observations, Vehicle Design 
Standards, and Application of the COMPF2 Post-flashover Computer Model." 
Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, pp. 391 to 405. 
 
Hietaniemi, J., Hostikka, S., and Vaari, J. (2004). "FDS Simulation of Fire Spread - 
Comparison of models results with experimental data." VTT-WORK-4, VTT 
Building and Transport, Kivimiehentie, Finland. 
 
Huggett, C. (1980). "Estimation of the Rate of Heat Release by Means of Oxygen 






Ingason, H., Gustavsson, S., and Dahlberg, M. (1994). "Heat Release Measurements 
in Tunnel Fires, BRANDFORSK Project 723-924." SP Report 1994:08, SP 
Swedish National Testing and Research Institute. 
 
ISO-5660-1:2002. "Reaction-to-fire-tests – Heat release, smoke production and mass 
loss rate – Part 1: Heat release rate (cone calorimeter method)." International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
 
ISO-5660-2:2002. "Reaction-to-fire-tests – Heat release, smoke production and mass 
loss rate – Part 2: Smoke production rate (dynamic measurement)." 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
 
ISO-5660-3:2003. "Reaction-to-fire-tests – Heat release, smoke production and mass 
loss rate – Part 3: Guidance on measurement." International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). 
 
ISO-9705:1993. "Fire Tests- Full-scale room test for surface products." International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
 
Janssens, M. (1991). "Measuring Rate of Heat Release by Oxygen Consumption." 
Fire Technology, 27, pp. 234 -249. 
 
Janssens, M. (2002). "Calorimetry." SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Quincy, MA, pp. 3-38 to 3-62. 
 
Janssens, M., Kimble, J., and D., M. "Computer Tools to Determine Material 
Properties for Fire growth Modelling From Cone Calorimeter Data." 
Proceedings of the  8th International Conference on Fire and Materials 2003, 
San Francisco, CA, pp. 377 to 387. 
 
Janssens, M., and Parker, W. J. (1992). "Oxygen Consumption Calorimetry." Heat 
Release in Fires, V. Babrauskas and S. J. Grayson, eds., Elsevier Applied 
Science, pp. 31 to 59. 
 
Janssens, M. L. "Improved Method of Analysis for the LIFT Apparatus, Part I: 
Ignition." Proceedings of the 2nd Fire and Materials Conference 1993, 
Crystal City, VA, pp. 37 to 46. 
 
Janssens, M. L., and Grenier, A. T. "An Improved Method for Analyzing Ignition 
Data of Composites." Proceedings of 23rd International Conference on Fire 
Safety 1997, Millbrae, California, pp. 253-264. 
 
Karlsson, B., and Quintiere, J. G. (2000). Enclosure Fire Dynamics, CRC Press, 
Washington, DC. 
 
Kennedy, W. D., and Patel, S. J. "The Mount Lebanon Tunnel Ventilation System." 
Sixth International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle 






Kennedy, W. D., Ray, R. E., and Guinan, J. W. "A Short History of Train Fire Heat 
Release Rate Calculations." Annual ASHRAE Meeting 1998, Toronto, Canada. 
 
Könnecke, R., and Schneider, V. "A Fire Engineering Design for New and Old 
Existing Subway Stations." Proceedings of the 10th International Interflam 
Conference 2004, Edinburgh, Scotland, pp. 803 to 807. 
 
Liang, M. (2002). "Evaluation Studies of the Flame Spread and Burning Rate 
Predictions by the Fire Dynamics Simulator," Master Thesis, University of 
Maryland. 
 
Lim, L. W. (2005). Personal communication with L. W. Lim, 1 Deputy Manager, 
Mechanical and Electrical Services Department, Land Transport Authority, 
Singapore, 18 Jan 05. 
 
Luk, K. H. (2004). "Smoke Management for Trackway Fires in Underground Train 
Stations," Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 
 
Luo, M., and Yau, R. (2002). "A Case Study:  Design of a Two-way Traffic Rail 
Tunnel." Tunnel Management International Journal, 5(4). 
 
Madrzykowski, D., Forney, G., and Walton, W. D. (2002). "Simulation of the 
Dynamics of a Fire in a Two-Storey Duplex - Iowa, December 22, 1999." 
NISTIR 6854, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Gaithersburg, Maryland. 
 
Mauser, G. (2005). Personal communication - Email from Gernot Mauser, 16 Feb 
2005. 
 
McGrattan, K. (2004). "Fire Dynamics Simulator (Version 4) Technical Reference 
Guide." NIST Special Publication 1018, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). 
 
McGrattan, K. (2005a). Personal communication - Email from Kelvin McGrattan, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 15 Feb 2005. 
 
McGrattan, K. (2005b). Personal communication - Email from Kelvin McGrattan, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)  to Charles 
Fleischmann, University of Canterbury, 7 March 2005. 
 
McGrattan, K., and Forney, G. (2004). "Fire Dynamics Simulator (Version 4) User  
Guide." NIST Special Publication 1019, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). 
 
McGrattan, K. B., and Hamins, A. (2003). "Numerical Simulation of the Howard 
Street Tunnel Fire, Baltimore, Maryland, July 2001." NUREG/CR-6793, Joint 







Meinhardt. (2002). "Assessment of Train Fire Heat Release Rate (Unpublished)." 
Meinhardt (Singapore) Pte Ltd. 
 
Mikkola, E., and Wichman, I. S. (1989). "On the ignition of Combustibles Materials." 
Fire and Materials, 14, pp. 87 to 96. 
 
Morgan, H. P., and De Smedt, J.-C. (2002). "Prescription in Flight." Fire Prevention 
and Fire Engineers Journal, pp. 22 to 26. 
 
Munro, J., Smith, G., Dowling, V. P., and White, N. "Combining Design Fires and 
Risk Assessment to Achieve Tunnel Safety." Proceedings of the 4th 
International Conference on Tunnel Fires 2002, Basel, Switzerland. 
 
NFPA-130. (2003 edition). "Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail 
Systems." National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts. 
 
NFPA-271. (2004 edition). "Standard Method of Test for Heat and Visible Smoke 
Release Rates for Materials and Products Using an Oxygen Consumption 
Calorimeter." National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Quincy, 
Massachusetts. 
 
Ohlemiller, T. J., and Villa, K. (1992). "Characterization of the California Technical 
Bulletin 133 Ignition Source and a Comparable Gas Burner." Fire Safety 
Journal, 18(4), pp. 325 to 254. 
 
Park, H. J. "An Investigation into mysterious questions arising from the Daegu 
underground railway arson case through fire simulations & small-scale fire 
tests." Proceedings of the 6th Asia-Oceania Symposium on Fire Science and 
Technology 2004, Daegu, Korea, pp. 16 to 27. 
 
Parker, A. "Fire Testing of Mass Transit Assemblies." Proceedings of the 3rd 
International Conference on Fire and Materials 1994, London, UK. 
 
Peacock, R. D. (1993). "Fire Safety of Passenger Trains: A Review of U.S. and 
Foreign Approaches. Prepared for FRA, USDOT." DOT/FRA/ORD-93/23, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
 
Peacock, R. D., Averill, J. D., Madrzykowski, D., Stroup, D. W., Reneke, P. A., and 
Bukowski, R. W. (2004). "Fire Safety of Passenger Trains; Phase III: 
Evaluation of Fire Hazard Analysis Using Full-scale Passenger Rail Car 
Tests." NISTIR 6563, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
 
Peacock, R. D., and Braun, E. (1984). "Fire Tests of Amtrak Passenger Rail Vehicle 
Interiors. Prepared for FRA, USDOT." Technical Note 1193, National Bureau 
of Standards (NBS). 
 
Peacock, R. D., and Braun, E. (1999). "Fire Safety of Passenger Trains; Phase I: 
Material Evaluation (Cone Calorimeter)." NISTIR 6132, National Institute of 






Peacock, R. D., Bukowski, R. W., and Markos, S. H. "Evaluation of Passenger Train 
Car Materials in the Cone Calorimeter." Proceedings of the 5th International 
Conference on Fire and Materials 1998, San Antonio, TX. 
 
Peacock, R. D., Jones, W. W., Bukowski, R. W., and Farney, L. C. (1991). "NIST 
Handbook 146, Volume II: Technical Reference Guide for HAZARD I Fire 
Hazard Assessment Method, Version 1.1." National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). 
 
Peacock, R. D., Reneke, P. A., Averill, J. D., Bukowski, R. W., and Klote, J. H. 
(2002). "Fire Safety of Passenger Trains, Phase II: Application of Fire Hazard 
Analysis Techniques." NISTIR 6525, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). 
 
Peacock, R. D., Reneke, P. A., Jones, W. W., Bukowski, R. W., and Babrauskas, V. 
(1995). "Concepts for Fire Protection of Passenger Rail Transportation 
Vehicles: Past, Present, and Future." Fire and Materials, 19, pp. 71 to 87. 
 
PIARC. (1999). "Fire and smoke Control in Road Tunnels." PIARC report 05.05.B, 
PIARC. 
 
Quintiere, J. G. (1993). "A Simulation Model for Fire Growth on Materials Subject to 
a Room-corner Test." Fire Safety Journal, 20, pp. 313-339. 
 
Rakaczky, J. A. (1980). "Fire and Flammability Characteristics of Materials Used In 
Rail Passenger Cars.  A Literature Survey." ARBRL-MR-03009, U.S. Army 
Ballistic Research Laboratory. 
 
Rasbash, D. J., Drysdale, D., and Deepak, D. (1986). "Critical Heat and Mass 
Transfer at Pilot Ignition and Extinction of a Material." Fire Safety Journal, 
10(1), pp. 1 to 10. 
 
Renie, G., and Prevot, R. (2003). "Passenger Vehicles - Fire Safety Design Report, 
Pre-Final Design Rev F (Unpublished)." Project Reference: 83000-01-D000-
VME+004 Internal Reference: CIM.W 976 001, Alstom Transport. 
 
Richter, I. E. "Propagation and Development of Temperatures from Tests with 
Railways and Road Vehicles - Comparison Between Test Data and 
Temperature Time Curves of Regulations." Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Fires in Tunnels 1994, Borås, Sweden, pp. 51 to 62. 
 
Richter, I. E., and Vauquelin, O. "Description of Measuring Techniques Used in the 
EUREKA-Project." Proceedings of the International Conference on Fires in 
Tunnels 1994, Borås, Sweden, pp. 20 to 35. 
 
RTI. (2002). "Introduction to the Singapore NEL Train." Rail Training International 








Schirmer_Engineering_Corporation. (1990). "Life Safety Study and Computer 
Modelling Analysis for New York City Railroad Tunnels and Pennsylvania 
Station." Contract to the National Railway Passenger Corporation, Sec No. 
15-890-29-04-00, Schirmer Engineering Corporation. 
 
SFPE. (2002). SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA), Quincy, MA. 
 
Shields, T. J., Silcock, G. W. H., and Hassani, S. K. S. (1998). "Behaviour of Glazing 
in a Large Simulated Office Block in a Multi-Storey Building." Journal of 
Applied Fire Science, 7(4), pp. 333-352. 
 
Sinai, Y. (2004). "Safety in Transit." Fire Prevention & Fire Engineers Journal, pp. 
36 to 38. 
 
Smith, E. E. (1976). "Transit Vehicle Material Specification Using Release Rate Tests 
for Flammability and Smoke, Phase 1 Report. Prepared for Transit 
Development Corporation." Ohio State University, Department of Chemical 
Research, Columbus, Ohio. 
 
Smith, E. E. "Fire Safety Evaluation of Rapid Transit System." Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Fire Safety 1983, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Soo, W. T. (2005). Personal communication - Email from W. T. Soo, Manager, 
Transit Regulation Department, Land Transport Authority, Singapore, 13 Feb 
2005. 
 
SP. (2004). "Runehamar Fire Tests,  
http://www.sp.se/fire/Eng/Protection/Runehamar_tests.htm, accessed 1 Sept 
04." SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute. 
 
Steinert, C. "Smoke and Heat Production in Tunnel Fires." Proceeding of 
International Conference on Fires in Tunnels 1994, Borås, Sweden, pp. 123 
to137. 
 
Tallec, Y. L., Sainrat, A., Métral, S., Briggs, P., Messa, S., and Breulet, H. "The 
FIRESTARR Project - Fire Protection of Railway Vehicles." Fire and 
Material 2001, Fisherman's Wharf, San Francisco, USA. 
 
Tan, J. (2005a). Personal communication - Email from Joseph Tan, Rolling Stock 
Project Engineer, Land Transport Authority, Singapore, 13 Feb 2005. 
 
Tan, J. (2005b). Personal communication - Email from Joseph Tan, Rolling Stock 
Project Engineer, Land Transport Authority, Singapore, 24 March 2005. 
 
Tewarson, A. (2002). "Generation of Heat and Chemical Compounds in Fires." SFPE 
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, National Fire Protection 






Thomson, H., and Drysdale, D. (1987). "Flammability of Plastics, I: Ignition 
Temperatures." Fire and Materials, 11, pp. 163 to 172. 
 
Thomson, H., Drysdale, D., and Beyler, C. (1988). "An Experimental Evaluation of 
Critical Surface Temperature as a Criterion for Piloted Ignition of Solid 
Fuels." Fire Safety Journal, 13, pp. 185 to 196. 
 
Tipping, G. "Composite Solutions to the Fire Performance needs of Mass Transit." 
3rd International Conference on the Response of Composite Materials to Fire 
2003, Centre for Composite Materials Engineering, University of Newcastle, 
UK. 
 
Vettori, R. L., Madrzykowski, D., and Walton, W. D. (2002). "Simulation of 
Dynamics of a Fire in a One Storey Restaurant - Texas, February 14, 2000." 
NISTIR 6923, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Gaithersburg, Maryland. 
 
VTT. (2003). "Fire Dynamics Simulator, 
http://www.vtt.fi/rte/firetech/services/fire_simulation/fds.pdf , accessed 20 Feb 05." 
 
Wade, C. A. (2003a). "BRANZFIRE Technical Reference Guide." Student Report No. 
92 (Revised 2003), Building Research Association of New Zealand (BRANZ), 
Porirua City, New Zealand. 
 
Wade, C. A. (2003b). "BRANZFIRE Thermal Database." Microsoft Access 
Application, Thermal.mdb, ed., Building Research Association of New 
Zealand (BRANZ), Porirua City, New Zealand. 
 
White, N., and Dowling, V. P. "Conducting a full-scale experiment on a rail passenger 
car." Proceedings of the 6th Asia-Oceania Symposium on Fire Science and 
Engineering 2004, Daegu, Korea, pp. 591 to 601. 
 
Wilk, E. (2002). "Bericht zur Bestimmung eines Bemessungsbrandes für 
Triebfahrzeuge der U-Bahn/ Frankfurt a. M., Anlage 8." Brandschutz Consult 
mbH, Leipzig. 
 
Wolinska, J. R. (2002). "Passenger Train Fire In tunnel." Tunnel Management 
International Journal, 5(4). 
 
Wu, Y. "Smoke Control in Tunnels with Slope using Longitudinal Ventilation Effect 
of Tunnel Slope on Critical Velocity." Proceedings of the 11th International 
Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels 2003, Luzern, 
Switzerland, pp. 77 to 86. 
 
Yau, R., Lai, F., Li, J., and Lau, B. (2002). "Design of Tunnel Ventilation System of 
Underground Rapid Transit System in Bangkok." 
 
Young, R. "Development of Heat Release Techniques Within European Railways." 






Appendix A: NFPA 130 and FRA test methods and 
performance criteria  
 
Materials Flammability and smoke emission 
Categorya Function of materiala Test method Performance criteria 
ASTM D 3675 Is≤  25 Cushions, 
mattress 
All 
ASTM E 662 Ds  (1.5 min)≤  100 
Ds  (4.0 min) ≤  175 
14 CFR 25, Appendix 
F, Part I (vertical test) 
Flame time ≤  10 s 
Burn length ≤  150 mm 
Fabrics All 
ASTM E 662 Ds  (4.0 min) ≤  200 
ASTM E 162 Is ≤  35 Sear and mattress frames, wall and 
ceiling lining and panels, seat and 
toilet shrouds, trays and other 
tables, partitions, shelves, opaque 
windscreens, and combustible 
signage 
ASTM E 662 Ds  (1.5 min)≤  100 
Ds  (4.0 min) ≤  200 
 
ASTM D 3675 Is ≤  25 Flexible cellular foams used in 
armrest and seat and mattress 
padding 
ASTM E 662 Ds (1.5 min)≤  100 
Ds (4.0 min) ≤  175 
ASTM E 162 Is ≤  25 Thermal and acoustical insulation 
ASTM E 662 Ds (4.0 min) ≤  100 
ASTM E 162 Is ≤  25b HVAC ducting 
ASTM E 662 Ds (4.0 min) ≤  100 
ASTM E 648 CRF ≥  5 kW/m2 Floor covering 
ASTM E 662 Ds (1.5 min)≤  100 
Ds (4.0 min) ≤  200 




Light diffusers, windows and 
transparent plastic windscreens ASTM E 662 
sD  (1.5 min)≤  100 
sD  (4.0 min) ≤  200 
ASTM C 1166 Average  flame 
propagation < 100 mm 
Elastomers Window gaskets, door nosings, 
intercar diaphragms, and roof 
mats ASTM E 662 Ds (1.5 min)≤  100 
Ds (4.0 min) ≤  200 
ASTM E 162 Is ≤  35 Exterior 
vehicle 
componentsc 
End caps, roof housing, 
articulation bellows, exterior 
shells, and component boxes and 
covers 
ASTM E 662 Ds (1.5 min)≤  100 
Ds (4.0 min) ≤  175 
All UL 1581, CSA C22.2, 
UL 1685, ANSL/ UL 
1666, NFPA 262, 
ASTM E 662 
Pass 
Control and low voltage ICEA S-19/ NEMA 




Fire alarm cable IEC 60331-11 Pass 
Structural 
Components 
Flooring, other ASTM E 199 Pass 
a Categories and functions follow NFPA 130. 
b FRA requirement is sI ≤  35 
c  NPFA 130 only  
Table A1: NFPA 130 and FRA test methods and performance criteria for the flammability 
and smoke emission characteristic of materials used in fixed guideway vehicles and 






1) Is is flame spread index 
2) Ds is an instantaneous measure of the optical density at a particular instant in 
time 
3) CRF is critical radiant flux 
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NFPA-130. (2003 edition). "Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail 








































Appendix B:  Major metro train fires in tunnel from 1970 to 2003  
 
City, Country Date Description Reference 
Daegu,  
South Korea 18 Feb 2003 
An arsonist started fire when he was on a train by spreading flammable liquid into 
one of the carriages of a six-car train when it reached Jungangno Station. Two six-
car trains were destroyed, and 198 people killed. 
(Anon 2004c) 
Berlin, 
Germany 7 July 2001 
The fire was started by an arc lamp in the rear carriage of the roughly 100 m long 
train, in a tunnel between the stations at "Kurt-Schumacher-Platz" and 
"Afrikanische Strasse". Despite the small size of fire, the amount of smoke in the 
carriage and the tunnel area was considerable.   
(Anon 2004d) 
Berlin, 
Germany 8 July 2000 
Electrical short-circuit caused arcing on the body of the last car of an eight-car 
train. The car superstructure ignited upon entering the Deutsche Oper station. 
Passengers were evacuated from both underground trains in the station. Last car of 




Netherlands 12 July 1999 
The brakes on the bogie started the fire of a high-speed tram when it was in 
Weesperplein underground station. The driver and a member of station staff tried to 
extinguish the fire but failed and the entire station got filled with smoke. Evacuation 
was initiated. The firemen eventually put off the fire. Two persons were slightly 
injured (smoke poisoning). 
(Colombo 2001) 
Baku, 
Aserbadjain 28 Oct 1995 
A fully loaded five-car train stopped about 200 m after Uldus station due to 
sparkover/ electric arc in electrical equipment in the rear bogie of the fourth car. 










City, US 21 Dec 1994 
An arsonist exploded a homemade bomb that sent a fireball whooshing through a 
subway car injuring himself and 47 others. The crude bomb went off while the 
subway train was parked in a station.   
(Anon 2004e) 
New York 
City, US 28 Dec 1990 
Electrical fire in the subway tunnel near Clark Street, Brooklyn kills two and 




A burning train stopped in a tunnel to evacuate passengers. Inaccessibility made 
fire fighting difficult, and the fire reached major proportions before firemen 
arrived. Tunnel draughts caused problems from smoke and gases. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Hamburg, 
Germany 20 Sep 1984 
A fire started in a seat on a three-car train late at night. The train was stopped and 
evacuated at Landungsbrucken station, where the fire spread to cables. Two cars 
were destroyed, and one passenger was affected by smoke. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
München, 
Germany 5 Sep 1983 
An electrical fault caused a train fire; after discharging passengers at HW the driver 
continued to a stabling siding where firemen extinguished the blaze. Two vehicles 
were destroyed, and seven passengers affected by smoke. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
London,  
UK 11 Aug 1982 
A short circuit on a Piccadilly line train in a tunnel between Wood Green and 
Bounds Green caused a fire which destroyed one vehicle. Over 50 passengers were 
evacuated along the tunnel; 15 of them were affected by smoke. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
New York 
City, US 2 Jun 1982 
A PATH train stabled near Exchange Place station caught fire, and the fire service 
took six hours to bring it under control. Four cars were destroyed, and several 
people were affected by smoke. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
New York 
City, US 16 Mar 1982 
A fault in under-floor control gear started a train fire in the running tunnel near 
Christopher Street. Rapid spread of smoke led to the evacuation of some 400 







Germany 11 Sep 1981 
A technical fault caused a fire on a light rail car in the running tunnel near 
Ramersdorf station. The fire was extinguished within 25 minutes, with no 
passengers injured; the car was destroyed. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Moscow, 
Russia 1 Jun 1981 
An electrical fault caused a fire on a train at Oktyabrskaya station, and two cars 
were engulfed before the fire brigade arrived. Heat and smoke made the firefighting 
difficult. Over 2000 passengers were evacuated from various trains by firemen in 
breathing apparatus. Seven people were reported to have died. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
New York 
City, US 1980 – 1981 
Between June 1980 and July 1981, eight fires on the New York Subway 
necessitated evacuation of passengers. A total of 50 people were hospitalised. 
Several of the fires were started by electrical faults in under floor control 
equipment. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
London, UK 21 Jun 1980 
A discarded cigarette is believed to have started a fire in a cross-passage between 
the Northern Line running tunnels at Goodge Street. Poisonous smoke given off by 
burning cables caused one fatality. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Hamburg, 
Germany 8 Apr 1980 
A fire was deliberately started in a seat near the front of a train, and spread rapidly 




City, US 8 Sep 1979 
A discarded cigarette ignited oil to start a fire at Grand Central Terminal on the Lennox 
Avenue line, creating dense smoke. Two cars of 12 stabled nearby were burnt out. Poor 
communication between train crews and controllers and between firemen and 
managers delayed evacuation of 100 people, resulting in four being injured. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Philadelphia, 
US 6 Sep 1979 
A transformer fire and explosion in a train carrying 1100 people at Septa's Erie 
Street station. The train's doors failed to open, causing panic. 148 passengers were 







France 25 Mar 1979 
A short circuit caused by a foreign body on the line at Reuilly-Diderot station on 
Line 1 started a fire on a passenger train, destroying one car. Thick smoke 
hampered rescue operations, affecting 26 people. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
San Francisco, 
US 17 Jan 1979 
A current collector fault on a BART train passing through the trans-Bay tunnel 
caused a short circuit and fire on the following train. Lack of communication 
between driver and control centre, poor co-ordination and errors of judgement 
hampered rescue of the passengers. One person died, and 56 were affected by 






Germany 24 Oct 1978 
A discarded cigarette set fire to a light rail car in the pre-metro tunnel at Hansaring 
station, and eight passengers were evacuated. Because of the smoke only firemen 
with breathing equipment could enter. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Toronto, 
Canada 15 Oct 1976 
An arsonist started a fire in a train at Christie Street station, resulting in the 
destruction of four vehicles. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Lisboan, 
Portugal 25 May 1976 
A traction failure led to a fire on a train; passengers were evacuated at a station, but 




March 1975 -  
Nov 1976 
There have been 27 fire or smoke incidents on subway cars of the BART system. 
All but three of these incidents occurred below the car floor and did not penetrate 
into the passenger compartment. The remaining three cases involved interior car 
fires that produced minor damage (Two burning trash fires and one aborted arson 
attempt to ignite a seat cushion with a pile of matches).  
(Braun 1978) 
Boston, US 2 Jul 1975 
Broken overhead wires in the light-rail tunnel near Kenmore Square station ignited 
the front of a car during the morning peak. Over 400 people were evacuated, and 34 







Canada 23 Jan 1974 
Faulty rubber tyres on a train caused a short circuit south of Rosemard station, 
starting a fire and leading to the destruction of nine vehicles and 300 m of cabling. 
Over 1000 passengers had to be evacuated. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Paris,  
France 27 Mar 1973 
An empty car in a Line 7 train was set on fire near Porte d'Italie by an arsonist 
igniting a seat. Despite rapid action by the fire services, the car was destroyed and 
two passengers at the station were killed by smoke. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Stockholm, 
Sweden 1972 - 1978 
Over this period seven fires broke out on board trains, resulting in destruction of 
the cars in each case. All the fires were thought to be arson.  
(Andersen 2004a) 
East Berlin, 
Germany 4 Oct 1972 
A train car stabled at Alexanderplatz caught fire, damaging the station buildings 
and destroying four vehicles. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
Montreal, 
Canada 12 Dec 1971 
A train collided with the end of the tunnel at Henri Bourassa metro station, 
followed by a short circuit and fire which spread to train-sets stationed nearby. 36 
cars were destroyed, and the driver killed. 
(Andersen 2004a) 
 







Andersen, T. (2004a). "Significant metro fires 1970-1987, http://home.no.net/lotsberg/artiklar/brann/metro_fires.html, accessed 20 Dec 2004." 
 
Anon. (2004c). "Arson attack in the subway of Daegu, South Korea, http://www.takagi-ryo.ac/docs/id/183/lang/1, accessed 10 Dec 2004." 
 
Anon. (2004d). "Berlin: Fire in a subway station, http://alt.brandschutz-zeitschrift.de/english/article_subwayberlin.htm, accessed 23 Dec 2004." 
 
Anon. (2004e). "NYC Subway Accidents, http://www.nycsubway.org/faq/accidents.html, accessed 24 Dec 2004." 
 
Anon. (2004f). "Fire Incidents in Tunnels (1990-2003), http://sci-fire.members.beeb.net/tunnelfiresafety/tunnelfires.html, accessed 20 Dec 
2004." 
 
Associated-Engineers. (1980). "Subway Environment Design Handbook, Volume II, Subway Environment Simulation (SES) Computer Program, 
Version 3.0, Part 1: User's Manual. Prepared for the Transportation Systems Center of the U.S.D.O.T." Associated Engineers, a Joint 
Venture of Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade and Douglas, Inc, De Leuw Cather and Company, and Kaiser Engineers. 
 
Braun, E. (1978). "Fire Hazard Evaluation of BART Vehicles. Prepared for Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA), now Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA)." NBSIR 78-1421, National Bureau of Standards (NBS). 
 
Colombo, A. G. (2001). "NEDIES PROJECT - Lessons Learnt from Tunnel Accidents." EUR Report March 2001, Institute for Systems, 
Informatics and Safety (ISIS) of the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
 
FIT-Workpackage2. (2003). "Design Fire Scenario's - 5a draft - Oct.2003 (Unpublished)." European Thematic Network on Fire in Tunnels (FIT). 
 
Note:  There were several other metro fire incidents reported in (Anon 2004f). They were not included here because it contained quite a number 






Appendix C: Emergency tunnel ventilation system operating 
direction for Circle Line (CCL) under various fire scenarios   
 
All the stations in Circle Line are built underground and are provided with air-
conditioning. Full height platform screens are installed at the edges of the platform to 
conserve energy and also to prevent passengers from falling or getting onto the track 
(see Figure C1).  Platform screen doors (PSD) are located along the platform screens 
and are inline with the metro train passenger doors when the metro train stopped at the 
station (see Figure C2).     
  
Figure C1:  Platform screens and 
platform screen doors (in closed position) 
Figure C2:  Platform screen doors inline 
with the metro train passenger doors 
when metro train stopped at station 
 
If a metro train on fire is stopped at the station trackway i.e. the section of track next 
to the station platform, the tunnel ventilation fans at both ends of the station will 
operate in exhaust mode to extract smoke and hot gases generated from the fire1. The 
PSD will be opened to allow passenger evacuation and for replacement air. The 
operation of the system should prevent the spread of smoke from the trackway into 
the station platform (except for some spillage from an undercarriage fire that is 
unavoidable) and to induce a stream of uncontaminated air in the direction of escape. 
This will prevent causing unnecessary panic and ensuring tenable environment is 
maintained along the means of escape within the station (Chua 2003).  
 
1 The emergency ventilation strategy used in CCL is one of the strategies normally used to 
handle train fires at the station trackway. Luk (2004) discussed in detail the other strategies 
that have been adopted by different metro lines /stations. He highlighted that the layout of the 
station and trackway, location of fire, the fire size, the capacities of the ventilation systems, etc 






However, if a metro train on fire is stalled inside a tunnel, passenger evacuation inside 
the tunnel will be required. The emergency tunnel ventilation system needs to be 
operated so that it provides a clear and safe path for passenger evacuation in the 
tunnel. This is achieved by operating the emergency tunnel ventilation system in a 
push-pull mode by operation staff in the operation control centre (OCC). The 
direction of the emergency tunnel ventilation airflow will be in the opposite the 
direction of evacuation which in turn depends on the position of the fire (front car, 
middle car or rear car) and the location of trains.   
 
The various fire scenarios that might occur in the tunnel and the emergency tunnel 
ventilation system operating directions are discussed below.   
 
C1 Only incident metro train inside tunnel section (between 
stations) 
 
Fire location unknown 
In event that the location of the metro train fire cannot be identified, it is 
recommended that the direction of emergency tunnel ventilation airflow be set in the 
normal train travelling direction.  
 
Front car fire, external metro train fire 
If the front car of the metro train is on fire, the direction of the emergency tunnel 
ventilation airflow should be set in the normal train travelling direction.   
 
Rear car fire, external metro train fire 
If the rear car of the metro train is on fire, the direction of the emergency tunnel 
ventilation airflow should be set in the opposite direction of a normal train travelling 






Middle car fire, external metro train fire 
If middle car of the metro train is on fire, the direction of the emergency tunnel 
ventilation airflow should be based on the evacuation arrangement determined by the 
operation staff in the OCC and the Customer Service Officer2 (CSO).    
 
Internal metro train fire 
With an internal metro train fire, the metro train should be able to move towards the 
next station for passenger evacuation. However, if the incident metro train is disabled 
in the tunnel, the direction of the emergency tunnel ventilation airflow should be 
based on the evacuation arrangement determined by the operation staff in the OCC 
and the CSO.      
 
C2 Incident metro train and non-incident metro train inside tunnel 
section (between stations) 
 
External metro train fire 
If any non-incident metro train is stopped behind the incident train, the emergency 
tunnel ventilation airflow should be set in a direction to prevent smoke from flowing 
towards the non-incident metro train regardless of the metro train fire location.  
  
Internal metro train fire 
With an internal metro train fire, the metro train should be able to move towards the 
next station for passenger evacuation. However, if the incident metro train is disabled 
in the tunnel and there is another metro train stopped behind it, the emergency tunnel 
ventilation air flow should be set in a direction that prevent the smoke from flowing 
towards the non-incident metro train regardless of the metro train fire location. 
 
2 Unlike typical metro system, the Circle Line trains will be driverless. However, there would 
be one customer service officer (CSO) in each train.  CSOs are trained to handle passengers' 
queries, manage emergency situations, report metro train faults and abnormalities to the OCC 
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Appendix D: Material properties 
 
D1 FRP polyester  
 
The components that are made of FRP polyester are the seats, under seat boxes, equipped cubicle assemblies, PEC module fittings, detrainment 
doors, driver console assembly, face (wall) and the ceiling panels at car end mask. The material properties for FRP polyester obtained from 
various references are compiled in Table D1.  Note that since only the seat sample is available, it is assumed that the thickness and density of 
other components made of FRP polyester are the same as the seat.   
 
Properties Value Value selected  Remark Reference 
Thicknessδ  (m) 0.004 0.004 Measured from the seat sample  
0.3 Polyester, FRP 
 
(Anon 2004g) Thermal conductivity  k  (W/mK) 
0.29 
0.295 (Ave) 
Polyester, glass filler (18-36%) (Tewarson et al. 1999)  
1795 Measured from the seat sample  
1950 Polyester, FRP (Anon 2004g) 
Density ρ   (kg/m3) 
1480 - 1730 
1795 
(measured 
value) Polyester, glass filler (18-36%) (Tewarson et al. 1999) 
1.51 Polyester, FRP (Anon 2004g) 
1.2-2.3 Polyester, unsaturated (SFPE 2002) Appendix C Table C3 
1.1 - 1.3 Polyester, glass filler (18-36%) (Tewarson et al. 1999) 
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 
1.047 
1.6735 (Ave) 
Polyester, chopped glass filler (Hilado 1990) Table 2.3 
Chemical Formula C5.77H6.25O1.63 C5.77H6.25O1.63 Polyester, unsaturated (SFPE 2002) Appendix C Table C3 
Energy per unit mass  2O  (kJ/kg 
of 2O ) 









0.71 -1.47 Polyester, FRP (Tewarson 2002) Table 3-4.14 Fraction of 2CO  from fuel (kg/kg) 
1.38 
Not used 
Wall panel, FRP 
Cone Calorimeter test average 
(Peacock and Braun 1999) Table D-
6 
0.039 – 0.102 Polyester, FRP (Tewarson 2002) Table 3-4.14 Fraction of CO  from fuel (kg/kg) 
 0.094 
0.0705 (Ave) 
Wall panel, FRP 
Cone Calorimeter test average 
(Peacock and Braun 1999) Table D-
6 
Fraction of soot from fuel (kg/kg) 0.054 – 0.07 0.062 (Ave) Polyester, FRP (Tewarson 2002) Table 3-4.14 
Radiative fraction 0.3 – 0.4 0.35 (Ave) Polyester, FRP (Tewarson 2002) Table 3-4.14 
Ignition Temperature igT  (°C) 346 - 399 346 (lowest) Polyester, glass fibre laminate 
(glass reinforced) 
(Hilado 1990) Table 2.5 
1400 – 6400 Polyester, FRP (Tewarson 2002) Table 3-4-7 
1390 Polyester (glass fibre reinforced) (Drysdale 1998) Table 5.8 
1750 Fire Rated Polyester (glass fibre 
reinforced) 
(Drysdale 1998) Table 5.8 
Heat of vaporisation vH∆ (kJ/kg) 
350 – 410 
1390 (lowest) 
Polyester, unsaturated (Babrauskas 2003) 
 9300 – 19000 Polyester, FRP (Tewarson 2002) Table 3-4.14 Effective heat of combustion  




Wall panel, FRP 
Cone Calorimeter test average 
(Peacock and Braun 1999) Table D-
6 




0.021 0.042  Wall panel, FRP 
  
(Peacock and Braun 1999) Figure D-
24 
 








D2 Styrene butadiene 
 
The floor covering is made of styrene butadiene. The material properties obtained from various references are compiled in Table D2. 
 
Properties Value Value selected  Remark Reference 
Thickness δ  (m) 0.003 0.003 Measured from the floor covering 
sample 
 
0.15 Styrene butadiene (Hilado 1990) Table 2.4 Thermal conductivity k  (W/mK) 
0.23 
0.19 (Ave) 
Synthetic rubber (Bejan 1993) Appendix B 
1478 Measured from the floor covering 
sample 




value) Synthetic rubber (Bejan 1993) Appendix B  
1.883 – 2.092 Styrene butadiene (Hilado 1990) Table 2.3 
1.97 Synthetic rubber (Bejan 1993) Appendix B  
1.94 Butadiene/styrene 8.58% copolymer (SFPE 2002) Appendix C Table C3 
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 
1.82 
1.9875 (Ave) 
Butadiene/styrene 25.5% copolymer (SFPE 2002) Appendix C Table C3 
 Ignition Temperature igT  (°C) 360 360 Styrene butadiene (Babrauskas 2003) 
Heat of vaporisation vH∆  (kJ/kg) 2700 2700 Styrene butadiene (Tewarson 2002) Table 3-4-7 
42490 Butadiene/styrene 8.58% copolymer 
 
(SFPE 2002) Appendix C Table C3 
41950 Butadiene/styrene 25.5% copolymer (SFPE 2002) Appendix C Table C3 
Effective heat of combustion  





Floor cover - Styrene-Butadiene  
Cone Calorimeter test average 
(Peacock and Braun 1999) Table D-6 
Maximum burning rate "maxm&  
(kg/m2s) 
0.01 0.01 Floor cover - Styrene-Butadiene 
 
(Peacock and Braun 1999) Figure D-
33 
 








The tunnel wall is made of concrete. The material properties obtained from various references are compiled in Table D3. 
 
Properties Value Value selected Remark Reference 
Thickness δ  (m) 0.7 0.7   (Alstom 2001b)  
1.28   (Bejan 1993) Appendix B 
1.0  FDS database 
Thermal conductivity k  (W/mK) 
 
0.81 – 1.4 
1.1 (Ave) 
 (Chapman 1974; Karlsson and Quintiere 2000) 
2200   (Bejan 1993) Appendix B 
2100  FDS database 
Density ρ   (kg/m3) 
1900 – 2300 
2100 (Ave) 
 (Chapman 1974; Karlsson and Quintiere 2000) 
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 0.88 0.88  (Bejan 1993) Appendix B  and FDS database 
 







D4 Window  
 
The window consists of two sheets of laminated glass: one 5 mm thick and the other 6 mm thick, with 12 mm air-gap in between. The thermal 
conductivity and the specific heat for the laminated glass are assumed to be the same as the float glass. The thermal conductivity and the specific 
heat for the float glass from various references are complied in Table D4 while the thermal conductivity and the specific heat for air at 300 K 
taken from (Incropera and DeWitt 2002) are 0.0263 W/mK and 1.007 kJ/kgK respectively.  
 
Properties Value Value selected Remark Reference 
0.78 (SFPE 2002) Table B.7  
0.76 (Parry 2002) and FDS database 
Thermal conductivity k  (W/mK) 
 
0.81 
 0.78 (Ave)  
(Bejan 1993)  Appendix B and (Kreith and Bohn 1986) 
0.84  (SFPE 2002) Table B.7  and FDS database 
0.88  (Anon 2004h) 
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 
0.8 
0.84 (Ave) 
 (Bejan 1993)  Appendix B and (Kreith and Bohn 1986) 
 
Table D4: Material properties for float glass 
  
The laminated glass has a lower specific heat compared with the air. Therefore it is assumed that the specific heat for the window is the same as 
the float glass since lesser energy is required to raise the temperature of the window and thus more conservative. For the thermal conductivity, it 






























Where U  is the overall heat transfer coefficient in W/m2K. 
 
This is valid since one-dimensional heat transfer will be performed in FDS if the thermal conductivity, the density and the specific heat are 
prescribed for the window.  
 
Finally the density of the window, which is measured since sample is available.  The material properties for the window are complied in Table 
D5 below.  
Properties Value used Remark 
Thickness δ  (m) 0.023 Measured from the window sample 




Density ρ   (kg/m3) 1380  Measured from the window sample 
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 0.84  Assumed to be same as float glass 
 










D5 Wall, ceiling and passenger door constructions 
 
The thickness for the wall, ceiling and passenger door constructions are 0.1, 0.6 and 0.35 m respectively. The constructions consist of glass wool 
sandwiched between the aluminium panel and the welded aluminium body or between two aluminium panels. The material properties for the 
aluminium and glass wool from various references are compiled in Table D6 and Table D7 respectively. 
 
Properties Value Value selected Remark Reference 
237   (Incropera and DeWitt 2002) 
Appendix A Table A.1 
204  (Bejan 1993) Appendix B 




 (Chapman 1974)  
3011 Measured from the wall panel 
sample 





value)  (Incropera and DeWitt 2002) 
Appendix A Table A.1 and (Bejan 
1993) Appendix B and (Chapman 
1974) 
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 0.9 0.9    (Incropera and DeWitt 2002) 
Appendix A Table A.1 and (Bejan 
1993) Appendix B and (Chapman 
1974) 
Melting point (°C) 660  660    (Incropera and DeWitt 2002) 
Appendix A Table A.1 
 








Properties Value Value selected Remark Reference 
0.038   (SFPE 2002) Table B.7  
0.037  (Bejan 1993) Appendix B 
Thermal conductivity k  (W/mK) 
 
0.036-0.04 
 0.038 (Ave) 
Density varies from 50 to 200 
kg/m3 
(Kreith and Bohn 1986)  
Density ρ   (kg/m3) 16 - 54 35 (Ave)   (Alstom 2001a; Renie and Prevot 
2003) 
0.7   (SFPE 2002)Table B.7 
0.66  (Bejan 1993) Appendix B 
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 
0.67 
0.68 (Ave) 
 (Kreith and Bohn 1986) 
 
Table D7: Material properties for glass wool 
The glass wool has a lower specific heat compared with the aluminium. Therefore it is assumed that the specific heat for the wall, ceiling and 
passenger door constructions is the same as the glass wool since lesser energy is required to raise the temperature of the constructions and thus 
more conservative. The thermal conductivities for the constructions are obtained using the same calculation method as for the window. As for 
the densities of the constructions, they can be calculated since information on the density and thickness of the aluminium panel and the glass 
wool for each construction is available. The material properties for the wall, ceiling and passenger door constructions are compiled in Table D8, 






Properties Value used Remark Reference 
Thickness δ  (m) 0.1   (Alstom 2001a) 
Thermal conductivity k  (W/mK) 0.038 Calculated   
Density ρ   (kg/m3) 119 Calculated  
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 0.68 Assumed to be the same as glass wool    
 
Table D8: Material properties for the wall construction 
 
Properties Value used Remark Reference 
Thickness δ  (m) 0.06   (Alstom 2001a) 
Thermal conductivity k  (W/mK) 0.038 Calculated   
Density ρ   (kg/m3) 176 Calculated  
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 0.68 Assumed to be the same as glass wool   
 
Table D9: Material properties for the ceiling construction 
 
Properties Value used Remark Reference 
Thickness δ  (m) 0.035   (Alstom 2001a) 
Thermal conductivity k  (W/mK) 0.038 Calculated    
Density ρ   (kg/m3) 276 Calculated  
Specific heat c  (kJ/kgK) 0.68 
 
Assumed to be the same as glass wool   
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Appendix E: FRP polyester - Calculation of molecular 
weight and stoichiometry coefficient for CO2, H2O and O2 
 
E1 Molecular weight 
 
The chemical formula for polyester is given as 63.125.677.5 CHC . The atomic weights 
ofC , H andO are 12, 1 and 16 respectively. Therefore the molecular weight = (12 x 
5.77) + (1 x 6.25) + (16 x 1.63) = 101.6 
 
E2 Stoichiometry coefficient for CO2, H2O and O2 
 
Consider stoichiometric reaction in air with the general form: 
),,(Pr),,( 222 NOHCOoductAirOHCFuel →+  Equation E1 
 
22222 76.32





cbad −+=  
Equation E3 
 
The chemical formula of polyester is given by 63.125.677.5 CHC . Therefore a = 5.77, 






25.677.5 =−+=d   
 
Thus Equation E2 can be written as: 
2222263.125.677.5 )5175.6(76.32
25.677.5)76.3(5175.6 NOHCONOOHC ++→++   
 
2222263.125.677.5 5.24125.377.5)76.3(5175.6 NOHCONOOHC ++→++   
 




(Karlsson and Quintiere 2000) 






Appendix F: Sample FDS data file for trial simulations 
 
 
Define name for output files  
……………………................. 
&HEAD CHID ='MCSimulation1Grid300',TITLE ='Circle Line - Train Fire' / All output files will have  
          names beginning with "MCSimulation1Grid300" 
 
Define grid size and computational domain 
…………….................................................... 
Grid size (choose only 1 grid size) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&GRID IBAR=96,JBAR=24,KBAR=18 / 300mmx300mmx300mm grids 
GRID IBAR=135,JBAR=27,KBAR=24 / 200mmx200mmx200mm grid 
GRID IBAR=180,JBAR=36,KBAR=30 / 150mmx150mmx150mm grid 
 
Computational domain for 1 car, MC car simulation 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&PDIM XBAR0=9.4,XBAR=36.,YBAR0=-3.1,YBAR=2.4,ZBAR0=0.,ZBAR=4.4 / Computational   
          Domain 
 
Stretching the grid (Select according to grid size) 
.............................................................................. 
Based on 300mm grid 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&TRNY CC=-2.275,PC=-1.55 / 3 cells at 517mmm 
&TRNY CC=-1.45,PC=-1.25 / 3 cells at 100mm  
&TRNY CC= 1.025,PC= 1.25 / 9 cells at 278mm 
&TRNY CC= 1.85,PC= 1.55 / 3 cells at 100mm  
&TRNY CC= 2.4,PC= 2.4 /2 cells at 425mm   
&TRNZ CC=0.4888,PC=1. / 2 cells at 500mm 
&TRNZ CC=0.7332,PC=1.1 / 1 cell at 100mm  
&TRNZ CC=1.222,PC=1.4 / 2 cells at 150mm  
&TRNZ CC=1.4664,PC=1.5 / 1 cell at 100mm  
&TRNZ CC=1.9552,PC=1.975 / 2 cells at 238mm  
&TRNZ CC=3.1772,PC=3.025 / 5 cells at 210mm  
&TRNZ CC=3.4216,PC=3.2 / 1 cell at 175mm  
&TRNZ CC=3.9104,PC=3.7 / 2 cells at 250mm  
&TRNZ CC=4.4,PC=4.4 / 2 cells at 350mm  
 
Based on 200mm grid 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
TRNY CC=-2.2852,PC=-1.55 / 4 cells at 387.5mmm 
TRNY CC=-1.4704,PC=-1.25 / 4 cells at 75mm  
TRNY CC= 0.974,PC= 1.25 / 12 cells at 208mm 
TRNY CC= 1.7888,PC= 1.55 / 4 cells at 75mm  
TRNY CC= 2.4,PC= 2.4 /3 cells at 283mm   
TRNZ CC=0.549,PC=1. / 3 cells at 333mm 
TRNZ CC=0.732,PC=1.1 / 1 cell at 100mm  
TRNZ CC=1.281,PC=1.4 / 3 cells at 100mm  
TRNZ CC=1.464,PC=1.5 / 1 cell at 100mm  
TRNZ CC=2.013,PC=1.975 / 3 cells at 158mm  
TRNZ CC=3.111,PC=3.025 / 6 cells at 175mm  
TRNZ CC=3.294,PC=3.2 / 1 cell at 175mm  
TRNZ CC=3.843,PC=3.7 / 3 cells at 167mm  







Based on 150mm grid 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
TRNY CC=-2.336,PC=-1.55 / 5 cells at 310mmm   
TRNY CC=-1.419,PC=-1.25 / 6 cells at 50mm   
TRNY CC= 1.025,PC= 1.25 / 16 cells at 156mm  
TRNY CC= 1.94167,PC= 1.55 / 6 cells at 50mm   
TRNY CC= 2.4,PC= 2.4 / 3 cells at 283mm   
TRNZ CC=0.5868,PC=1. / 4 cells at 250mm 
TRNZ CC=0.7335,PC=1.1 / 1 cell at 100mm  
TRNZ CC=1.3203,PC=1.4 / 4 cells at 75mm  
TRNZ CC=1.467,PC=1.5 / 1 cell at 100mm  
TRNZ CC=2.0538,PC=1.975 / 4 cells at 119mm  
TRNZ CC=3.0807,PC=3.025 / 7 cells at 150mm  
TRNZ CC=3.3741,PC=3.2 / 2 cells at 88mm  
TRNZ CC=3.9609,PC=3.7 / 4 cells at 125mm  
TRNZ CC=4.4,PC=4.4 / 3 cells at 233mm  
 




Miscellaneous input parameters 
......................................................... 
&MISC DTCORE=200., SURF_DEFAULT='CONCRETE', REACTION='FRPPOLYESTER', 
NFRAMES=1800, TMPA=32./  The SURF line corresponding to CONCRETE will be applied to all 
          obstructions, unless otherwise specified. NFRAMES specifies the default number of output 
          dumps per calculation. REACTION indicates that the combustion stoichiometry will be similar 
          to that of FRP Polyester. Ambient temp = 32 degree C 
 
Reaction parameters of FRP Polyester 
................................................................. 
&REAC ID         ='FRPPOLYESTER' 
      FYI        = 'C_5.77 H_6.25 O_1.63, SFPE Handbook' 
      EPUMO2     = 11900.    
      MW_FUEL    = 101.6 
      NU_CO2     = 5.77   
      NU_H2O     = 3.125 
      NU_O2      = 6.5175 
      SOOT_YIELD = 0.062   
      CO_YIELD  = 0.0705   






&SURF ID         = 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION' 
      FYI        = 'Aluminium-Glass wool-Aluminium'    
      C_P        = 0.68     
      DENSITY    = 119. 
      KS         = 0.038  
      DELTA      = 0.1  
      BACKING    = 'EXPOSED'/ 100mm wall 
 
&SURF ID         = 'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION' 
      FYI        = 'Aluminium-Glass wool-Aluminium'    
      C_P        = 0.68     





      KS         = 0.038  
      DELTA      = 0.06  
      BACKING    = 'EXPOSED'/ 60mm ceiling 
 
&SURF ID         = 'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' 
      FYI        = 'Aluminium-Glass wool-Aluminium'    
      C_P        = 0.68     
      DENSITY    = 276. 
      KS         = 0.038  
      DELTA      = 0.035 
      BACKING    = 'EXPOSED' / 35mm door 
 
&SURF ID         = 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' 
      RGB        = 1.0,1.0,0.75 
      KS         = 0.049 
      C_P        = 0.84 
      DENSITY    = 1380. 
      DELTA      = 0.023 
      BACKING    = 'EXPOSED' / 
 
&SURF ID         = 'CONCRETE' 
      FYI        = 'Quintiere, Fire Behavior' 
      RGB        = 0.66,0.66,0.66 
      C_P        = 0.88     
      DENSITY    = 2100. 
      KS         = 1.1   
      DELTA      = 0.7 / 
 
Flammability parameters (Choose either simulation based on heat of 
vaporisation or HRRPUA) 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
Simulation based on heat of vaporisation 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&SURF ID         = 'STYRENE_BUTADIENE' 
      KS         = 0.19 
      DENSITY    = 1478. 
      C_P  = 1.9875 
      DELTA      = 0.003 
      TMPIGN     = 360. 
      BACKING    = 'INSULATED' 
      BURNING_RATE_MAX     = 0.01 
      HEAT_OF_VAPORIZATION = 2700.  
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION   = 17950. / 
 
&SURF ID        = 'FRP_POLYESTER' 
      KS = 0.295 
      DENSITY   = 1795. 
      C_P = 1.6735 
      DELTA     = 0.004 
      TMPIGN    = 346. 
      BACKING   = 'INSULATED'  
      BURNING_RATE_MAX     = 0.021 
      HEAT_OF_VAPORIZATION = 1390.  
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION   = 12870. / 
 
Simulation based on HRRPUA 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
SURF ID         = 'STYRENE_BUTADIENE'    





      DENSITY   = 1478.    
      C_P = 1.9875  
      DELTA     = 0.003     
      TMPIGN    = 360.     
      BACKING   = 'INSULATED'    
      HRRPUA    = 281.    
      RAMP_Q    = 'SB' /     
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0.0 , F = 0.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  15.0 , F = 0.76 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  35.0 , F = 0.74 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  60.0 , F = 1.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  125.0 , F = 0.43 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  192.0 , F = 0.40 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  255.0 , F = 0.36 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  345.0 , F = 0.39 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  520.0 , F = 0.20 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  665.0 , F = 0.14 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  878.0 , F = 0.09 / 
RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  1212.0 , F = 0.06 / 
 
SURF ID         = 'FRP_POLYESTER'     
      KS = 0.295   
      DENSITY = 1795.    
      C_P = 1.6735  
      DELTA     = 0.004     
      TMPIGN    = 346.     
      BACKING = 'INSULATED'    
      HRRPUA  = 618.    
      RAMP_Q = 'PEST'/  
RAMP ID = 'PEST', T =  0.0 , F = 0.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST', T =  3.0 , F = 1.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST', T =  25.0 , F = 0.28 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST', T =  48.0 , F = 0.20 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST', T =  248.0 , F = 0.15 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST', T =  338.0 , F = 0.20 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST', T =  433.0 , F = 0.10 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST', T =  689.0 , F = 0.03 / 
 
Ignition Source 
…….....................       
 
Fire size (Choose only 1 fire size) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&SURF ID='FIRE',HRRPUA=5000., RGB=1.0,0.0,0.0 /  Ignition source 200kW  
SURF ID='FIRE',HRRPUA=257., RGB=1.0,0.0,0.0 /  Ignition source 1540kW  
 
Fire Location (Choose only 1 fire location) 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&VENT XB=22.7,22.9,1.075,1.275,1.5,1.5, SURF_ID='FIRE' / Fire on the seat 
VENT XB=34.05,34.25,1.25,1.45,1.1,1.1, SURF_ID='FIRE' / Fire in the corner 
VENT XB=18.55,21.625,-0.975,0.975,1.1,1.1, SURF_ID='FIRE' / Undercarriage fire 
 
Tunnel Ventilation  
...................,............ 
&SURF ID='tunnel-right', VOLUME_FLUX=-31.4 / Supply   
&VENT CB='XBAR0', SURF_ID='OPEN' / 













&OBST XB= 11.4,34.55,-1.3,1.3,-0.3,0.4 / Right MC car Undercarriage 
&OBST XB= 11.4,34.55,-1.55,1.55,0.4,1. / Right MC car Undercarriage 
 
Door position (For closed doors simulation, select all. For passenger doors 
opened simulation, select only OBST under 'Detrainment Doors'. For 
detrainment doors opened simulation, select all items under ' 1st and 4th 
passenger doors')  
................................................................................................................................................................. 
Detrainment Doors   
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&OBST XB= 11.4, 11.5,-0.7,0.7,1.2,3.025, RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0/  
         Detrainment Door Left (with 100mm leakage).  
&OBST XB= 34.45,34.55,-0.7,0.7,1.1,3.1, RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER'/  
         Detrainment Door Right 
 
1st and 4th Passenger Doors  
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
OBST XB=32.0375,32.1,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C1  
OBST XB=31.1625,31.5375,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C1 
OBST XB=30.6,30.6625,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C1 
OBST XB=30.6,32.1,-1.55,-1.515,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C1 
OBST XB=13.5,13.5625,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C4 
OBST XB=14.0625,14.4375,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C4 
OBST XB=14.9375,15.0,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C4 
OBST XB=13.5,15.0,-1.55,-1.515,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C4 
 
OBST XB=31.5375,32.0375,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det21a'/Passenger Door Window Front Left1a 
HEAT XYZ=31.7825,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det21a'/ 
OBST XB=31.5375,32.0375,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det21b'/Passenger Door Window Front Left1a 
HEAT XYZ=31.7825,-.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det21b'/ 
OBST XB=30.6675,31.1675,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det23a'/Passenger Door Window Front Left1b 
HEAT XYZ=30.9175,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det23a'/ 
OBST XB=30.6675,31.1675,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det23b'/Passenger Door Window Front Left1b 
HEAT XYZ=30.9175,-.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det23b'/ 
OBST XB=14.4375,14.9375,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det33a'/ Passenger Door Window Front Right 4a 
HEAT XYZ=14.6875,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det33a'/ 
OBST XB=14.4375,14.9375,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det33b'/ Passenger Door Window Front Right 4a 
HEAT XYZ=14.6875,-.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det33b'/ 





'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS',HEAT_REMOVE='det35a' / Passenger Door Window Front Right 4b 
HEAT XYZ=13.8125,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det35a'/ 
OBST XB=13.5625,14.0625,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS',HEAT_REMOVE='det35b' / Passenger Door Window Front Right 4b 
HEAT XYZ=13.8125,-.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det35b'/ 
 
MC-car Geometry (Right) 
............................................. 
&OBST XB=11.4,34.55,-1.55,1.55,1.0,1.1,RGB=0.5,0.5,0.5, SURF_ID = 'STYRENE_BUTADIENE' / 
          Floor Cover 
 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.55,-0.9,3.025,3.05,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.55,-0.9,3.05,3.1,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.5,-0.9,3.1,3.15,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.45,-0.9,3.15,3.2,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,0.9,1.55,3.025,3.05,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,0.9,1.55,3.05,3.1,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,0.9,1.5,3.1,3.15,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,0.9,1.45,3.15,3.2,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.4,1.4,3.2,3.25,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.31,1.31,3.25,3.3,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.27,1.27,3.3,3.35,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.2,1.2,3.35,3.4,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.15,1.15,3.4,3.45,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-1.075,1.075,3.45,3.5,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-0.925,0.925,3.5,3.55,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-0.825,0.825,3.55,3.6,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-0.7,0.6,3.6,3.65,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling 
&OBST XB=12.0,33.25,-0.375,0.375,3.65,3.7,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION', SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling  
 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.55,-0.9,3.025,3.05,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.55,-0.9,3.05,3.1,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.5,-0.9,3.1,3.15,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.45,-0.9,3.15,3.2,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,0.9,1.55,3.025,3.05,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 





SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,0.9,1.5,3.1,3.15,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,0.9,1.45,3.15,3.2,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.4,1.4,3.2,3.25,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.31,1.31,3.25,3.3,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.27,1.27,3.3,3.35,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.2,1.2,3.35,3.4,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.15,1.15,3.4,3.45,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.075,1.075,3.45,3.5,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-0.925,0.925,3.5,3.55,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-0.825,0.825,3.55,3.6,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-0.7,0.6,3.6,3.65,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-0.375,0.375,3.65,3.7,RGB= 0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 
'FRP_POLYESTER',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Ceiling at End Mask 
 
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.55,1.55,3.025,3.05,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling   
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.55,1.55,3.05,3.1,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling   
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.5,1.5,3.1,3.15,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling 
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.45,1.45,3.15,3.2,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.4,1.4,3.2,3.25,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.31,1.31,3.25,3.3,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.27,1.27,3.3,3.35,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.2,1.2,3.35,3.4,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.15,1.15,3.4,3.45,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.075,1.075,3.45,3.5,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE/ Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-0.925,0.925,3.5,3.55,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-0.825,0.825,3.55,3.6,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-0.7,0.6,3.6,3.65,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling  
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-0.375,0.375,3.65,3.7,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID= 
'CEILING_CONSTRUCTION',SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Gangway Ceiling   
 
&OBST XB=21.1,24.5,-1.275,-0.825,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Front Centre 
&OBST XB=21.1,24.5,-1.45,-1.275,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  





&OBST XB=21.1,24.5,0.825,1.275,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Centre 
&OBST XB=21.1,24.5,1.275,1.45,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Centre 
 
&OBST XB=26.8,30.2,-1.275,-0.825,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Front Right1 
&OBST XB=26.8,30.2,-1.45,-1.275,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /     
          Seat Front Right1 
&OBST XB=26.8,30.2,0.825,1.275,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Right1 
&OBST XB=26.8,30.2,1.275,1.45,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Right1 
&OBST XB=32.25,33.25,-1.275,-0.825,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /   
          Seat Front Right2  
&OBST XB=32.25,33.25,-1.45,-1.275,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Seat Front Right2 
&OBST XB=32.25,33.25,0.825,1.275,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Right2 
&OBST XB=32.25,33.25,1.275,1.45,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /   
          Seat Back Right2 
 
&OBST XB=15.4,18.8,-1.275,-0.825,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Front Left1 
&OBST XB=15.4,18.8,-1.45,-1.275,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Seat Front Left1 
&OBST XB=15.4,18.8,0.825,1.275,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Left1 
&OBST XB=15.4,18.8,1.275,1.45,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Left1 
&OBST XB=12.35,13.35,-1.275,-0.825,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Front Left2 
&OBST XB=12.35,13.35,-1.45,-1.275,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Seat Front Left2 
&OBST XB=12.35,13.35,0.825,1.275,1.4,1.5,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Left2 
&OBST XB=12.35,13.35,1.275,1.45,1.4,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.0,1.0, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Seat Back Left2 
 
&OBST XB=28.65,30.2,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det2a' / Window Back Right 1 
&HEAT XYZ=29.425,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det2a'/ 
&OBST XB=28.65,30.2,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det2b' / Window Back Right 1 
&HEAT XYZ=29.425,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det2b'/ 
&OBST XB=26.8,28.35,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det3a'/ Window Front Right 2 
&HEAT XYZ=27.575,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det3a'/ 
&OBST XB=26.8,28.35,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det3b'/ Window Front Right 2 
&HEAT XYZ=27.575,-.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det3b'/ 
&OBST XB=26.8,28.35,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det4a'/ Window Back Right 2 
&HEAT XYZ=27.575,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det4a'/ 
&OBST XB=26.8,28.35,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det4b'/ Window Back Right 2 
&HEAT XYZ=27.575,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det4b'/ 
&OBST XB=22.95,24.5,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 






&OBST XB=22.95,24.5,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det5b'/ Window Front 3*Centre 
&HEAT XYZ=23.725,-.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det5b'/ 
&OBST XB=22.95,24.5,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det6a'/ Window Back 3**Centre 
&HEAT XYZ=23.725,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det6a'/ 
&OBST XB=22.95,24.5,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det6b'/ Window Back 3**Centre 
&HEAT XYZ=23.725,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det6b'/ 
&OBST XB=21.1,22.65,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det7a'/ Window Front 4**Centre 
&HEAT XYZ=21.875,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det7a'/ 
&OBST XB=21.1,22.65,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det7b'/ Window Front 4**Centre 
&HEAT XYZ=21.875,-.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det7b'/ 
&OBST XB=21.1,22.65,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det8a' / Window Back 4**Centre 
&HEAT XYZ=21.875,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det8a'/ 
&OBST XB=21.1,22.65,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det8b' / Window Back 4**Centre 
&HEAT XYZ=21.875,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det8b'/ 
&OBST XB=17.25,18.8,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det9a'/ Window Front Left 5 
&HEAT XYZ=18.025,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det9a'/ 
&OBST XB=17.25,18.8,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det9b'/ Window Front Left 5 
&HEAT XYZ=18.025,-.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det9b'/ 
&OBST XB=17.25,18.8,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det10a'/ Window Back Left 5 
&HEAT XYZ=18.025,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det10a'/ 
&OBST XB=17.25,18.8,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det10b'/ Window Back Left 5 
&HEAT XYZ=18.025,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det10b'/ 
&OBST XB=15.4,16.95,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det11a'/ Window Front Left 6 
&HEAT XYZ=16.175,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det11a'/ 
&OBST XB=15.4,16.95,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det11b'/ Window Front Left 6 
&HEAT XYZ=16.175,-1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det11b'/ 
&OBST XB=15.4,16.95,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det12a'/ Window Back Left 6 
&HEAT XYZ=16.175,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det12a'/ 
&OBST XB=15.4,16.95,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det12b'/ Window Back Left 6 
&HEAT XYZ=16.175,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det12b'/  
 
&OBST XB=21.1,24.5,-1.45,-0.975,1.1,1.4,RGB=0.8,1,0.8, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Underseat Boxes Front Centre 
&OBST XB=21.1,24.5,0.975,1.45,1.1,1.4,RGB=0.8,1,0.8, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
           Underseat Boxes Back Centre 
&OBST XB=26.8,30.2,-1.45,-0.975,1.1,1.4,RGB=0.8,1,0.8, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
           Underseat Boxes Front Centre1 
&OBST XB=32.25,33.25,-1.45,-0.975,1.1,1.4,RGB=0.8,1,0.8, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
           Underseat Boxes Front Left 
&OBST XB=32.25,33.25,0.975,1.45,1.1,1.4,RGB=0.8,1,0.8, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
           Underseat Boxes Back Left 
&OBST XB=12.35,13.35,-1.45,-0.975,1.1,1.4,RGB=0.8,1,0.8, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
           Underseat Boxes Front Right 
&OBST XB=12.35,13.35,0.975,1.45,1.1,1.4,RGB=0.8,1,0.8, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 






&OBST XB=22.65,22.95,-1.55,-1.45,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION'/  
          Wall Front Centre 
&OBST XB=21.1,24.5,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Wall Front Centre 
&OBST XB=24.5,24.9,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Wall Front Centre 
&OBST XB=20.7,21.1,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Wall Front Centre 
&OBST XB=22.65,22.95,1.45,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION' /   
          Wall Back Centre 
&OBST XB=21.1,24.5,1.45,1.55,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Centre 
&OBST XB=24.5,24.9,1.5,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back centre 
&OBST XB=20.7,21.1,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' /  
           Wall Back Centre 
 
&OBST XB=24.5,24.9,1.45,1.5,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / PEC 
 
&OBST XB=28.35,28.65,-1.55,-1.45,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION'/   
           Wall Front Right1 
&OBST XB=26.8,30.2,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Front Right1 
&OBST XB=30.2,30.6,-1.55,-1.5,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Front Right1 
&OBST XB=26.4,26.8,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Front Right1 
&OBST XB=28.35,28.65,1.45,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Right1 
&OBST XB=26.8,30.2,1.45,1.55,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Right1 
&OBST XB=30.2,30.6,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Right1 
&OBST XB=26.4,26.8,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Right1 
 
&OBST XB=30.2,30.6,-1.5,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / PEC 
 
&OBST XB=16.95,17.25,-1.55,-1.45,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION'/  
            Wall Front Left1 
&OBST XB=15.4,18.8,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
            Wall Front Left1 
&OBST XB=15.0,15.4,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
            Wall Front Left1 
&OBST XB=18.8,19.2,-1.55,-1.5,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
            Wall Back Left1 
&OBST XB=16.95,17.25,1.45,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Left1 
&OBST XB=15.4,18.8,1.45,1.55,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Left1 
&OBST XB=15.0,15.4,1.5,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Left1 
&OBST XB=18.8,19.2,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Left1 
 
&OBST XB=18.8,19.2,-1.5,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / PEC 
&OBST XB=15.0,15.4,1.45,1.5,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / PEC 
 
&OBST XB=32.25,33.25,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 





&OBST XB=32.25,33.25,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
           Wall Back Left2   
&OBST XB=32.1,32.25,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' /         
          Wall Front Left2   
&OBST XB=32.1,32.25,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Wall Back Left2  
&OBST XB=12.0,12.15,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Wall Front Left2 
&OBST XB=12.15,12.25,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Wall Front Left2 
&OBST XB=12.25,12.35,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,.7, SURF_ID= ‘WALL_CONSTRUCTION', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Wall Front Left2 
&OBST XB=12.0,12.15,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Wall Back Left2 
&OBST XB=12.15,12.25,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Wall Back Left2 
&OBST XB=12.25,12.35,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Wall Back Left2 
&OBST XB=12.35,13.35,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID= 'WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
         Wall Front Left2  
&OBST XB=12.35,13.35,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Wall Back Left2   
&OBST XB=13.35,13.5,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Wall Front Left2   
&OBST XB=13.35,13.5,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,1,0.7, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' /  
          Wall Back Left2   
 
&OBST XB=12.0,12.15,-1.45,-0.7,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
           Equipped Cubicle Front Left 
&OBST XB=12.15,12.25,-1.45,-0.75,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE /  Equipped Cubicle Front Left 
&OBST XB=12.25,12.35,-1.45,-0.9,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE /  Equipped Cubicle Front Left 
&OBST XB=12.0,12.15,0.7,1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Equipped Cubicle Back Left 
&OBST XB=12.15,12.25,0.75,1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE / Equipped Cubicle Back Left 
&OBST XB=12.25,12.35,0.9,1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID= 'FRP_POLYESTER', 
SAWTOOTH=.FALSE /  Equipped Cubicle Back Left 
 
&OBST XB=32.0375,32.1,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C1 
&OBST XB=31.1625,31.5375,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C1 
&OBST XB=30.6,30.6625,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C1 
&OBST XB=30.6,32.1,1.515,1.55,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C1 
 
&OBST XB=26.3375,26.4,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C2 
&OBST XB=25.4625,25.8375,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C2 
&OBST XB=24.9,24.9625,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C2 
&OBST XB=24.9,26.4,-1.55,-1.515,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C2 
&OBST XB=26.3375,26.4,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C2 
&OBST XB=25.4625,25.8375,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 





&OBST XB=24.9,24.9625,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C2 
&OBST XB=24.9,26.4,1.515,1.55,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C2 
 
&OBST XB=19.2,19.2625,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C3   
&OBST XB=19.7625,20.1375,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C3 
&OBST XB=20.6375,20.7,-1.55,-1.515,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C3 
&OBST XB=19.2,20.7,-1.55,-1.515,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Front C3 
&OBST XB=19.2,19.2625,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C3 
&OBST XB=19.7625,20.1375,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C3 
&OBST XB=20.6375,20.7,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C3 
&OBST XB=19.2,20.7,1.515,1.55,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C3 
 
&OBST XB=13.5,13.5625,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C4 
&OBST XB=14.0625,14.4375,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C4 
&OBST XB=14.9375,15.0,1.515,1.55,1.975,3.025,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C4 
&OBST XB=13.5,15.0,1.515,1.55,1.1,1.975,RGB=0.0,0.8,0.0, SURF_ID= 
'SIDEDOOR_CONSTRUCTION' / Passenger Door Back C4 
 
&OBST XB=31.5375,32.0375,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det22a'/ Passenger Door Window Back Left 1a 
&HEAT XYZ=31.7825,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det22a'/ 
&OBST XB=31.5375,32.0375,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det22b'/ Passenger Door Window Back Left 1a 
&HEAT XYZ=31.7825,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det22b'/ 
&OBST XB=30.6675,31.1675,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det24a'/ Passenger Door Window Back Left 1b 
&HEAT XYZ=30.9175,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det24a'/ 
&OBST XB=30.6675,31.1675,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det24b'/ Passenger Door Window Back Left 1b 
&HEAT XYZ=30.9175,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det24b'/ 
&OBST XB=25.8375,26.3375,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS',HEAT_REMOVE='det25a' / Passenger Door Window Front Left 2a 
&HEAT XYZ=26.0875,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det25a'/ 
&OBST XB=25.8375,26.3375,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS',HEAT_REMOVE='det25b' / Passenger Door Window Front Left 2a 
&HEAT XYZ=26.0875,-1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det25b'/ 
&OBST XB=25.8375,26.3375,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det26a' / Passenger Door Window Back Left 2a 
&HEAT XYZ=26.0875,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det26a'/ 
&OBST XB=25.8375,26.3375,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det26b' / Passenger Door Window Back Left 2a 
&HEAT XYZ=26.0875,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det26b'/ 
&OBST XB=24.9625,25.4625,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det27a'/ Passenger Door Window Front Left 2b  
&HEAT XYZ=25.2125,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det27a'/ 
&OBST XB=24.9625,25.4625,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det27b'/ Passenger Door Window Front Left 2b  
&HEAT XYZ=25.2125,-1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det27b'/ 





 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det28a'/ Passenger Door Window Back Left 2b 
&HEAT XYZ=25.2125,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det28a'/ 
&OBST XB=24.9625,25.4625,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det28b'/ Passenger Door Window Back Left 2b 
&HEAT XYZ=25.2125,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det28b'/ 
&OBST XB=20.1375,20.6375,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det29a'/ Passenger Door Window Front Right 3a 
&HEAT XYZ=20.3875,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det29a'/ 
&OBST XB=20.1375,20.6375,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det29b'/ Passenger Door Window Front Right 3a 
&HEAT XYZ=20.3875,-1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det29b'/ 
&OBST XB=20.1375,20.6375,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det30a'/ Passenger Door Window Back Right 3a 
&HEAT XYZ=20.3875,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det30a'/ 
&OBST XB=20.1375,20.6375,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det30b'/ Passenger Door Window Back Right 3a 
&HEAT XYZ=20.3875,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det30b'/ 
&OBST XB=19.2625,19.7625,-1.55,-1.527,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det31a'/ Passenger Door Window Front Right 3b 
&HEAT XYZ=19.5125,-1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det31a'/ 
&OBST XB=19.2625,19.7625,-1.55,-1.527,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS' ,HEAT_REMOVE='det31b'/ Passenger Door Window Front Right 3b 
&HEAT XYZ=19.5125,-1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det31b'/ 
&OBST XB=19.2625,19.7625,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det32a'/ Passenger Door Window Back Right 3b 
&HEAT XYZ=19.5125,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det32a'/ 
&OBST XB=19.2625,19.7625,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det32b'/ Passenger Door Window Back Right 3b 
&HEAT XYZ=19.5125,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det32b'/ 
&OBST XB=14.4375,14.9375,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det34a'/ Passenger Door Window Back Right 4a 
&HEAT XYZ=14.6875,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det34a'/ 
&OBST XB=14.4375,14.9375,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det34b'/ Passenger Door Window Back Right 4a 
&HEAT XYZ=14.6875,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det34b'/ 
&OBST XB=13.5625,14.0625,1.527,1.55,2.5,3.025,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det36a'/ Passenger Door Window Back Right 4b 
&HEAT XYZ=13.8125,1.477,2.5,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det36a'/ 
&OBST XB=13.5625,14.0625,1.527,1.55,1.975,2.5,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det36b'/ Passenger Door Window Back Right 4b 
&HEAT XYZ=13.8125,1.477,2.025,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det36b'/ 
 
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,-1.55,-0.7,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Gangway Wall Front Left 
&OBST XB=11.4,12.0,0.7,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.8,0.6,0.4, SURF_ID='WALL_CONSTRUCTION' / 
          Gangway Wall Back Left 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,-1.55,-1.45,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=33.25,34.55,1.45,1.55,1.1,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Face Panel at End Mask  
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,-1.55,-0.7,1.1,2.0,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,0.7,1.55,1.1,2.0,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,-1.45,-1.25,2.,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,1.25,1.45,2.,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,-1.45,-0.8,2.95,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,0.8,1.45,2.95,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /      





&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,-0.8,-0.7,1.7,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,0.7,0.8,1.7,3.025,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,-0.9,-0.7,3.025,3.2,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,0.7,0.9,3.025,3.2,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Face Panel at End Mask 
&OBST XB=34.45,34.55,-0.7,0.7,3.1,3.2,RGB=0.3,0.7,0.7, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Face Panel at End Mask 
 
&OBST XB=34.527,34.55,-1.25,-0.8,2.475,2.95,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS',HEAT_REMOVE='det51a' / Window at End Mask 
&HEAT XYZ=34.477,-1.025,2.475,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det51a'/ 
&OBST XB=34.527,34.55,-1.25,-0.8,2.,2.475,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS',HEAT_REMOVE='det51b' / Window at End Mask 
&HEAT XYZ=34.477,-1.025,2.05,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det51b'/ 
&OBST XB=34.527,34.55,0.8,1.25,2.475,2.95,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
 'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS', HEAT_REMOVE='det52a' / Window at End Mask 
&HEAT XYZ=34.477,1.025,2.475,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det52a'/ 
&OBST XB=34.527,34.55,0.8,1.25,2.,2.475,RGB=1.0,1.0,1.0, SURF_ID= 
'LAMINATED_SAFETY_GLASS',HEAT_REMOVE='det52b' / Window at End Mask 
&HEAT XYZ=34.477,1.025,2.05,RTI=100,ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=675.,LABEL='det52b'/ 
 
&OBST XB=33.65,34.45,-1.45,-0.75,1.1,2.2,RGB=0.8,0.4,0.4, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' / 
          Driver Console Assembly 
&OBST XB=34.25,34.45,0.75,1.45,1.1,2.2,RGB=0.8,0.4,0.4, SURF_ID='FRP_POLYESTER' /  
          Driver Console Assembly 
 
Output from FDS 
.............................. 
&BNDF QUANTITY='GAUGE_HEAT_FLUX', DTSAM=1. / Data written to file every 1 s  
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL_TEMPERATURE', DTSAM=1./ Data written to file every 1 s  
&BNDF QUANTITY='BURNING_RATE', DTSAM=1. / Data written to file every 1 s  
&ISOF QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION', VALUE(1)=0.114,VALUE(2)=0.001, DTSAM=2./  
          Data written to file every 2 s 
&SLCF PBX=22.8, QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', DTSAM=2./ Data written to file every 2 s 
&SLCF PBY=0., QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', DTSAM=2./ Data written to file every 2 s  
&SLCF PBZ=2.6, QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', DTSAM=2. / Data written to file every 2 s 
 
&THCP XYZ=17.1,0.,2.1,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempL1' / 
&THCP XYZ=17.1,0.,2.4,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempL2' / 
&THCP XYZ=17.1,0.,2.7,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempL3' / 
&THCP XYZ=17.1,0.,3.0,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempL4' / 
 
&THCP XYZ=22.8,0.,2.1,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempC1' / 
&THCP XYZ=22.8,0.,2.4,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempC2' / 
&THCP XYZ=22.8,0.,2.7,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempC3' / 
&THCP XYZ=22.8,0.,3.0,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempC4' / 
 
&THCP XYZ=28.5,0.,2.1,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempR1' / 
&THCP XYZ=28.5,0.,2.4,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempR2' / 
&THCP XYZ=28.5,0.,2.7,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',LABEL='MC_car_FO_TempR3' / 













&THCP XB=9.4,9.4,-3.1,2.4,0.0,4.4,QUANTITY='VOLUME FLOW',LABEL='Left_VOLUME' / 
&THCP XB=36.0,36.0,-3.1,2.4,0.0,4.4,QUANTITY='VOLUME FLOW',LABEL='Right_VOLUME' / 
&THCP XB=9.4,9.4,-3.1,2.4,0.0,4.4,QUANTITY='HRR',LABEL='Left_HRR' / 






&THCP XB=11.4,11.4,-0.7,0.7,1.1,3.1,QUANTITY='HRR',LABEL='DD_Left_HRR' / 






&THCP XB=30.6,32.1,-1.55,-1.55,1.1,3.025,QUANTITY='HRR',LABEL='1stSide_door_HRR' / 



















Appendix G: Cone Calorimeter test data 
 
This Appendix contains data sheets; and HRRPUA and mass loss rate curves for the 
specimens tested in the Cone Calorimeter for this study.  However, note that for tests 
















































Component: Train car seat Test orientation: Horizontal 
Material: FRP polyester 
 
Mounting: Specimen holder with retainer frame 
Specimen wrapped with aluminium foil 
Specimen 
size: 
0.1 m x 0.05 m x 0.004 m thick Data recording interval: 1 s 



































































kW/m2  g g s s kW/m2 s kW/m2 s kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 MJ/m2 MJ/kg kg/sm2 kg/sm2 
1 36.5 17.9 500 1139 143 505 109 720 116 105 103 51.1 13.8 .0045 n/r 
2 33.5 17.7 492 1010 121 498 126 731 98 93 95 40.1 12.7 .0043 n/r 
25 
3 35.9 18.1 513 1153 120 519 114 764 103 93 93 44.7 12.6 .0044 n/r 
1 37.0 16.1 100 800 150 126 110 380 123 112 106 58.5 14.0 n/r n/r 
2 36.5 17.2 110 797 137 143 104 450 119 105 99 53.4 13.9 n/r n/r 
35 
3 33.6 16.7 108 804 162 126 107 352 124 109 103 49.0 14.5 n/r n/r 
1 36.5 16.5 50 676 156 77 132 364 136 126 122 55.6 13.9 n/r n/r 
2 33.4 12.5 51 666 189 61 131 287 150 130 122 52.9 12.7 n/r n/r 
50 
3 33.5 16.5 50 558 164 68 132 253 135 122 119 45.5 13.4 n/r n/r 
1 33.6 12.0 33 565 173 42 149 231 148 140 137 58.4 13.5 n/r .0161 
2 36.7 16.4 34 530 192 60 159 303 153 147 144 60.3 14.9 n/r .0169 
65 
3 35.4 15.4 34 510 170 54 186 294 147 144 141 58.1 14.5 n/r .0152 
n/r = The mass loss rate at igt and max mass loss rate at other heat fluxes are not reported since the information is not required for the simulation. 
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Figure G1: Seat sample HRRPUA at 25 kW/m2 Figure G2: Seat sample HRRPUA at 35 kW/m2 
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Figure G5: Seat sample mass loss rate at 25 kW/m2 Figure G6: Seat sample mass loss rate at 35 kW/m2 
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Component: Train car floor covering Test orientation: Horizontal 
Material: Styrene butadiene 
 
Mounting: Specimen holder with retainer frame and wire grid 
Specimen wrapped with aluminium foil 
Specimen size: 0.1 m x 0.1 m x 0.003 m thick Data recording interval: 1 s 



































































kW/m2  g g s s kW/m2 s kW/m2 s kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 MJ/m2 MJ/kg kg/sm2 kg/sm2 
1 51.2 28.8 650 1436 44 821 Nila Nila 26 30 33 29.2 13.0 .0025 n/r 
2 50.5 28.3 570 1383 49 919 Nila Nila 24 28 31 29.2 13.2 .0024 n/r 
25 
3 52.5 32.4 590 1159 41 837 Nila Nila 23 26 29 19.0 9.5 .0023 n/r 
1 50.3 24.4 224 1038 54 334 79 801 36 43 44 41.8 16.2 n/r n/r 
2 51.2 26.5 233 1165 54 338 74 776 33 41 43 41.6 16.8 n/r n/r 
35 
3 50.5 24.6 240 1032 55 296 91 790 42 46 46 42.5 16.4 n/r n/r 
1 51.1 19.8 120 985 70 169 64 514 55 59 58 40.6 12.3 n/r n/r 
2 52.7 22.3 118 893 74 185 88 639 57 62 61 44.2 14.5 n/r n/r 
50 
3 51.5 24.3 115 900 79 178 82 552 59 66 65 43.8 16.1 n/r n/r 
1 52.0 21.2 78 749 96 120 97 468 83 81 77 43.8 14.2 n/r .0078 
2 50.3 21.9 75 710 100 124 102 453 77 81 79 44.3 15.6 n/r .0079 
65 
3 51.5 25.6 76 650 93 114 102 436 76 78 75 42.5 16.4 n/r .0078 
a  Nil because there is no 2nd peak HRR. 
n/r = The mass loss rate at igt and max mass loss rate at other heat fluxes are not reported since the information is not required for the simulation. 
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Figure G9: Floor covering sample HRRPUA at 25 kW/m2 Figure G10: Floor covering sample HRRPUA at 35 kW/m2 
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Figure G13: Floor covering sample mass loss rate at 25 kW/m2 Figure G14: Floor covering sample mass loss rate at 35 kW/m2 
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Figure G15: Floor covering sample mass loss rate at 50 kW/m2 Figure G16: Floor covering sample mass loss rate at 65 kW/m2 

























Component: Train car wall panel Test orientation: Horizontal 
Material: Aluminium panel with exposed surface 
painted with powder paint 
Mounting: Specimen holder with retainer frame  
Specimen wrapped with aluminium foil 
Specimen size: 0.1 m x 0.1 m x 0.0014 m thick Data recording interval: 1 s 
  Problem: No data was collected for the two tests at 35 kW/m2 








































































Data not collected/  
NI 
50 
2 42.5 40.5 NI NI 8 332 NI NI 2 2 2 NI NI n/r n/r 
1 42.5 40.5 55 92 88 63 67 78 32 26 26 2.0 10.4 n/r .0035 65 
2 42.7 41.9 53 66 83 58 Nila Nila 16 13 13 1.1 12.9 n/r .0028 
a  Nil because there is no 2nd peak HRR 
NI = No ignition. 
n/r = Not reported because not required for the simulation 
Note: For a specimen that did not show sustained flaming, the peak heat release rate peakq"& , and the average "q&  values for the first 60, 120 and 180 
s were tabulated for periods beginning with the first reading after the last negative rate of heat release reading that occurs at the beginning of the 
test. 
 








Figure G17: Wall panel sample HRRPUA at 65 kW/m2  
 
 
Figure G18: Wall panel sample mass loss rate at 65 kW/m2  
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Component: Train car bellows (Inner) Test orientation: Horizontal 
Material: WPE Vamac compound ref 22-003, grey Mounting: Specimen holder with retainer frame and wire grid 
Specimen wrapped with aluminium foil 
Specimen size: 0.1 m x 0.1 m x 0.003 m thick Data recording interval: 1 s 
  Problem: No data was collected for one of the tests at 35 kW/m2 
exposure heat flux level. For the other test at 


































































kW/m2  g g s s kW/m2 s kW/m2 s kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 MJ/m2 MJ/kg kg/sm2 kg/sm2 
1 Data not collected 35 
2 35.8 Nila 179 900 111 242 Nila Nila 91 92 82 Nila Nila n/r n/r 
1 38.0 14.5 84 844 147 151 89 423 116 118 105 50.9 14.7 n/r n/r 50 
2 35.8 15.0 78 684 148 136 107 426 108 115 102 47.3 15.5 n/r n/r 
1 36.2 10.8 64 720 165 97 78 370 136 121 106 46.3 12.4 n/r n/r 65 
2 37.6 12.8 51 717 176 109 100 457 140 130 113 50.6 13.9 n/r n/r 
a Nil because data acquisition stopped mid-way through the test. 
n/r = Not reported because not required for the simulation 
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Figure G19: Bellows (Inner) sample HRRPUA at 35 kW/m2 Figure G20: Bellows (Inner) sample HRRPUA at 50 kW/m2 
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Figure G21: Bellows (Inner) sample HRRPUA at 65 kW/m2  
Data acquisition stopped 
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Figure G22: Bellows (Inner) sample mass loss rate at 35 kW/m2 Figure G23: Bellows (Inner) sample mass loss rate at 50 kW/m2 
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Figure G24: Bellows (Inner) sample mass loss rate at 65 kW/m2  
Data acquisition stopped 







Component: Train car bellows (Outer) Test orientation: Horizontal 
Material: WPE Vamac compound ref 22-004, black Mounting: Specimen holder with retainer frame and wire grid 
Specimen wrapped with aluminium foil 
Specimen size: 0.1 m x 0.1 m x 0.003 m thick Data recording interval: 1 s 
  Problem: The retainer frame popped up and hit the ignitor during 
the tests for specimen 1 at 35 and 50 kW/m2 and 
specimen 2 at 65 kW/m2 exposure heat flux levels. 
For all the tests, the wire grid bent into parabolic shape 

































































kW/m2  g g s s kW/m2 s kW/m2 s kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 MJ/m2 MJ/kg kg/sm2 kg/sm2 
1 52.2 Nila 115 1090 104 209 53 611 48 67 63 41.6 Nila n/r n/r 35 
2 53.2 28.3 120 1077 84 201 39 573 45 61 60 31.7 12.8 n/r n/r 
1 53.0 Nila 78 812 134 140 87 482 82 92 83 47.5 Nila n/r n/r 50 
2 52.3 15.9 74 1226 116 142 48 566 81 89 77 50.5 13.8 n/r n/r 
1 53.4 20.8 45 995 194 89 76 337 128 127 114 53.7 16.5 n/r n/r 65 
2 53.1 Nila 48 525 369 86 102 274 220 190 160 54.9 Nila n/r n/r 
a Nil because there was error in the mass loss data 
n/r = Not reported because not required for the simulation 
 























Specimen 1 Specimen 2 Average 
 

















Specimen 1 Specimen 2 Average
 
Figure G25: Bellows (Outer) sample HRRPUA at 35 kW/m2 Figure G26: Bellows (Outer) sample HRRPUA at 50 kW/m2 
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Figure G28: Bellows (Outer) sample mass loss rate at 35 kW/m2 Figure G29: Bellows (Outer) sample mass loss rate at 50 kW/m2 






















Figure G30: Bellows (Outer) sample mass loss rate at 65 kW/m2  
 






Component: Train car air-con duct  Test orientation: Horizontal 
Material: Glass wool with the outer surface covered 
with a layer aluminium paper sheet 
Mounting: Specimen holder with retainer frame  
Specimen wrapped with aluminium foil 
Specimen size: 0.1 m x 0.1 m x 0.025 m thick Data recording interval: 1 s 

































































kW/m2  g g s s kW/m2 s kW/m2 s kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 MJ/m2 MJ/kg kg/sm2 kg/sm2 
1 35 
2 
Test not conducted 
1 20.7 19.0 NI NI 12 463 NI NI 2 2 2 NI NI n/r n/r 50 
2 21.2 18.5 NI NI 8 316 NI NI 3 3 3 NI NI n/r n/r 
1 20.6 16.7 NI NI 10 405 NI NI 2 2 2 NI NI n/r n/r 65 
2 21.4 15.9 NI NI 12 547 NI NI 2 2 2 NI NI n/r n/r 
NI = No ignition  
n/r = Not reported because not required for the simulation 
Note: The peak heat release rate peakq"& , and the average "q&  values for the first 60, 120 and 180 s were tabulated for periods beginning with the 
first reading after the last negative rate of heat release reading that occurs at the beginning of the test. 
 









Appendix H: Sample FDS data file for Cone Calorimeter 
model 
 
Define name for output files  
......................………………. 
&HEAD CHID='ConeSimulation1', TITLE='CONE CALORIMETER' / 
 All output files will have names beginning with "ConeSimulation1" 
 




&GRID IBAR=25,JBAR=35,KBAR=32 / 
 
Computational domain  
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&PDIM XBAR0 = -0.1, XBAR = 0.1, 
      YBAR0 = -0.1, YBAR = 0.1, 
      ZBAR0 = -0.05, ZBAR = 0.20 / 
 
Stretching the grid in z-direction 
............................………………..... 
&TRNZ IDERIV=0,CC=0.04,PC=0.01/ 
&TRNZ IDERIV=1,CC=0.04,PC=0.6 / 
 
Simulation time (in s) 
.......................………... 
&TIME TWFIN=1200. / 
 
Miscellaneous input parameters 
........................………………........ 
&MISC AUTOMATIC_Z = .FALSE., NFRAMES=1200 / 
 
Material properties of calcium silicate block 
.............................................…………………… 
&SURF ID    = 'Block' 
      RGB   = 0.66,0.66,0.66 
      C_P   = 1.25     
      DENSITY=720. 
      KS    = 0.12   
      DELTA = 0.02 / 
 
Flammability parameters (choose either simulation based on heat of vaporisation 
or HRRPUA. Note only one material can be selected) 
.........................................................................................………………………………. 
Simulation based on heat of vaporisation  
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&SURF ID        = 'FRP_POLYESTER' 
      RGB       = 0.0,0.0,1.0 
      C_DELTA_RHO= 3.341    
      TMPIGN     = 448. 
      BACKING    = 'INSULATED' 
      MASS_FLUX_CRITICAL   = 0.0044   
      BURNING_RATE_MAX     = 0.0161 





      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION   = 13670. /  
 
SURF ID         = 'STYRENE_BUTADIENE' 
      RGB       = 0.5,0.5,0.5 
      C_DELTA_RHO= 8.363    
      TMPIGN     = 419. 
      BACKING    = 'INSULATED' 
      MASS_FLUX_CRITICAL   = 0.0024   
      BURNING_RATE_MAX     = 0.0079 
      HEAT_OF_VAPORIZATION = 12320.  
      HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION   = 14570. / 
 
Simulation based on HRRPUA  
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
FRP polyester (Choose only one depending on tested exposure heat flux simulated) 
============================================================= 
 
HRRPUA curve for test at 25 kw/m2 exposure heat flux 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SURF ID        = '25FRP_POLYESTER'     
      RGB       = 0.0,0.0,1.0     
      C_DELTA_RHO = 3.341       
      TMPIGN      = 448.     
      BACKING     = 'INSULATED'     
      HRRPUA      = 115.     
      RAMP_Q      = 'PEST1'/     
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.26 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  8 , F = 0.72 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  13 , F = 0.78 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  25 , F = 1.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  35 , F = 0.92 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  102 , F = 0.75 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  130 , F = 0.76 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  185 , F = 0.88 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  227 , F = 0.95 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  248 , F = 0.94 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  296 , F = 0.86 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  499 , F = 0.22 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  552 , F = 0.18 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  590 , F = 0.17 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  590 , F = 0.00 / 
 
HRRPUA curve for test at 35 kw/m2 exposure heat flux 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SURF ID        = '35FRP_POLYESTER'     
      RGB       = 0.0,0.0,1.0     
      C_DELTA_RHO = 3.341       
      TMPIGN      = 448.        
      BACKING     = 'INSULATED'     
      HRRPUA      = 147.     
      RAMP_Q      = 'PEST1'/     
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.20 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  2 , F = 0.26 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  15 , F = 0.93 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  22 , F = 1.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  36 , F = 0.88 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  67 , F = 0.70 / 





RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  251 , F = 0.68 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  351 , F = 0.69 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  384 , F = 0.64 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  498 , F = 0.37 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  613 , F = 0.17 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  656 , F = 0.14 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  697 , F = 0.09 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  720 , F = 0.09 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  761 , F = 0.09 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  761 , F = 0.00 / 
 
HRRPUA curve for test at 50 kw/m2 exposure heat flux 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SURF ID        = '50FRP_POLYESTER'     
      RGB       = 0.0,0.0,1.0     
      C_DELTA_RHO = 3.341       
      TMPIGN      = 448.         
      BACKING     = 'INSULATED'     
      HRRPUA      = 164.     
      RAMP_Q      = 'PEST1'/     
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.18 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.28 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  12 , F = 0.96 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  18 , F = 1.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  29 , F = 0.98 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  41 , F = 0.88 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  71 , F = 0.69 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  107 , F = 0.66 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  149 , F = 0.67 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  222 , F = 0.74 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  248 , F = 0.74 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  314 , F = 0.65 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  409 , F = 0.39 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  503 , F = 0.15 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  544 , F = 0.09 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  585 , F = 0.09 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  585 , F = 0.00 / 
 
HRRPUA curve for test at 65 kw/m2 exposure heat flux 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SURF ID        = '65FRP_POLYESTER'     
      RGB       = 0.0,0.0,1.0     
      C_DELTA_RHO = 3.341       
      TMPIGN      = 448.       
      BACKING     = 'INSULATED'     
      HRRPUA      = 172.     
      RAMP_Q      = 'PEST1'/     
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.17 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  0 , F = 0.26 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  13 , F = 0.91 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  27 , F = 1.00 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  58 , F = 0.83 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  114 , F = 0.79 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  179 , F = 0.78 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  243 , F = 0.90 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  268 , F = 0.89 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  301 , F = 0.84 / 





RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  533 , F = 0.09 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  541 , F = 0.09 / 
RAMP ID = 'PEST1', T =  541 , F = 0.00 / 
 
Styrene butadiene (Choose only one depending on tested exposure heat flux simulated) 
============================================================== 
HRRPUA curve for test at 25 kw/m2 exposure heat flux 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
&SURF ID           = '25STYRENE_BUTADIENE'     
      RGB       = 0.5,0.5,0.5     
      C_DELTA_RHO = 8.363     
      TMPIGN      = 419.     
      BACKING     = 'INSULATED'     
      HRRPUA      = 41.     
      RAMP_Q      = 'SB' /      
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0 , F = 0.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0 , F = 0.73 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  132 , F = 0.98 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  199 , F = 1.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  271 , F = 0.98 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  354 , F = 0.85 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  444 , F = 0.63 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  463 , F = 0.63 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  530 , F = 0.56 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  530 , F = 0.00 / 
 
HRRPUA curve for test at 35 kw/m2 exposure heat flux 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
&SURF ID           = '35STYRENE_BUTADIENE'     
      RGB       = 0.5,0.5,0.5     
      C_DELTA_RHO = 8.363     
      TMPIGN      = 419.     
      BACKING     = 'INSULATED'     
      HRRPUA      = 78.5     
      RAMP_Q      = 'SB' /      
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0 , F = 0.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0 , F = 0.38 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  9 , F = 0.42 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  64 , F = 0.65 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  96 , F = 0.64 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  124 , F = 0.61 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  220 , F = 0.52 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  275 , F = 0.54 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  395 , F = 0.68 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  451 , F = 0.74 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  557 , F = 1.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  575 , F = 0.96 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  628 , F = 0.78 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  669 , F = 0.66 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  786 , F = 0.25 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  852 , F = 0.20 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  852 , F = 0.00 / 
 
HRRPUA curve for test at 50 kw/m2 exposure heat flux 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
&SURF ID           = '50STYRENE_BUTADIENE'     
      RGB       = 0.5,0.5,0.5     
      C_DELTA_RHO = 8.363     
      TMPIGN      = 419.     





      HRRPUA      = 75.     
      RAMP_Q      = 'SB' /      
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0 , F = 0.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0 , F = 0.40 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  5 , F = 0.53 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  40 , F = 0.93 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  57 , F = 0.96 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  241 , F = 0.65 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  289 , F = 0.68 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  365 , F = 0.84 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  466 , F = 1.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  511 , F = 0.95 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  692 , F = 0.33 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  839 , F = 0.15 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  839 , F = 0.00 / 
 
HRRPUA curve for test at 65 kw/m2 exposure heat flux 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
&SURF ID           = '65STYRENE_BUTADIENE'     
      RGB       = 0.5,0.5,0.5     
      C_DELTA_RHO = 8.363     
      TMPIGN      = 419.     
      BACKING     = 'INSULATED'     
      HRRPUA      = 97.     
      RAMP_Q      = 'SB' /      
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0 , F = 0.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  0 , F = 0.31 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  16 , F = 0.73 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  36 , F = 0.94 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  43 , F = 0.96 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  129 , F = 0.77 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  200 , F = 0.66 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  224 , F = 0.64 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  262 , F = 0.67 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  309 , F = 0.80 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  369 , F = 1.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  392 , F = 1.00 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  412 , F = 0.95 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  540 , F = 0.35 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  589 , F = 0.26 / 
&RAMP ID = 'SB', T =  647 , F = 0.18 / 
 
Specify the sides of the computational domain as open vent 
........................................................……………………………. 
&VENT CB='XBAR0',SURF_ID='OPEN' / 
&VENT CB='XBAR' ,SURF_ID='OPEN' / 
&VENT CB='YBAR0',SURF_ID='OPEN' / 
&VENT CB='YBAR' ,SURF_ID='OPEN' / 
&VENT CB='ZBAR0',SURF_ID='OPEN' / 
&VENT CB='ZBAR' ,SURF_ID='OPEN' / 
 
Specify the temperature of the outer surface of the conical heater  
.......................................................…………………………………… 








Specify the temperature of the inner surface of the conical heater (Choose only 
one depending on the exposure heat flux simulated) 
...............................................................………………………………………………. 
SURF ID='CONE', TMPWAL = 883./ 65kWm^-2 heat flux 
SURF ID='CONE', TMPWAL = 808./ 50kWm^-2 heat flux 
SURF ID='CONE', TMPWAL = 712./ 35kWm^-2 heat flux 
&SURF ID='CONE', TMPWAL = 633./ 25kWm^-2 heat flux 
 
Specimen and calcium silicate block geometry (Choose only one depending on 
material simulated) 
...................................………………………………………………………………… 
For FRP polyester 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&OBST XB=-.050,0.050,-.050,0.000,-0.029,-
0.025,SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','FRP_POLYESTER' /   
&OBST XB=-.050,0.050,-.050,0.050,-0.049,-0.029,SURF_ID='BLOCK' /  
 
For styrene butadiene 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
&OBST XB=-.050,0.050,-.050,0.000,-0.028,-
0.025,SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','STYRENE_BUTADIENE' /   
&OBST XB=-.050,0.050,-.050,0.050,-0.048,-0.028,SURF_ID='BLOCK' / 
 
Conical heater geometry 
................……………....... 
&OBST XB=-.0140,-.0120,-.0920,-.0900,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0120,-.0100,-.0920,-.0900,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0100,-.0080,-.0920,-.0900,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
    . 
    . 
    .  
    . 
                                                          . 
&OBST XB=-.0160,-.0140,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0140,-.0120,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0120,-.0100,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=-.0120,-.0100,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0120,-.0100,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0100,-.0080,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=-.0100,-.0080,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0100,-.0080,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0080,-.0060,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=-.0080,-.0060,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0080,-.0060,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0060,-.0040,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=-.0060,-.0040,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0060,-.0040,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0040,-.0020,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=-.0040,-.0020,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0040,-.0020,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0020,0.0000,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=-.0020,0.0000,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=-.0020,0.0000,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0000,0.0020,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=0.0000,0.0020,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0000,0.0020,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 





&OBST XB=0.0020,0.0040,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0020,0.0040,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0040,0.0060,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=0.0040,0.0060,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0040,0.0060,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0060,0.0080,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=0.0060,0.0080,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0060,0.0080,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0080,0.0100,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=0.0080,0.0100,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0080,0.0100,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0100,0.0120,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='CONE' / 
&OBST XB=0.0100,0.0120,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0225, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0100,0.0120,-.0820,-.0800,0.0125,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0120,0.0140,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0140,0.0160,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0281, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0160,0.0180,-.0820,-.0800,0.0008,0.0242, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    . 
                                                          . 
&OBST XB=0.0080,0.0100,0.0900,0.0920,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0100,0.0120,0.0900,0.0920,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
&OBST XB=0.0120,0.0140,0.0900,0.0920,0.0008,0.0125, SURF_ID='SHIELD' / 
 
Output from FDS 
...........………….... 
&PL3D DTSAM=10000. /  
 
&THCP XYZ=0.00,0.00,-.025,IOR= 3,QUANTITY='GAUGE_HEAT_FLUX',LABEL='Surface Heat 
Flux' / 
 
&SLCF PBY=0.00,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / 
&SLCF PBY=0.00,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / 
&SLCF PBY=0.00,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / 
 
&BNDF QUANTITY='GAUGE_HEAT_FLUX' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL_TEMPERATURE' / 
&BNDF QUANTITY='BURNING_RATE' / 
 
Note: It will require two hundred over pages to include all the input data for the conical 
heater geometry. Therefore only portion of it can be shown in this Appendix for practical 
reason.   
 
